The Labour left. by Seyd, Patrick
THE LABOUR LEFT 
PATRICK SEYD
Ph. D.
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS
SUBMITTED JUNE 1986
THE LABOUR LEFT
PATRICK SEYD
SUMMARY
Throughout its lifetime the Labour Party has
experienced ideological divisions resulting in the
formation of Left and Right factions. The Labour Left has
been the more prominent and persistent of the	 two
factions, intent on defending the Party's socialist
principles against the more pragmatic leanings of the
Party leadership. During the 1930s and 1950s the Labour
Left played a significant, yet increasingly reactive, role
within the Party. In the 1970s, however, the Labour Left
launched	 an offensive with a wide-ranging political
programme, a set of proposals 	 for	 an	 intra-Party
transferral	 of	 power, and a political leader with
exceptional skills. By 1981 this offensive had succeeded
in securing the election of a Party Leader whose whole
career had been very closely identified with the Labour
Left, in achieving a significant shift of power from the
parliamentarians to the constituency activists, and in
developing a Party programme which incorporated certain
major left-wing policies. Success, however, contained the
seeds of decline. A split in the parliamentary Party and
continual bitter intra-Party factional divisions played a
major part in the Party's disastrous electoral performance
in the 1983 General Election. The election result gave
additional impetus to the Labour Left's fragmentation to
the point that it is no longer the cohesive faction it was
in previous periods and is now a collection of disparate
groups.
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"What a mysterious thing 'the Left' is."
Richard Crossman commenting in his diary in
1951
"The Labour Party is a very broad party,
reflecting a wide variety of opinions from Left
to Right. This diversity of view is a great
source of strength and we must vigorously resist
any attempt that is made to drive the Left or
the Right out of the party."
Tony Benn, speaking in Birmingham at the
May Day rally, 1979
"This Conference deplores the growth of
factional groups inside the Party, whether of
the right or left or centre. Whilst recognising
that, in a broadly based Party, it is natural
for members holding similar opinions on
controversial questions to co-operate to press
their views, it believes that the establishment
of such groups on a permanent basis leads to
intolerance and intrigue, and to the formation
of what are in effect parties within the Party,
and that they constitute a threat to the Party's
unity and effectiveness as a fighting force."
Resolution submitted by Bristol South CLP
to the 1981 Labour Party conference
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INTRODUCTION
Delegates to the Labour Party's annual
conference, meeting in Blackpool in October 1980, decided
that the Party should adopt a wide range of commitments
including an alternative economic programme, a withdrawal
from the European Economic Community, a unilateral policy
of nuclear disarmament, and an abolition of both private
education and private medicine. They also decided to
introduce an electoral college to choose the Party's
Leader and Deputy Leader and to reaffirm a previous
commitment to introduce the	 practice	 of mandatory
reselection of all Labour MPs. These conference decisions
were the culmination of a long campaign by the Labour Left
to change the character of the Party. Further confirmation
of the extent to which the Party had changed came in
November 1980 when Michael Foot, a long-standing member of
the Labour Left, was elected by the Parliamentary Labour
Party as its new leader. Both Party Leader and policies
were now closely identified with the Left. Never before in
the Party's history had the Labour Left been so powerful.
The forward march of the Labour Left is the
subject of this thesis. First, to explain its rise to such
a prominent position within the Party. Some Labour Left
critics claimed that the victories had been secured by
conspiracy and by irrational and forcible tactics
reminiscent of the pre-war German fascists. One object of
this thesis is to demonstrate how wide of the mark and how
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hysterical were these attacks. This thesis 	 suggests
various alternative reasons why the Labour Left came to
power.
The foundation for the rise of the Labour Left
was the collapse of post-war social democracy with its
commitment to a mixed economy, economic growth, full
employment, universal social services and free collective
bargaining. By the mid-1960s a weak economy, low economic
growth and an unstable currency led to challenges to the
political consensus. On both the Left and the Right of the
party spectrum there was a reaction to the 	 social
democratic consensus and the emergence of a more
fundamental politics believed to be more appropriate to
current political circumstances. Public expenditure cuts
and labour law reform by Labour governments and free
market economics by Conservative governments are specific
examples of the extent to which conventional politics had
collapsed.
Full employment and a steady growth in money
wages had been the background to industrial relations for
almost twenty years but by the end of the 1960s pressures
to curb increases in money wages resulted in the growth of
trade union militancy, firstly over wages but then in
defence of traditional legal immunities. A new generation
of trade union leaders emerged from this militancy more in
sympathy with the Labour Left than their predecessors. The
alliance between Party leaders and certain senior trade
unionists, first forged in the 1930s, which had placed the
Labour Left in so weak a position with the Party, no
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longer prevailed.
The political terrain had shifted and the Labour
Left responded to this by producing a cogent analysis of
the economy and restating the relevance of a traditional
form of socialism which emphasised the importance of
structural changes to the capitalist economy rather than a
more restricted notion of socialism which had prevailed in
the 1950s. Furthermore, as well as a relevant programme
the Labour Left also had powerful political leadership in
the person of Tony Benn, a most able political
communicator and senior Labour politician, who emerged to
weld together a wide range of groups and individuals into
a single, powerful left wing force within the Party.
A new political generation, both male and
female, entered the Labour Party in the 1970s/1980s. They
were primarily younger people with a higher education,
radicalised in the late-1960s, and likely to be public
service professionals. The Labour Left inspired and then
capitalised upon the recruitment of this new political
generation.
Finally, in explaining the rise of the Labour
Left, the emergence of a new local government left is
significant. The development of trade union militancy had
been a major source of support for the Labour Left in the
mid-1960s and early 1970s but by the mid-1980s the unions
were less of a radical force primarily due to large scale
unemployment, and parts of local government had replaced
them as a radical institutional base of support. Local
government could not provide the votes within the Labour
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Party as had the affiliated unions but it could provide a
source of ideas, outside the usual parliamentary-dominated
Party channels, could provide the opportunity to test out
in practice some of the ideas developed by the Labour
Left, and often in doing so acted as the sole
institutional focus of opposition to the Conservative
Government.
This thesis compares this 'new Labour Left' with
its predecessors of the 1930s and 1950s and notes its
distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Some of the
weaknesses have contributed to its fragmentation and
decline since 1981 which leads to the third object of the
thesis which is to explain the realignments now occurring
within the Labour Left. Terms have been used recently such
as 'hard' and 'soft' left, 'new' and 'traditional' left,
'vanguardist' and 'participatory' left. These terms need
examining in order to ascertain the significance and force
of today's Labour Left.
Before examining the contemporary Labour Left in
any detail it is necessary to place this faction within a
Party framework. Chapter One suggests reasons for the
existence of a Labour Left and the conditions within the
Party that facilitate its activities.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE LABOUR PARTY: PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND VALUE SYSTEM 
The Labour Party began life as an indirect
party, namely that its membership was composed solely of
affiliated bodies - primarily trade unions, socialist
societies, and trade councils; not until 1918 was the
direct element, namely the dues-paying individual,
formally incorporated into the Party constitution. Since
then Party membership has comprised	 both	 forms
affiliated and individual but during the past sixty seven
years the importance of indirect membership has declined,
except as a means of revenue-raising, as the Party
constitution has been amended to stipulate that
participants in the Party's formal decision-making process
should be individual, paid-up Party members.(1)
Individual Party membership is open to
applicants who are over the age of 15; who are British
subjects, citizens of Eire, or have resided in Britain for
more than one year; who, if eligible, belong to a TUC
affiliated or bona-fide trade union; who are not members
of political parties or organisations deemed ineligible
for affiliation to the Party; and who accept and conform
to the Party constitution, programme, principles and
policy.(2) This last stipulation might be seen to require
a rigid uniformity of opinion within the Party but, in
fact, the Party's purpose has been a constant source of
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intra-party debate.
The	 Party	 defines
	
its	 objects	 in	 its
constitution. The fourth clause is entitled "Party
Objects" which is sub-divided into seven sections of which
five deal with domestic issues and the remaining two
concentrate upon international matters. The first of the
Party's objects is stated as being to organise a Labour
Party inside and outside Parliament; the second, is to co-
operate with the TUC; the third is to put into effect the
principles agreed by the Party conference; and the fifth,
sixth and seventh are concerned to improve people's
standards of life in Britain, the Commonwealth and the
world, but it is the fourth section of this clause which
is most specific in defining the Party's objects. It
commits the Party to
...secure for the workers by hand or by brain
the full fruits of their industry and the most
equitable distribution thereof that may be
possible upon the basis of the common ownership
of the means of production, distribution, and
exchange, and the best obtainable system of
popular administration and control of 	 each
industry or service.(3)
Rather than settle any arguments over the Party's purpose
this clause has been a constant source of intra-party
dispute. Acceptance of Party constitution, programme,
principles, and policy does not therefore imply some
uniformity of opinion on the part of the individual
membership. An historian of the Labour Party, Kenneth
Morgan, has written
The history of the Labour Party is a story
throughout the century... of tension between a
gradualist, moderate parliamentary party and
leadership, and political constituency activists
-7-
and trade union rank and file militants usually
attempting to goad the party in a more
explicitly socialist direction.(4)
Not all parliamentarians have been gradualists and not all
Party and trade union activists have been militants.
Crosscurrents of opinion exist within all the Party's
institutions. Nevertheless Morgan's thesis that a tension
has existed continuously within the Party between
gradualist and militant is accurate.
Divisions of Purpose 
During the Party's first eighteen years
existence its programmatic commitment was limited to
resolutions passed at annual Party conferences of which
the most important was the one to establish
a distinct Labour Group in Parliament, who shall
have their own Whips, and agree upon their
policy, which must embrace a readiness to co-
operate with any party which for the time being
may be engaged in promoting legislation in the
direct interest of Labour, and be equally ready
to associate themselves with any party	 in
opposing	 measures	 having
	
an	 opposite
tendency.. .(5)
In this period the Labour Party existed as a force to
represent working class opinion in the House of Commons.
Attempts in those early years by the Social Democratic
Federation and the Independent Labour Party to inject a
socialist commitment into the Labour Party's objectives
and to secure commitments to a recognition of the class
war or to public ownership of the means of production were
defeated leaving many socialists disillusioned and
disappointed. Immediately before the First World War a
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good deal of dissatisfaction was expressed in the party
about the performance of the Parliamentary Labour Party
(hereafter PLP). Many felt that the PLP was too closely
tied to the Liberal Party(6) and with the growth from 1910
onwards of working class militancy, resulting in major
industrial disputes in the mines, docks and railways,
syndicalism emerged as a serious challenge to this newly-
established alliance of trade unions and a parliamentary
Labour Party. No consensus existed within the Labour Party
as to its function or its future.
It was the First World War which rescued the
Labour Party by providing an impetus from which emerged a
constitutional commitment to socialism and a greater
degree of consensus over the Party's function and future.
The reasons why the Labour Party emerged in 1918 with a
new constitutional commitment and a new political
programme are varied. The fact that the national war
effort necessitated state 	 intervention	 and	 control
provided a considerable boost to socialist ideas of
planning. Divisions within the Liberal Party and the rapid
growth in trade union membership were both factors which
encouraged Labour's leaders to draw up a distinctive
political programme. Perhaps the major impact of war, and
then of the Russian revolution, was in stimulating a class
consciousness which Labour's leaders responded to,
particularly in the 'War Bhmergency: Workers National
Committee' .(7) Common ownership of the means of production
had its origins in the 'conscription of riches' slogan
adopted by this Committee. A socialist commitment in the
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revised Party constitution and a new and comprehensive
political programme, Labour and the New Social Order,
which was distinctly anti-capitalist in tone and set out
four key policy objectives,(8) transformed the Labour
Party. Nevertheless it is incorrect to describe the Labour
Party as united in purpose after 1918.(9)
The 1918 constitutional commitment did not
settle the argument as to the meaning of socialism, rather
it was a "rallying point around which the adherents of
different ideologies and the representatives of different
interests assembled".(10) The adoption of Clause 4 meant
that "an objective had been proclaimed which both
accommodated and concealed a large diversity of particular
concerns".(11) Divisions existed within the Party over the
meaning of socialism and the basic purpose of the Party,
apart from its commitment to winning seats in the House of
Commons, remained in dispute. Division is clearly apparent
at the Party conference convened in January 1918 to
discuss the Party's new programme.
The very first resolution at this conference
deplored the "anarchic individualism and profiteering of
the competitive capitalism of pre-war time" and called for
"a new social order based... on the deliberately planned
co-operation in production and distribution".(12) However,
there was nothing in the resolution about ownership and a
delegate from the British Socialist Party moved an
amendment deleting the section on planned co-operation and
substituting "the Social Democratic ownership and control
of industry in order to secure that the machinery of
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production and distribution is utilised for the welfare of
all".(13) In moving the amendment the BSP delegate opined
that co-operation between capital and labour was the wrong
course and that control of industry would never be
achieved whilst the ownership remained in private hands.
Sidney Webb's retort to this on behalf of the National
Executive Committee (hereafter NEC) was to state that
whilst the Party's constitution laid down the commitment
to the common ownership of the means of production "they
did not want repeatedly, over and over again, to ring the
changes on the old shibboleths"(14) - a rather strange
response considering that this was the first resolution,
grandly titled, 'The Task of Social Reconstruction', at a
conference held to approve a new programme. Nevertheless
the BSP amendment was defeated.
Again conflict emerges in the debate on the
second resolution for discussion, entitled 'The Need for
Increased Production', which condemned capitalism for its
inefficiency and argued that increased production was
vital for social reconstruction. This increased production
would be secured by "the elimination of every kind of
efficiency and waste...".(15) Ramsay MacDonald's speech in
moving this resolution reflects the prevailing ideas of
the Party leadership at this time - a commitment to
eliminate inefficiency combined	 with	 a	 sentimental
rhetoric concerning a transformation in society.(16)
Against Ramsay MacDonald's opposition, the Northampton
Labour Representation Committee succeeded in inserting
into the resolution an amendment that "the socialisation
of industry" was necessary to secure the elimination of
waste.(17) What emerges from the debates on these two
resolutions is the tension between those who regarded the
Party's purpose as being to transform the relationship
between capital and labour and those who viewed it as
being to improve the efficiency of the British economy. It
is this tension which provides a major source of the
Left/Right divisions within the Party.
Divisions within the Labour Party over the
meaning and purpose of its socialist commitment have
extended beyond economic affairs, however, and into
foreign affairs. Certainly Party unanimity was greater in
foreign affairs than in economic affairs in the inter-war
years. The belief in a socialist foreign policy based upon
anti-capitalist presumptions was firmly held at all Party
levels. The four key principles of this socialist foreign
policy were internationalism, class solidarity, peace and
antipathy to power politics. Nevertheless in the 1930's
arguments within the Party over the realism of these
principles emerged and were fought out over such issues as
non-intervention in Spain, collective security and
rearmament. However, it was after 1945 that divisions over
foreign policy became a major item of Party affairs.
Tension developed between those believing in the
possibilities of transforming international relations by
maintaining principled commitments and those observing the
nature of contemporary world politics and concluding that
a strategy of 'realpolitik' was necessary. Tension was
exacerbated by the Cold War: some in the Party were
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unwilling to become too closely identified with the USA
whilst others regarded this country as the defender of
liberal democracy from authoritarian communism.
These divisions over the nature of a socialist
foreign	 policy have complemented the divisions over
domestic policy. Labour Left and Labour Right tended to
adopt coherent lines of thought which straddled both the
domestic and foreign fields and which brought both
factions into consistent opposition.
Factionalism in the Labour Party
Party members share a variety of values, beliefs
and attitudes held together by an overall mobilising
vision of 'the good society'. The party is a coalition of
individuals with a very wide range of beliefs. Some of
these individual members will be organised into functional
or attitudinal groupings which reflect their particular
interests. For example, groupings exist to represent such
functional interests as law, teaching, medicine and social
work.(18) Party members also organise into alliances to
mobilise support on specific issues; two recent examples
of alliance formation occurred over the issue of British
membership of the European Economic Community and the
issue of devolution of powers to assemblies in Scotland
and Wales.(19) There is also a third type of grouping, the
faction. The faction exists over a longer period of time
than the alliance and is concerned with more than one
issue; it also straddles the opinions of the specific
functional interests within the Party. The faction is an
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intra-party group with clearly recognisable political
views, which exists over a certain length of time, which
has a modicum of organisation, and which attempts to
maximise its influence within the Party.
Factionalism has been of only limited importance
in the history of the Conservative Party. Factions in that
Party have not been entirely absent, but limited emphasis
upon ideology, lack of interest among Party members over
policy discussions, and a structure restricting the role
of the Party member in policy-making have all curbed its
incidence. It is only in the nineteen seventies that
factionalism became a crucial feature of Conservative
politics as a specific group emerged and eventually
dominated both the Cabinet and the Party organisation.(20)
In contrast factionalism has been a permanent feature of
Labour's politics. Both Labour Left and Right emerge as
distinct factions during the Party's lifetime.
The Left/Right divide is a result of the lack of
agreement within the Party as to the meaning and nature of
socialism. The divisions of purpose within the Party in
the twentieth century have varied only in their intensity
and the factors which have affected this intensity include
the Party's overall parliamentary strength, the proximity
of a general election, the Party's electoral performance,
and whether the Party Leader is due for retirement.
The factional differences can be summarised as
being the contrast between the pursuit of transformation
or amelioration of society, between the visionary and
practical approach to politics, between an oppositional
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and governing mentality, between an emphasis upon class
and nation, between support for industrial militancy and
pursuit of industrial harmony. Some of these differences
are apparent when one examines statements from some of the
leading figures, past and present, from Labour Left and
Right. Aneurin Bevan writes of the "classic conflict"
between Left and Right and argues that the Left (or
"fundamentalists")
are people who believe that there are certain
principles that have held good and are likely to
hold good so long as British society is based in
the main on the institutions of private
ownership. They take the view that if the Labour
Party was to abandon its main thesis of public
ownership it would not differ in any important
respect from the Tory Party. The only conflict
would be about nuances, about semi-tones and
half-tints... If the Labour Party decided to
adjust its policy in accordance with these
ideas, it would be practically certain to wreck
itself. The Party has been nurtured in the
belief	 that	 its	 raison	 d'etre	 is	 a
transformation of society... The controversy is
between those who want the mainsprings of
economic power transferred to the community and
those who believe that private enterprise should
still remain supreme but that its worst
characteristics should be modified by liberal
ideas of justice and equality.(21)
Eric Heffer argues that
the Labour Party must completely reject the
concept of the mixed economy, which has been the
official view of the Party since the late 1950s.
It has been tried and it does not work. It does
not bring about a redistribution of wealth; nor
does it bring growth in the economy.(22)
Heffer's views begin from the premise that
because we live in a class society, based upon
private ownership, there is a fundamental
struggle between those who own and control
industry and those who do not. In other words,
the class struggle is a reality. If there were
no class struggle, there would be no strikes, no
'irregular' industrial action, no sit-ins, or
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work-ins. That struggle takes many forms;
sometimes it is quiescent, but at other times it
is violent in nature... Control of the state is
fundamental in the political struggle. Those who
control the state determine the future
development of the economy, of law, of public
ownership, and of just about everything else...
The myth has grown that in our society the state
is neutral. It is not, and never has been.
Therefore its apparatus must be democratised and
made more responsive to the
	 needs	 of	 a
democratic society. The theory has also
developed that the Labour Party too should be
neutral in relation to the class struggle once
it obtains office, or even before.., there
cannot be neutrality in the class struggle.
Either one is for the workers in their struggle
or against them. That is why I am convinced the
Labour Party should state clearly that it is not
neutral. As far as the workers are concerned, we
must forthrightly stand on the side of the trade
unions in their fight for better wages and
conditions. (23)
The permanence of class struggle, the need to support
workers in their battles with capital, and the need to
control the capitalist state are common themes on the
Labour Left. None of these appear in Tony Crosland's
defence of socialism. In answer to the question why be a
socialist, Crosland suggests three answers.
First of all the rising material standards and
apparent contentment, the areas of avoidable
social distress and physical squalor.., are
still on a scale which narrowly restricts the
freedom of choice and movement of large numbers
of individuals. Secondly... we retain a
disturbing amount, compared with some other
countries,	 of	 social antagonism and class
resentment, visible both
	 in	 politics	 and
industry, and making society less peaceful and
contented than it might be.
	 Thirdly,
	 the
distribution of rewards and privileges still
appears	 highly	 inequitable,
	 being	 poorly
correlated with the distribution of merit,
virtue, ability or brains; and, in particular,
opportunities for gaining the top awards are
still excessively unequal. This significant
residue of distress, resentment and injustice
affords a prima facie justification for further
social change - as I think, and shall argue, in
a socialist direction. It may not justify the
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same saeva indignatio as mass unemployment and
distressed areas before the war - rather a
purposeful, constructive, and discriminating
determination to improve an already improved
society. However, the belief that further change
will appreciably increase personal freedom,
social contentment and justice, constitutes the
ethical basis for being a socialist.(24)
Crosland perceives the prosperity of the mixed economy
whilst Heffer witnesses a continuous class struggle.
Crosland is concerned with the pockets of deprivation
whereas Heffer worries about the overall nature of the
state.
The late John Mackintosh captures the essence of
Labour Right opinion. He argues that it is
reformist in outlook; it accepts the existing
economic system but wants many ameliorations. It
considers that the conduct of large firms has to
be watched over, some may need curbing and
others require aid, while in certain cases
public ownership may be appropriate, but all
this does not add up to any concept that an
alternative economic system is possible or
desirable .(25)
The differences between Left and Right are about
more than particular policies. What transcends even the
policy differences is a culture, a way of life, an
approach to politics. A person on the Left of the Party is
by inclination an 'outsider'. The Left does not link
easily with parts of the political establishment such as
the senior civil service, controllers of the media, and
representatives of industrial or financial capital, whilst
the Right is more at ease with and more likely to be in
the company of such people. The language and behaviour of
the two factions reflects this 'outsider/insider'
dichotomy. The use of the term 'comrade' has been much
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more an accepted part of the language of the Left
reflecting its commitment to a revolutionary working class
tradition of collective action, and the singing of the Red
Flag is an important symbol of this tradition. No Labour
Solidarity meeting - the current Labour Right group -
would end with this international hymn of revolution.
Today these distinctive traditions remain
important. There is a great deal of policy agreement
between Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley. Nevertheless,
even though both emphasised their unity after their
election as Party Leader and Deputy Leader in October 1983
both would continue to operate within distinct political
spheres with a distinct language and symbolism. For
example, just as Kinnock would neither be invited to nor
attend a Labour Solidarity rally so Hattersley would
neither be invited to nor attend a Tribune rally.
It would be incorrect to assert that the
respective factions have maintained rigidly consistent
opinions over a long period of time. Shifts of opinion and
differences of opinion occur within the respective
factions, but nevertheless in the Party's past, and still
so in the present, it is possible to predict the response
of many individual Party members to particular issues on
the basis of their factional position.
There are authors who claim that the terms Left
and Right are of limited value in the study of politics.
David Butler and Donald Stokes argue, in a comprehensive
study of British electoral behaviour, that the terms have
no significance for the British mass public.(26) Samuel
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Brittan argues that the terms have no value in political
analysis or discussion and he states that the specific
term Labour Left is "an anachronism associating under one
umbrella a whole variety of ideas.., which do not belong
together".(27) David Lipsey argues that to categorise the
divisions in the Labour Party as being between Labour's
Left and Right is to create a "bogus dichotomy". He states
that the variations within the categories are
considerable, that the trade unions cannot be classified
in such terms on many of the day-to-day issues that
confront their leaders, and that these two categories
exclude the non-aligned from consideration.(28)
The difficulties in defining these terms Labour
Left and Right are acknowledged but nevertheless as
distinctive ideological perspectives or sets of attitudes
to which individual members of the Labour Party often
adhere, they are useful, since they correspond to the
reality of political conflict in which many persons on a
wide range of issues will coalesce continually together
and divide from others.(29)
One example of Party members coalescing into
distinctive Left and Right factions is revealed in the
voting behaviour of the twenty nine members of the
National Executive Committee.
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Table 1 NEC Recorded Votes (30)
Year	 Number of votes
1982/1983
	
52
1983/1984	 14
1984/1985
	 37
By ascribing a score of +1, -1 and 0 to NEC members' votes
For, Against, and Abstention (or absence) it is possible
to use simple correlation analysis to ascertain whether
any voting patterns prevail. By isolating the correlation
scores of .95 and above two distinct groupings are
identified within the 1982/1983 NEC. One group has a
membership of Tony Benn, Laurence Coates, Jo Richardson,
Dennis Skinner and Audrey Wise and the other includes Ken
Cure, Anne Davis, Gwyneth Dunwoody, John Golding, Denis
Healey, Neville Hough, Dennis Howell, Shirley Summerskill,
Russell Tuck and Eric Varley. Fifteen NEC members (52% of
the total membership) divide into these two factions, with
ten in one and five in the other. Our correlation matrix
reveals how cohesive are both factions: for example, Tony
Benn, Jo Richardson and Audrey Wise voted together on
every occasion during that year and Dennis Howell voted
against them on every occasion.
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix: NEC Votes(1982/1983) 
(the full correlation matrix is contained in
Senn
Coates
Cure
Davis
Dunwoody
Golding
Healey
Hough
Howell
Richardson
Skinner
Summerskill
Tuck
wise
Varley
Benn
- 99
-.95
-.95
-.94
-.96
-1.0
1.0
• 96
-%
10
Appendix 1)
Coates
	 Cure	 Davis	 Dunwoody
- 99	
-.95
-.95
95
.95	 .96
.95
	 .96
.99	 .99
-.99
	 -.95
-1.0
.95	 .96
M	 M	 M
-.99
1.0
Golding
-.96
95
.96
.98
1.0
.96
-.96
-.96
1.0
-.96
M
Healey
.96
.98
.98
Slough
-.96
.95
1.0
.96
.96
-.96
-.96
1.0
-.96
M
Howell
-1.0
.99
.95
.96
96
-1.0
.96
M
-1.0
Richardson
-.99
-.95
-.96
-.96
-1.0
-.96
-.96
1.0
Skinner
-1.0
-.96
.	 -.96
-.96
-.96
-1.0
Sumeerskill
-.96
.95
.96
.
1.0
.98
1.0
.96
-.96
-.96
,%
M
Tuck
-.96
.96
.95
.96
-.96
-.96
-.96
M
Wise
1.0
-.95
-.96
-1.0
,%
,%
Verify
1.0
.96
.96
-1.0
M
M
The number of NEC recorded votes in 1983/1984 is
insufficient to carry out a correlation analysis but the
198+11985 votes allow further analysis. Again by
extracting the correlation coefficients of .95 and above
it is possible to distinguish two distinct factions, one
whose membership includes Tony Benn, Joan Maynard, Jo
Richardson, Dennis Skinner and Audrey Wise, and the other
whose members are Betty Boothroyd, Gwyneth Dunwoody, Alan
Hadden, Roy Hattersley, Neville Hough and Neil Kinnock. In
comparison with the 1982/1983 NEC the voting patterns
reveal that factional membership has diminished: only
eleven NEC members (38% of the total) can be placed in
such tightly-knit groups. The second point of comparison
is highlighted by Neil Kinnock's identification with the
right-wing members of the NEC. This graphically reveals
the process of Labour Left fragmentation which occurs
during the 1980s and which is discussed in Chapter nine.
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The alliance of .Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley as Party
Leader and Deputy Leader respectively is reflected in
their voting together in thirty two of the thirty seven
recorded votes. Kinnock' s voting behaviour . reveals the
fluidity of factionalism over time : nevertheless the data
still reveals the existence of distinct factions within
the NEC in 198 0r/1985. For example, our correlation matrix
reveals that Gwyneth Dun wo ody and Roy Ha ttersle y voted
tog ether on every occasion and were opposed on every 
occasion by Dennis Skinner.
Table 3 Correlation Matrix : NEC Votes (198)4/1985) 
( the full correlation matrix is contained in
Appendix 2)
Henn
Boothroyd
Dunwoody
Hattersley
Hough
Maynard
Richardson
Skinner
Wise
Hidden
Kinnock
Benn
.98
Boothroyd
1.0
1.0
.98
-1.0
.98
.97
Dunwoody
1.0
1.0
.98
-1.0
.98
.97
Hattersley	 Hough
1.0
	
.98
1.0	 .98
.98
.911
-1.0	 -.98
.98
	
.96
.97
	
.95
Maynard
.98
Richardson
.97
Skinner
-1.0
-1.0
-1.0
-.98
-.98
-.97
Wise
.97
Madden
.98
.98
.98
.96
-.98
.95
Kinnock
.97
.97
.97
.95
-.97
.95
It is true that the Left and Right factions will
be divided  amongst themselves on particular issues and
this thesis will refer specifically to these divisions in
the Labour Left but it will be argued that at times there
is a common bond of ideas and sentiment uniting a faction
and dividing  it from another.
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It is also accepted that the trade unions reveal
broad agreement on certain issues which straddle any
Left/Right conflict but the trade unions still tend to
divide into Left/Right categories in Party debates. For
example, the 'praetorian guard' of the 1940s/1950s which
sustained the Labour leadership consisted of the right
wing General and Municipal Workers' Union, the Transport
and General Workers' Union and the National Union of
Mineworkers whereas the Left advance of the 1970s was
dependent upon the support of the Transport and General
Workers' Union and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers. In the late 1970s it was the leaders of such
unions as the Association of Professional, Executive,
Clerical and Computer Staff, the Electrical, Electronic,
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union and the Union of Post
Office Workers who were meeting in order to try and re-
establish the strength of the Right within the Labour
Party whilst on the other hand the National Union of
Public Employees emerged as a key union on the Left.
Finally Lipsey's point that a considerable
number of pragmatists exist within the Labour Party
committed to neither of these factions is correct. At
every level of the Party, from branch to PLP there are
those who associate with neither Left nor Right but regard
themselves	 as belonging to 'the non-aligned centre'
deciding each issue on its merits rather than on
ideological commitment. For example, a recent survey of
Labour Party members in a northern Labour constituency
reveals that 33% identified themselves as being part of
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the centre and 25% of them regard the terms Left/Right as
being irrelevant: only 38% associated themselves with
either Left or Right.(31) It is clear that not every
single member of the Labour Party divides on Left/Right
lines on every single issue but on certain well-defined
issues Left/Right differences are apparent and often both
factions will be attempting to mobilise support amongst
these non-aligned in pursuit of their objectives.
Lipsey dislikes factionalism within the Labour
Party because he believes it curbs creative thinking by
making people prisoners of political slogans. There is
evidence to show that at times this criticism is apt. For
example, since 1979, the unwillingness of the Labour Left
to examine and debate the planning of incomes, or the
Labour Right to consider detailed proposals for
controlling the economy as contained in the alternative
economic strategy were the result of factional
intransigence. Nevertheless the terms Left and Right are
not creations of sloppy journalism but have a distinct
reality to the events and persons that make up the Labour
Party and are important in understanding the distribution
of power within the Labour Party.
Factionalism has been engendered by ideological
differences but it has also been facilitated by two
factors: first, the Party structure and organisation; and,
second, the Party value system.
Party Structure 
The Party structure affords the opportunity for
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factions to pursue their points of view at various levels.
First, the 'indirect' nature of the Party enables factions
to extend any debate beyond one, single Party channel into
the forums of the affiliated bodies such as the trade
unions, the Co-operative societies, and the socialist
societies. Decisions taken within these affiliated bodies,
especially within the trade unions with their considerable
voting strength at the Party conference, can have far-
reaching consequences within
	 the Labour Party.	 Second,
within	 the 'direct' section	 of the Party, namely the
individual membership organised into CLPs,	 there	 are
constituent elements - women and youth - which are given
separate representation at national, regional and local
levels and these provide alternative channels for the
expression of factional opinion. The women's section of
the Party has not, until recently, become a target for
factional pressure but the youth section has been a
constant point of factional pressure for organised groups
both within and outside the Party.(32) One of the factors
in the Party leadership's opposition to the proposal for a
separate section to be created for black Party members may
be its fear that such a section might be used for
factional advantage.
A feature of the Party's origins as an extra-
parliamentary and federal body has been the emphasis
placed upon the formality of voting. Election by members
of the PLP of the Party Leader, Deputy Leader, Chief Whip,
Chairman of the Parliamentary Party, the Parliamentary
Committee when in Opposition and the Liaison Committee
-25-
when in Office,(33) and of the NEC by affiliated bodies
separately or together, provides an obvious opportunity
for factional campaigning.
The contest between Aneurin Bevan and Hugh
Gaitskell for the Party Treasurer's post in 1954, the
election of Ian Mikardo as Chairman of the PLP in 1974 and
his subsequent replacement in the following election by
Cledwyn Hughes, and the electoral challenge to Michael
Cocks as Chief Whip in 1983 are just some of the more
well-publicised examples of factionalism emerging in
internal Party elections.
Apart from the structural dimension and the
emphasis upon voting both providing the opportunity for
factionalism to extend throughout the Party there is also
the fact, notably absent within the Conservative Party, of
the ambiguity and tension over the ultimate source of
authority within the Party which itself becomes part of
the factional argument. Before the Party adopted its
revised constitution in 1918 there had been a tension
between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Party
and this was not alleviated by the new constitutional
form. The new constitution declared that the work of the
Party would be "under the direction and control of the
Party Conference"(34) whilst the NEC would be "the
Administrative Authority of the Party".(35) No mention was
made in the constitution of the powers or responsibilities
of the PLP. The gap was filled in practice by the PLP
leadership taking the initiative in policy formulation and
implementation in conjunction with the NEC, and the NEC
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then adopting an influential role in the annual conference
supported by some of the major trade unions. However,
factional argument over the legitimacy of particular Party
institutions to determine policy has been a substantive
part of the intra- party debate. The ambiguity in the
Party's constitution over the source of authority has
enabled factions, if defeated in one forum, to fight in
another and to use this constitutional ambiguity to claim
a legitimacy for their activity. For much of the Party's
history the Labour Left has been in a minority within the
Party's leading institutions but when defeated in the PLP
and the NEC it has appealed to delegates at the annual
Party conference. The fact that a majority of trade union
leaders regularly cast their bloc votes in support of the
Parliamentary leadership in the 1930s and from 1945 until
the early 1960s meant that the Left suffered defeat but on
very rare occasions the Parliamentary leadership came
close to defeat(36) or made concessions prior to the
annual conference in order to meet Left arguments.(37)
During the 1960s the practice of PLP initiative sustained
by the NEC and supported by the annual conference broke
down and the Left was in a position to win votes at both
the NEC and the annual conference. However, the ambiguity
concerning the respective powers of the parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary parties has remained. Michael Foot,
for a large part of his political career a leading left-
wing rebel but more recently a senior figure of authority
in the Party notes that the Party constitution "contains
one extraordinary feature - the recognition of 	 two
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sovereign authorities" and argues that "many of the
internal rows of the Labour Party, in modern or ancient
times, have revolved around this anomalous, theoretically
impractical, constitutional arrangement" .(38)
This intra-party factional activity has been
further stimulated by Party values which applaud the
spirit of discussion and debate as central to democratic
socialism in contrast to monolithic Conservatism and
Communism.
Party Value System 
Perhaps the most explicit statements appealing
to this spirit of democratic socialism were those made in
1937 by participants involved in the debate as to the
future position of the Socialist League within the Party.
First, the NEC claimed that:
The Labour Party has never exercised an iron
discipline nor does it demand unthinking
loyalty. It encourages free discussion and it
has been tolerant in its fellowship. It seeks a
loyalty to its general principles based on
understanding and democratic comment.(39)
Then Harold Laski, in defending the Socialist League at
the 1937 Labour Party conference, made what is perhaps the
classic statement demanding tolerance of a minority
position and appealing to the spirit of democratic debate:
I would like to remind the Executive of this
Party that mechanical uniformity of opinion is
the supreme vice of the Communist Party of Great
Britain, and therefore I do not want to see it
introduced into the Labour Party of Great
Britain. Accordingly, I ask from this Conference
the right.., to take all the steps that are open
to me as a member of the Party to persuade my
fellow-members that majorities are not always in
the right and that truth may begin, even in this
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Party, in a minority of one. Accordingly... I
ask this Conference to insist to the National
Executive that it is interested in no sort of
heresy hunt, whether of the Left or of the
Right; that it is not interested in the question
of 'wings'; it is interested in the flight and
in the direction of the bird... There are all
kinds of questions within the ambit of our
policy upon which differences of opinion are not
merely legitimate, but are essential to the
progress of our ideals. I stand here to plead
for tolerance and for generosity. Out of
tolerance and generosity alone can there come
understanding; out of understanding only can
there come that firm adherence to the right and
to reason that will ultimately give us triumph.
The principles for which we stand may today be
the minority view; tomorrow they may be the view
of the majority. We ask for the right that has
always distinguished this Party, freely to make
our opinions known.(40)
The degree of anguish apparent in Laski's plea should
perhaps warn the student of Labour politics that tolerance
of intra-party activity has often differed in theory and
practice. The spirit of tolerance has been tempered by
another idea, that of the need for political unity in the
face of political enemies. In fighting the class enemy a
working class organisation's strength lies in its unity
and this can only be undermined by organised factional
activity. Two parliamentary rebels, Michael Foot and Dick
Crossman, have noted the hostility that exists within the
PLP to organised rebellion. Michael Foot, in his comments
on the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932, writes that
whilst isolated abstentions in the House of Commons are
tolerated on the grounds of individual conscience
nevertheless
the sin against the Holy Ghost of the Party
machine was the 'organised conscience', the
attempt of two or three or more gathered
together to make their conscientious scruples
effective in action.(41)
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Dick Crossman, as Leader of the House of Commons in 1966,
comments that conscience "must be individual, not
collective, nor organised".(42)
In order to ensure that organised factionalism
was almost impossible to sustain Herbert Morrison, on
behalf of the NEC, moved an amendment to the Party
constitution in 1946 which stipulated that
Political organisations... having their own
Programme, Principles and Policy for distinctive
and separate propaganda, or possessing Branches
in the Constituencies.., shall be ineligible for
affiliation to the Party.(43)
Since, as was pointed out at the very beginning of this
chapter, individual membership of the Party is not
possible for anyone belonging to an organisation deemed
ineligible for Party affiliation, this constitutional
amendment provided the Party leadership with the means to
control the extent of organised factionalism within the
Party. It was by invoking this constitutional provision
that Victory for Socialism's activities were curbed by the
NEC in 1956 and that five senior figures in the Militant
Group were expelled from the Party in 1983.
Such hostility to organised factionalism has
placed the Labour Left in a considerable dilemma as one of
its leading figures for over forty years, Ian Mikardo, has
commented:
If they (ie members of the Labour Left) get
together and organise they are condemned as
sectarian and as a threat to the solidarity of
the Movement, and are thereby crushed, and if
they remain informal and unorganised they are
out-manoeuvred and picked off one at a time.(44)
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'Unity is Strength' has been a strong trade union
principle and has been invoked by trade union leaders to
curb intra-party activity in the 1930s and 1950s. The
tolerance shown by the Party leadership towards the Left
has been limited. Its members have often been cast as
'splitters', undermining the Party's electoral appeal, and
therefore they have been expelled, proscribed,
disaffiliated, or generally harassed. Only in the 1960s
did a more tolerant attitude towards factionalism begin to
emerge. This new attitude was reflected in	 a	 NEC
resolution passed in 1976 which stated
In the last decade the Labour Party has
thankfully reached new heights of tolerance and
understanding of differences within its own
ranks. The threat of discipline and expulsion
has never won one political argument and never
will. In the present circumstances we reiterate
the idea that the principle of tolerance must be
one	 of	 the	 basic concepts of democratic
socialism .(115)
This greater tolerance was extended to group
activity in the Party. In the 1950s it would have been the
case that Independent Labour Publications, the Labour Co-
ordinating Committee, and the Campaign for Labour Party
Democracy - three active and well organised groups on the
Labour Left today - would have been deemed to be groups
contravening the Party constitution but in the 1970s the
Party constitution was applied less rigidly and these
groups were tolerated. By 1983 a register of non-
affiliated groups had been established, albeit as a
specific response to the organised Militant Group activity
within the Party which eventually led to the expulsion of
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some of its leading members, but nevertheless this gave
group activity some constitutional legitimacy for the
first time since 1946. The Labour Party however still does
not provide the formal legitimacy for factions in the
decision making process that is provided in some other
socialist parties - a point to which I shall return in the
conclusion to this thesis.
This chapter has provided the overall context
within which Left and Right factionalism operates within
the Party. Chapter Two provides greater details on the
nature of Labour Left ideology, organisation and personnel
between 1918 and 1970 in order that comparisons can be
drawn, where appropriate, with the contemporary Labour
Left in later chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LABOUR LEFT 1918-1970 
Ambiguity of purpose has been a permanent
feature of the Labour Party. Ideological arguments have
therefore been common and these have provided the basis
for the emergence of the Labour Left as the most
consistently distinctive faction in the Party. Advocating
and defending its idea of socialism in domestic and
foreign affairs against the Party's social reformists,
gradualists and pragmatists has been a continuous task of
the Labour Left. There is no single body of ideas which
can be ascribed to this Labour Left. Divisions of opinion
and disputes over strategy have prevailed (and still do
so) and to this extent it would be incorrect to write of
the	 Labour
	 Left	 as	 a party within the Party'.
Nevertheless there has been enough common ground to bind
members of the Labour Left together, giving them a sense
of community and of solidarity in which they recognise
their friends and allies and are aware of what divides
them from their political opponents both in and out of the
Labour Party.
If we examine leading figures on the Labour Left
we see a range of influences including pacifism,
libertarianism, christianity, marxism and collectivism
which have been important in the development of their left
wing political commitments. For example, three leading
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figures in the 1930s display a variety of such political
influences. Stafford Cripps' opinions were based upon a
Marxist economic determinism from which emerged his class
analysis of both national and international politics. What
appears in hindsight to be a rather crude version of
Marxism perhaps helps to explain his sudden shift to the
Left in 1931 and his subsequent movement away from the
Left in the 1940s.(1) Sir Charles Trevelyan, first a
Liberal then a member of the Labour Party, had political
beliefs based upon a commitment to internationalism and
pacifism.(2) G.D.H. Cole, an influential intellectual in
the labour movement and another prominent figure on the
Labour Left subscribed to the Marxian tradition in the
1930s although in later years he rejected this approach.
Cole's socialism was always eclectic and difficult to
categorise but his basic commitment to a revolutionary
conception of socialist ends originated in a radical
individualism opposed to all forms of totalitarianism.(3)
Another person active on the Left in the 1930s
and its leading figure in the 1950s, Aneurin Bevan, was
committed to a form of socialism which synthesised Marxism
and liberalism. His biographer writes that Bevan was "a
convinced Marxist but never a Communist" whose belief in
the class struggle as central to the political process
remained unshaken throughout his 1ife.(4) Fenner
Brockway's commitment to the Left spans almost all of the
twentieth century based upon a humanist, ethical belief in
the need for a transformation of society combined with an
attachment to libertarianism.(5)
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This libertarian sand is again apparent as a
major influence on Dick Crossman, a leading member of the
post-war Labour Left. His socialism is primarily an anti-
establishment sentiment. He records in his diary
...my radical passions have never been based on
a moral or egalitarian philosophy. It's been
really an expression of my bump of irreverence,
based on my conviction that governments and
establishments are fools and that participation
by the people will probably improve government
in this country.(6)
A similar variety of formative influences is
apparent when one examines the ideas, interests and
interpretations of prominent personnel of the contemporary
Labour Left. Two leading figures in the 1970s, Michael
Foot and Tony Benn, represent the radical, dissenting
tradition of British politics. Foot's inspirations are
primarily in eighteenth century English literature whilst
Benn's are in the Bible and seventeenth century English
history.(7) Neither of them are marxists yet both
recognise and respect the influence of Marxism on the
Labour Left. For example, Tony Benn states
I would not think it correct to call myself a
Marxist
yet he believes
It would be... unthinkable to try to construct
the Labour Party without Marx...
but he is
... consciously seeking to re-establish the
relevance and legitimacy of the moral teachings
of Jesus(8)
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Eric Heffer is another whose Christian commitment is an
important source of political inspiration but so also is
his Marxist upbringing as a member of the Communist Party
in his earlier years.(9) Another for whom Marx is a
formative influence based upon his experience in the 1960s
is Arthur Scargill. He states
There is a class conflict, we do live in a class
society - those who own and control the means of
production, distribution and exchange and those
who work by hand and by brain. There is no
middle class as is suggested by those academics
and intellectuals who would like to stratify
society. There are only two classes in the
strict political sense.(10)
Michael Meacher is one who today reflects the
traditional ethical strand within the Labour Left. His
commitment is to a socialist humanism in which values such
as co-operation and altruism would prevail in a market
socialist order where power would be decentralised and
production would be determined by social priorities.(11)
Stuart Holland's programme is in parts very similar to
Meacher's but he reflects more the technocratic element on
the Left committed to central planning of the economy.(12)
Finally, there are those on the Left more from a
pragmatic impulse arising from their experience in society
and because of the prevailing values of the particular
community in which they were brought up than from an
intellectual inspiration of one source or another. Neil
Kinnock is one who refers to this pragmatic impulse as an
important factor in his own political commitments.(13) So
also does Ken Livingstone who, in reply to a question on
whether any one particular book influenced him towards
socialism answered
No. It was all practical things. My workplace
involvement, helping my American friends, etc.
I've never been a theoretician.(14)
Ben Pimlott, in Labour and the Left in the 
1930s, refers to the "continuity in 	 the	 political
attitudes and causes of Labour's left-wing which no other
British Parliamentary group has matched".(15) James Jupp
also, in The Radical Left in Britain 1931-1941, comments
on the "basic continuity (of the Labour Left) throughout
the history of the organised Labour movement", and argues
that whilst the issues and personalities change over the
years its "essential concerns, objectives and tactics
remain remarkably similar."(16) It has been argued already
that the Labour Left has not been a single, homogenous
bloc of people who have agreed on everything; nor have
their attitudes been consistent over a period of fifty
years. Divisions of opinion have occurred amongst those
who have regarded themselves as on the left of the Party
and where agreement has existed at one moment of time
these people have sometimes changed their minds and
arrived at a different consensus of opinion at another
moment in time. Both the varieties of opinion and the
shifts of opinion need to be emphasised but nevertheless a
solid core of people in the Labour Party have coalesced
together to become the Labour Left sharing	 similar
sentiments, values and ideas.
The previous chapter has already referred to the
political differences which existed within the Labour
Party in 1918 and which the new Party constitution did
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nothing to diffuse. It was between the two world wars that
a distinct Labour Left gradually emerged, convinced that
unjust and inefficient capitalism should be transformed
rather than reformed and apprehensive that the Labour
leadership was moving away from the Party's constitutional
commitment, contained in Clause Four, section four, that
there should be a complete transformation of Britain's
economic relationships. For example, Left critics of the
Party's policy statement Labour and Nation (1928) were
worried that even though it contained proposals for the
public ownership of land, coal, power, transport and
industrial insurance the Party was concerned solely with
securing a rationalised capitalism.(17) Similar doubts
were expressed by Left critics in 1934 in discussions over
the Party's policy document For Socialism and Peace. The
document contained proposals for the drastic
reorganisation of a wide range of industries - banking and
credit, transport, electricity, water, iron and steel,
coal, gas, agriculture, textiles, shipping, ship-building
and engineering - which would require "for the most part
nothing short of immediate public ownership",(18) but the
ambiguity of these words raised questions as to what would
in fact be nationalised and set off the debate as to
whether the purpose of the exercise was to modernise and
rationalise a decaying economy or else to transform the
prevailing economic relationships.
The Left's objective at this time was "the
complete transference of all major industries and
industrial operations to public ownership and socialist
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control".(19) It was opposed to the	 idea	 of	 any
reconstruction of capitalism. Private ownership of
property was both inefficient and inhumane and it resulted
in a class war. The Labour Left's aim was to remove power
from the owners of capital. Any modification in this
objective was deemed to be gradualism and this was what
the Labour Left was intent on ensuring did not prevail
within the Party. G.D.H. Cole and G.R. Mitchinson attacked
gradualism as being "based on the assumption that the
capitalist system will remain in being, and continue to
function successfully, except in those particular
industries or branches of economic activity which the
Government picks out for successive socialisation".(20)
In the inter-war years the specific differences
between Labour Left and the Party leadership on domestic
policy matters were not great. The Party leadership was as
critical of the system of property relationships as the
Labour Left. For example, the Party policy statement For
Socialism and Peace (1934) states that:
The choice before the nation is either a vain
attempt	 to patch up the superstructure of
capitalist society in decay at its very
foundations, or a rapid advance to a Socialist
reconstruction of the national life. There is no
half-way house between a society based on
private ownership in the means of production,
with the profit of the few as the measure of
success, and a society where public ownership of
those means enables the resources of the nation
to be deliberately planned for attaining the
maximum of general well-being.(21)
Arthur Henderson, introducing the statement to the 1934
Party Conference argued:
The present system involves serious injustices,
it affords unmerited privileges to the few, and
acute and undeserved hardship, privation and
suffering to the many. It condemns numbers of
decent, honest, self-respecting, law-abiding
citizens to long periods of enforced idleness
and unrelieved misery.(22)
At a general level all within the Party were
critical of capitalist society and all were agreed that
the specific remedy for dealing with this inhuman and
inefficient society was nationalisation. For example, Hugh
Dalton writes in 1935 that the "rapid extension (of the
socialised sector of the economy) is one of the principal
objects of the Labour Party".(23)
Whether any difference existed in practice
between Cole's demand for "the complete transference of
all major industries" into public ownership and Dalton's
"rapid extension" of the public sector could and would
only be settled after a period of Labour government. Three
years of minority Administrations in the inter-war years
did not provide that opportunity to test the rhetoric in
practice and therefore the Labour Left's concern remained
at the level of a general critique of gradualism.
The specific policy differences that occurred
between Labour Left and Party leadership at this time
arose more over foreign affairs. At a general level there
was agreement within the Party that a socialist foreign
policy entailed a commitment to internationalism and world
peace, an antipathy to power politics, and a need for
international working class solidarity, but the rise of
fascism in Europe and, in particular, the invasion of
Abyssinia and the outbreak of civil war in Spain, resulted
in specific disagreements within the Party.
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Various strands of opinion existed on the left
of the Party concerning foreign affairs at this time but
the two most distinctive were the Marxist belief that war
was an inevitable feature of capitalism and the pacifist
dislike of rearmament. Both strands were united in their
belief that fascism should be resisted by international
working class solidarity in refusing to participate in
capitalist war, to support the League of Nations, or to
support a rearmament programme. An example of this
sentiment is contained in the resolution passed at the
Socialist League's 1935 conference which stated:
For British workers any war entered into by a
capitalist Government, whatever its allies, will
be an imperialist war conducted for imperialist
ends. (2J4)
The Labour Left's widespread pacifism and
support for war resistance began to crumble in the face of
European fascism. Many came round to the view that
collective security through the League of Nations and
rearmament, albeit with a 'Peoples Government' in office
rather than the National Government, was necessary.
The Labour Left in the 1930s: organisation, support and 
leadership
An identifiable Labour Left began to develop in
the 1920s centred around Lansbury's Weekly(25) and the
Independent Labour Party (hereafter the ILP) after
Clifford Allen's retirement as its Chairman in 1925 and
his replacement by Jimmy Maxton. Over the next seven years
- 44-
the ILP established its own distinct political programme
beginning with the 'living wage' proposal in 1926 and
developing this into Socialism in Our Time, (1927). The
ILP organised a regular caucus in the PLP, sponsoring
group amendments on the House of Commons Order Paper; it
used its extensive constituency-based individual
membership to canvas support within the Party; and it
articulated its distinctive viewpoint within the Labour
movement though ILP newspapers such as The Labour Leader,
the Birmingham Town Crier and the Leicester Pioneer.
After the ILP's disaffiliation from the Labour
Party in 1932 over its disagreements with the Party
leadership's gradualist tendencies and their unwillingness
to tolerate an alternative source of organised power
within the Party, the Socialist League became the
organised expression of Labour Left sentiments. The Labour
Left was handicapped, however, by the Socialist League's
limited,	 London-based	 membership,	 its	 very	 close
identification with one dominant and controversial
personality - Stafford Cripps - and the direct competition
for working class support that it faced from the Communist
Party.
The Socialist League never secured the
individual support that the ILP retained in the 1920s.
Whereas the ILP had over 1,000 branches and a membership
of around 56,000 in the mid-twenties(26), the Socialist
	
League never
	 recruited	 more	 than	 3,000	 members.
Furthermore, as A.J.P. Taylor writes,
The
	 Socialist
	 League was the ILP with a
difference. The ILP had been
	 predominantly
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working class in composition, despite some
intellectuals near the top. The Socialist League
was intellectual and nothing else, all leaders
and no followers. Its branches counted for
little; its programme of ideas was all that
mattered .(27)
Its membership was concentrated in London and
the Home Counties, and it was run by "a London-based
clique".(28) Only two leading trades unionists - Arthur
Pugh and Harold Clay(29) - were associated with it for any
length of time and it attracted trade union hostility
because Stafford Cripps was its leader. At the 1935 Labour
Party conference Charles Dukes, from the National Union of
General and Municipal Workers, criticised the Socialist
League's policy of mass resistance to war in the following
terms:
What does Sir Stafford Cripps know about 'mass
action'? I do not mind a Bevin or a Marchbank,
or anybody else, who really can say to this
Movement: 'I tomorrow will lead my men'; but I
resent people who have no idea as to what those
people think - people who have no authority, no
responsibility, no influence - talking in this
conference	 as	 though it were possible to
organise	 mass	 action	 against	 political
action. (30)
At the 1937 conference John McGurk from the
Miners' Federation of Great Britain spoke out against
Cripps in similar fashion:
Sir Stafford Cripps is a rich man with rich pals
around him, and they are the biggest danger to
the Labour Party in this country. You will find
those chaps where Mosley is before much
longer. (31)
The Socialist League's very close identification
with Cripps was a political handicap. He was a very good
speaker, energetic and enthusiastic in his commitments but
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the political base for his ideas was limited and he
therefore flitted from one panacea to another. Cripps'
Aunt, Beatrice Webb, described him as "oddly immature in
intellect and unbalanced in judgement... ignorant and
reckless in his statements and proposals".(32) An example
of this recklessness and lack of political sensitivity
which was unlikely to win him and the Labour Left much
support amongst trade unionists and workers was his
comment in 1936, at the time that Anglo-German relations
were deteriorating:
If Germany should defeat Great Britain in a
capitalist and international war... I don't
believe it would be at all a bad thing for the
British working classes. A disaster for the
profit makers and capitalists but not
necessarily for the working classes.(33)
He also lacked the ability to work closely with
others. Kingsley Martin, editor of the New Statesman in
the 1930s, comments that "Stafford was a lone wolf, too
conscious of his superiority, to those around him and
completely incapable of making intimate contacts with the
rank and file".(34)
The Labour Left was also limited in the 1930s by
the fact that the Socialist league was competing with two
other bodies, both outside the Labour Party, for working
class support. After the ILP's disaffiliation in 1932 it
became an outspoken critic of the Labour Party and a rival
to the Socialist league, but in fact its impact, measured
by its membership which shrivelled in just four years from
16,773 in 1932 to 4,392 in 1935,(35) was marginal. It was
the Communist Party which was the major force in left wing
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politics in the 1930s. James Jupp writes that "... it is
impossible to write about the successes and failure of the
Left in the 1930s without putting Communists at the centre
of the story".(36) Until 1933 the Communist Party was
antagonistic to the Labour Party but from then onwards, in
response to the rise of fascism, it campaigned first for a
united front of labour organisations and then in 1936
applied unsuccessfully to affiliate to the Labour Party.
The Labour Left was so concerned with the impact of
fascism that it eventually organised jointly with its two
rivals a united front. Joint activity with the ILP and
Communist Party, organisations competing with the Labour
Party for electoral support, was the ground for
disaffiliating the Socialist League and threatening to
expel any individual who continued to work in the united
front campaign. As a consequence of this action by the
Party leadership the Socialist league was wound up. This
was the last occasion on which the Labour Left had direct
access within the Party as an affiliated organisation. No
such constitutional legitimacy was ever afforded to the
Labour Left again and the Party constitution was amended
in 1946 in a manner designed to make any organised Labour
Left unconstitutional.
The Labour Left in the 1930s: an assessment 
Both Pimlott and Jupp believe that the Labour
Left suffered in the 1930s from its lack of a specific
programme. Jupp argues that the Left's socialism was
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"instinctive rather than well defined, idealistic rather
than practical".(37) He argues that it played only a
limited role in policy making because it had little to
offer in foreign and economic affairs, constitutional
matters, or in general political strategy. Pimlott agrees,
arguing that whereas leading Party figures such as Dalton
and Jay were concerned with analyses and programmes the
Left relied on "symbolic campaigns". The Labour Left was
ineffective in the 1930s, he believes, because it had a
"predilection for the noisy confrontation", was led by
"the brilliant and egotistical figure of Sir Stafford
Cripps", was an "elitist, inward-looking intellectual
coterie" which "engaged in factional fight after factional
fight whose main effects were to alienate Labour opinion",
and "showed a disastrous insensitivity to the realities of
political power and influence within the Labour 
movement" .(39)
However, the Labour Left's part in rallying the
flagging morale of Party activists, disappointed and
disillusioned by the very limited response of the Party
leadership to the threats to social democracy both within
Britain and abroad, should not be underestimated. The fact
that Cripps, Laski and Pritt became members of the NEC in
1937 on the first occasion that constituency delegates
alone elected seven representatives to serve on this body
reflects the fact that support for a radical party was not
so small as might be assumed merely from a study of the
annual conference voting figures during this period. Jupp
argues that the Left was "indispensable"(40) acting as a
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conscience and propagandist, not amongst the electorate
who had little sympathy for its views, but within the
Labour Movement. The Labour Left acted as "a source of
inspiration"(41) within the Labour Party, especially
amongst CLPs which held no chance of electing a Labour MP.
He claims that it played "an invaluable role in educating
and	 enlivening	 a professedly radical but basically
conservative movement" .(142)
A study of the Labour Left in the inter-war
years should also note its long term impact. The war years
must be included as an extension as well as an enlargement
of the preceding decade and the Labour victory in 1945
cannot be understood simply as a response to wartime
radicalisation.(43) Pimlott acknowledges this point in
arguing that it had a "profound and long lasting
influence"(44) on British politics in the personnel, the
issues and the groupings which emerged after 1945.
The Labour Left had an extensive mass membership
organisation in the 1920s. In the 1930s it had the support
and advice of intellectuals such as Harold Laski and
G.D.H. Cole, but the Labour Left wished to challenge the
Labour Party by establishing its own collective view, its
own alternative structure of power, and eventually its own
recruitment of working class socialists in competition
with the Labour Party. It became an alternative party
within the Party. This the Party leadership would not
tolerate. The ILP's confidence that, with its long history
and tradition as part of the Labour Party, it could stand
on its own after 1932 was revealed as unsound as its
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membership shrivelled. The spectre of that ILP collapse
has haunted the Labour Left over the subsequent fifty
years and acted as a reminder that it would have very
little impact on working class politics independent of the
Labour Party. Eventually forty-three years after the ILP
disaffiliated from the Labour Party Independent Labour
Publications renewed its commitment to the Labour Party
but as a very small organisation in comparison with the
original ILP or with the other socialist society which had
been part of the Labour Party at its foundation, and
remains so today - the Fabian Society.
The Labour Left in the post-war years (1945-1963): ideas 
Labour Left criticism of the Party leadership
had been muted to some extent in the inter-war years by
the fact that the Party did not secure an overall
parliamentary majority and therefore the opportunities for
Labour governments to transform British capitalism were
constrained so some believed by lack of numbers.(45) After
1945 that constraint no longer prevailed. Rhetoric and
practice could be compared and the Labour Left's response
to the Attlee Governments was to argue that not enough had
been achieved in the domestic field whilst in foreign
affairs not enough effort was being made to curb the
development of the Cold War.
The Labour Left believed that the extent of the
domestic transformation achieved by the Attlee Government
was limited. The public ownership of the major utilities
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and of iron and steel was not the end of the work but
merely the beginning. The Labour Left resisted Morrison's
desire to consolidate these reforms(46) and argued the
need to push on with a further programme of public
ownership. It argued the need for public ownership of the
key industries in the British economy in order to control
'the commanding heights'. A shopping list of further
industries to be nationalised included land, chemicals,
aircraft, insurance, engineering and shipbuilding.(47)
Public ownership remained the defining characteristic of
socialism for the Labour Left.
In the 1950s the Labour Left was placed more and
more on the defensive on economic issues. Lacking any
extensive research and analysis of the structural changes
occurring in the British economy it tended to react to the
initiatives from the Right of the Party. For example, in
response to revisionist(48) claims that ownership of
industry was no longer so central to socialism it
reiterated the principles contained in Clause 4 of the
Party constitution. General slogans rather than detailed
policies became the norm for the Labour Left on economic
issues. As early as 1952 Dick Crossman records in his
diary that on economic matters "...there is literally no
difference between the Left and the Right of the
Party."(49) He notes that it was quite possible to agree
on the need for socialist planning of the economy and that
between the two leading protagonists of Left and Right -
Bevan and Gaitskell - the only differences on domestic
policy
	
were
	
ones	 of "...emphasis, temperament and
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will...".(50) But he also records that on foreign policy
"there are really basic issues dividing us (i.e. Left and
Right)..."(51)
The Labour Left's response to the development of
the Cold War had been to criticise the Attlee Government's
policies of mounting a holding operation against Soviet
expansion, organising an alliance with the Atlantic
nations, and backing these two objectives with military
power.
The critique developed from various standpoints.
The pacifist opposed policies dependent on the use of
force and armaments; the fellow-traveller offered
unquestioning support for the Soviet Union; the neutralist
argued for a third force in world affairs, European-based
and independent of both the USA and the USSR; and the
antimilitarist expected welfare rather than armaments
expenditure.
Shifts of opinion occurred within the Labour
Left according to the behaviour of the two super-powers.
The Labour Left's initial strong support for the Soviet
Union after the war was eroded as the cold war developed,
leaving only a small number of fellow-travellers giving
the Soviet Union unquestioning support. On the other hand
the support expressed for the USA's position in 1948 had
shifted to criticism of its re-armament policies by 1951.
Also the support expressed for the idea of a 'third force'
in international politics in 1947-1948 waned until it re-
emerged as support for neutralism in 1951.
Division
	 and
	 shifts	 of	 opinion occurred
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therefore within the Labour Left but certain general
principles prevailed. First, the belief that in any
ideological conflict it would be economic and social
factors rather than military expenditure which would win
popular support. Second, the view that the moral
standpoint remained important in international diplomacy,
and therefore example should not be subordinated to
deterrence based upon ever-expanding military expenditure.
Third, the opinion that foreign policy could not and
should not be isolated from domestic affairs. As a
consequence the Labour Left disagreed with the extent of
rearmament in the 19505 claiming that it would have an
harmful impact upon the British economy. The Labour Left
also wished the arms budget to be reduced because it had
its doubts about American foreign policy and felt the need
for a greater degree of independence from the USA. It was
also sceptical that the Soviet Union was as great a threat
to world peace and stability as was generally believed,
but neither pacifist nor neutralist sentiment prevailed on
the Labour Left. For example it endorsed initially the
establishment of NATO although this gave way to a
commitment to the idea of Britain leading a neutral third
force in international politics.
Division of opinion and different emphases
existed therefore in this period but as the Cold War
developed there emerged two distinct foreign policies
within the Party - Left and Right - with differing
assessments of the international situation and differing
objectives and vying with each other for the allegiance of
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the Party membership. As outlined by Gordon they were, on
the Left:
distrust of American capitalism, half-trust in
the Soviet system, antagonism to armaments, and
concern for the domestic effects of
rearmament...(52)
and on the Right:
(t)rust in the valuable American ally, concern
for the system of Atlantic security,
apprehensive of Soviet intentions, and faith in
power balancing...(53)
The Labour Left in the post-war years	 (1945-1963):
organisation, support and leadership 
The post-war Labour Left no longer organised as
in the inter-war years. Whereas the ILP and Socialist
League had been affiliated bodies, accorded therefore
certain formal rights of representation within the Party,
with an extensive branch structure and policy-making
apparatus, the post-war Labour Left had nothing similar.
The Party leadership no longer wanted to provide the
opportunities for organised factionalism that had
prevailed in the 1930s and therefore, immediately after
the war it amended the Party constitution in a manner
which determined the nature of Labour Left organisation
for the next thirty years. The amendment ruled out the
possibility of a group with a distinct programme, or
policy, or branch organisation having any legitimacy
within the Party.(54) Any attempt to establish such an
organisation in an open manner was immediately met with
hostility by the Party leadership and the threat of
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expulsion of the individual Party members concerned.
Between 1945 and 1970, Labour Left organisation was almost
entirely centred around the parliamentary caucus. Even
this was deemed to be unconstitutional between 1952 and
1966, and therefore had to be organised in a clandestine
manner.(55)
Opposition to the Party leadership within the
PLP was not organised as a cohesive force in the period of
the Attlee Governments. Gordon has described it as
"fragmented into various groups and cliques lacking in
cohesion".(56) Berrington's study of Labour backbenchers
over a ten year period (1945-1955) reveals a lack of
continuity amongst left-wing MPs, especially with regard
to foreign affairs and defence. For example, only 31 MPs
who voted against the Party Whip over defence policy in
March 1952 also joined the 62 rebels, again over defence
policy, in March 1955. Out of these 31, only 19 appeared
to be part of the left rebellions between 1945 and
1950.(57) Steck's analysis of 3 major backbench rebellions
between 1951 and 1955 reveals that a total of 106 MPs were
involved of whom only 14 rebelled on all 3 occasions, 40
rebelled twice, and 51 protested only once.(58) Steck
concludes that the parliamentary left was "a heterogeneous
grouping with a minimal unity provided by a dislike of
official policy and by Bevan's person".(59)
A small nucleus of parliamentarians did meet
together to produce two pamphlets - Keep Left (1947) and
Keeping Left (1950) - and after Bevan's resignation in
1951, welcomed him to their ranks. By September 1951 the
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group had been given the name of "The Bevanites".(60)
Regular meetings of the group occurred to discuss
parliamentary business but as Michael Foot notes "the
Bevanites... (never) had whips and party managers and the
paraphernalia of a party within a party...".(61) Dick
Crossman comments that
Bevanism and the Bevanites seem much more
important, well-organised and machiavellian to
the rest of the Labour Party, and indeed to the
USA, than they do to us who are in the Group and
who know that we are not organised, that Aneurin
can never be persuaded to have any consistent or
coherent strategy and that we have not even got
to the beginning of a coherent, constructive
policy. What we have, and it is very important,
is a group of MPs who meet regularly, who know
and like each other and who have come to
represent 'real Socialism' to a large number of
constituency members. (62)
Between 1951 and 1955 backbench rebellions
involving Bevanite MPs occurred in defiance of the PLP
leadership on certain major issues(63) and three pamphlets
were produced which were associated with the
Bevanites.(64) However, Crossman records in his diary how
limited was the extent of Bevanite activity. In 1951 he
notes that "the Group has no coherent analysis or policy
whatsoever..."(65) and again in 1953 he refers to "...the
appalling absence of Bevanite policy".(66)
One reason why the Bevanites failed to develop
any clear policies was that the group was very dependent
upon Bevan. Crossman notes that "...we are nothing without
Nye as a mouthpiece",(67) but this was counter-productive
in many ways, since Bevan was an individualist, with
leadership ambitions, but with no liking for detailed
discussion of policy.(68) Bevan needed the group for the
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support it gave him in his conflicts with the Party
leadership and the group needed Bevan because he gave it a
standing in the Party that none of the other Bevanite MPs
could provide and, furthermore, if Bevan secured the
leadership of the Party then his patronage powers would
presumably benefit members of the group. However, Bevan
made no attempts to act as a fully-participating member of
the group - his attendance was erratic and he did not
consult the group on major decisions.(69)
The Bevanites suffered from too close an
association and too great a dependence upon one single
person who possessed his own leadership ambitions. They
also suffered because amongst their leading figures were
no trade unionists of note. Just as Bevin had been able to
denigrate the Labour Left in the 1930s because its
leadership contained no major trade union figures so when
Gaitskell described the Bevanites as a group of
"frustrated journalists"(70) he was attacking the Labour
Left at a vulnerable point. The Bevanites recruited very
few trade union MPs(71) but included some prominent
journalists (Crossman, Driberg and Castle) amongst their
ranks. However, Steck's analysis of the 57 MPs who defied
the Party Whip on defence policy in March 1952 reveals
that "the Bevanites were somewhat unrepresentative of the
Party as a whole in displaying a middle class bias"(72)
but that they were more of a coalition of working class
and middle class MPs than Gaitskell's comment might
suggest.(73)
The Bevanites made few attempts to plan their
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support within the extra-parliamentary Party. Their
opponents presumed that because six of the seven CLP
representatives on the NEC by 1952 were Bevanites, an
extensive factional organisation and network existed.
However, Crossman records that there was no planning of
strategy or tactics by the Bevanites prior to the 1952
Party conference and as a consequence, they were "...going
to it as an army of innocents" .(7t) Crossman does note
caucus meetings for the six Bevanites prior to NEC
meetings in 1953(75) and resolutions were drafted as
suggestions for CLPs to submit to the 1953 Party
conference,(76) but the Left's linkage with the 'rank and
file' was informal and 'ad hoc' in the early 1950s. In the
summer of 1950, the Keeping Left group had first initiated
constituency Brains Trusts - panels of MPs, the majority
of whom were from the left of the Party, visiting CLPs for
question	 and answer sessions - which the Bevanites
continued. Eighty seven such meetings were held in 1953
involving twenty six MPs. Both the PLP and the
Organisation Sub-Committee of the NEC approved resolutions
banning these Brains Trusts in February 1953, although
this ban was not confirmed by the NEC.(77)
The Bevanite MPs won an impressive degree of
political support in the NEC constituency section
elections. Between 1951 and 1954 the successful Bevanite
candidates only polled less than 50% of the votes cast on
two occasions and by 1954 they were polling 6 of every 10
votes cast.
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% of CLP votes for Bevanite MPs*(78) 
1951
	 1952	 1953	 1954
Bevan	 75	 84	 89	 -
Castle
	 59	 76	 80	 80
Crossman
	 -	 54	 61	 71
Driberg
	 56	 65	 65	 68
Greenwood
	 -	 -	 -	 75
Mikardo
	 49	 55	 49	 63
Wilson	 -	 55	 73	 81
* i.e. % of the total vote cast in this section.
Support for the MPs was widely distributed and
"represented an over-whelming personal vote of approval
for a group of MPs representing a common ideological
outlook".(79) However, personality often plays a
significant part in these elections to the CLP section of
the NEC. As prominent publicists and propagandists who
championed the Party's rank and file these Bevanites won
support which was not forthcoming for the Labour Left
ideas in general. After analysis of resolutions to three
party conferences (1952, 1953 and 1954) Steck concludes
that CLPs were "far more conservative, far less militant,
and far less active" than the Left (or Right) assumed.(80)
By December 1953 Crossman was writing in his
diary that Bevanism was "...collapsing as a force"(81) and
eleven months later he recorded that the Bevanite group
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"...had totally disintegrated".(82) Formally the Bevanite
Group had been disbanded after the PLP banned such
factional	 groupings
	 in October 1952, but Bevanites
continued to meet informally at Crossman's flat and by
1954 some Bevanites were meeting on a regular basis with
Left wing parliamentary candidates, trade union officials
and	 academics in an organisation called The Second
Eleven.(83) Its main objective was to recruit more left
wing Labour MPs and therefore it discussed possible
candidates, constituencies in which Labour MPs were likely
to be retiring and any forthcoming by-elections. It also
circulated some suggested Party conference resolutions,
but by 1956 it was reported to the Second Eleven by Harold
Wilson that the NEC was considering proscription of the
group and as a consequence it was wound up.
Very few attempts were made to establish any
constituency-based organisation of the Labour Left during
this whole period. Socialist Fellowship was formed in 1949
with two Labour MPs - Ellis Smith and Fenner Brockway - as
sponsors, with a rank and file apparatus and an annual
conference, but this was proscribed by the Party
leadership in 1951 as a consequence of the leading role
played in the organisation by Trotskyists.(84)
Another attempt to create a constituency-based
organisation was made in 1958 when some of the Bevanite
MPs, led by Ian Mikardo, decided to reactivate Victory for
Socialism. VFS had been established in 1944 as an
organisation "pledged to work for the early attainment of
a Socialist Society".(85) By the end of the 1950s its
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activities were limited to periodic conferences (86) and
by 1956 it had a membership of only 91 and a budget of
£150.00. However, after Bevan's speech to the 1957 Party
Conference, in which he appeared to have abandoned his
left colleagues, some Left MPs felt the need to re-
establish a left presence in the constituencies. Even
though VFS was almost moribund and had in the words of one
Bevanite MP a "sour smell of ineffectualness",(87) it also
possessed some degree of legitimacy amongst the Party
leadership in the sense that its regular meeting at the
annual Party Conference was reported in the official diary
of events. The revised VFS was the first attempt since
1937 by the Labour Left to create a nationwide extra-
parliamentary organisation with an individual membership,
elected officers and executive, and local groups.
In the first flush of enthusiasm and publicity,
14 groups had been established and almost 1,000 members
had joined by July 1958. Analysis of these members reveals
that one-third were from the London area, with the highest
concentration in Hampstead. In the provincial cities only
Birmingham and Liverpool had more than 30 members - 34 and
33 respectively - whilst there were no members in Wales.
By March 1959 paid-up membership had slumped to 223.(88)
This small London-based organisation settled into a
limited existence over the next five years, producing the
occasional pamphlet(89), providing members with draft
conference resolutions for them to advocate within their
CLPs, and attracting the occasional publicity for a
political statement.(90)
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The experience of the VFS leadership determined
to a large extent the nature of Labour Left organised
activities in the 1970s. The Party leadership remained
hostile to an organised, constituency-based Left
faction(91) and VFS members faced the threat of Trotskyist
takeover by the Socialist Labour League from 1961
onwards.(92) The hostility of the Party leadership and a
threatened Trotskyist takeover convinced many of this
generation of left activists that it was impossible to
establish a membership-based, extra-parliamentary Labour
Left organisation. Many of the members of the Tribune
Group who, in the late 1970s opposed the creation of the
extra-parliamentary Tribune organisation were those who
had been active in WS between 1958 and 1961.
After 1961 many of the prominent figures in VFS
moved over to support a new organisation - the Unity Group
- which emerged from an appeal by some members of
Cambridge Labour Party after the 1960 Party conference
decision on nuclear weapons for 'Party Unity Behind
Conference Decisions'. The Unity Group deserves mention
because it was a forerunner of the more typical Labour
Left organisation of the 1970s in that it was not
dominated by parliamentarians and it was more concerned
with organising support within the CLPs and with co-
ordinating left wing strategy immediately prior to the
annual Party conference rather than with the usual
publicity-seeking behaviour of the Labour Left at this
time.
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The Labour Left (1945-1963): an assessment 
During the 1950s the Left made little headway in
the Party. Revisionist sentiments prevailed at the top of
the Party and so the place of public ownership in the
Party programme was reduced and the Party's electoral
strategy was to court rather than attempt to influence
existing electoral preferences. However, as Lewis Minkin
argues, revisionist ideas and strategies did not have
extensive support amongst the Party's rank and file. He
states that there was "no fundamental transformation of
opinion within the Party towards the revisionist position
on public ownership" but that the shift of policy on this
issue was secured "by a remarkable and complex mixture of
factors which included deliberate ambiguity, a significant
pattern of mandate distortion, and the manipulation and
bias of the Conference procedures".(93) The alliance of
the Party leadership and the 'praetorian guard' of trade
union leaders enabled left wing challenges to be defeated,
deflected or marginalised. Throughout this period from
1952 until 1963 the majority of the seven CLP
representatives on the NEC were on the left of the Party
but they were in an overall minority. David Howell argues
that on the crucial policy issues these left
representatives "made no impact".(94) Furthermore, no
conference victories were secured by the Left until the
Party conference approved a commitment to unilateral
nuclear disarmament in 1960. Labour Left campaigns within
the trade unions were all unsuccessful. For example,
-64-
Bevan's campaign to be elected Party Treasurer attracted
only 1.2 million votes in 1954 and this number was almost
halved twelve months later. No major trade union leader
supported the Labour Left until Frank Cousins' election as
General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers
Union in 1956. The style of Labour Left activity in this
period, epitomised by the leading Bevanites who appeared
as public-school-educated professionals to be disloyal to
the Labour Party leadership, offended many trade union
leaders.
However, the Labour Left contributed to its own
weakness by failing to analyse the socio-economic changes
occurring in Britain. Little attempt was made to re-
examine in any depth the nature of the 'humanised
capitalism' of post-war British society. The political
initiative passed to the Right, first in the form of
Morrisonian consolidation and, second, in the form of
revisionism. The Left produced nothing to compare in
comprehensive analysis of post-war Britain with Tony
Crosland's The Future of Socialism. As a consequence, the
Left tended to react to events rather than to deal with
long-term trends. The Left possessed some able publicists
and propagandists but produced few researchers. Bevan, who
to a large extent determined the tenor of the left wing
activity in the 1950s, epitomised both the strength and
weakness of the Left at this time. He was a fine
individual socialist who inspired very many rank and file
members and who gave the Bevanites a political impact they
would not otherwise have gained, but he was an erratic and
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unpredictable individualist. He was concerned with the
broad sweep of ideas and less with intricate details.
Questions concerning the management of the economy, which
became increasingly important in political debate in the
1950s, were ones to which he was not attuned.(95)
The Labour Left was also hamstrung by the
centrality of the Cold War in the 1950s. Jupp's comments
on the Communist Party in the 1930s, namely that it
operated "at the centre of the stage" of left wing
politics, is not true of the 1950s. Communist Party
propaganda and recruitment were no longer significant, but
Communism and the Communist Party remained important to
the political fortunes of the Labour Left. Because the
Soviet Union was generally perceived to be the major
threat to Western security and Communists as an internal
threat to Britain's security, the Labour Left's past
identity and association with both was a disadvantage
which was exploited by its opponents. The 'fellow-
travelling' element within the Labour Left was small and
during the period the Labour Left began to distance itself
from the worst features of Stalin's Russia, nevertheless
its refusal to adopt the anti-Soviet Cold War position
meant it was vulnerable to accusations of flirting with
'the enemy'. Furthermore the position of the Communist
Party within the labour movement remained important during
this period. Trade Union leaders regarded Communists in
some cases as wreckers out to undermine their legitimate
authority. The Labour Left, who were very often critical
of the trade union leadership in the 1950s as failing to
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represent the true voice of the rank and file, were
therefore linked with these Communists agitators. Trade
Union leaders missed no opportunity to condemn the Labour
Left as Communist sympathisers. Only in the 1960s, as the
Cold War began to decline in its intensity, did the 'Red
smear' become of less political significance. We will see
in a later chapter that an attempt by the Social
Democratic Alliance in the 1970s to link some of the
leading figures in the labour movement with the Soviet
Union failed to make the impact it desired and instead it
rebounded to the detriment of the SDA.
Although the 1950s was a period in which the
Labour Left was weak within the Party, a weakness
compounded by its own lack of any strategic response to
the economic boom and by the international tensions
between the world's two super-powers, it appeared to have
recovered some of its strength by 1963. A factional
dispute had waged within the Party after its third
successive election defeat in 1959. The defeat
	 had
prompted the revisionist Right to challenge some
fundamental Party commitments. For two years the disputes
centred around the twin issues of public ownership, in
particular the contemporary relevance of the commitment in
the Party's constitution to "...the common ownership of
the means of production, distribution and exchange...",
and a defence policy dependent upon the use of nuclear
weapons. The arguments were intense and bitter at both the
ideological and the personal level, but by 1962 they were
waning. The Left had successfully beaten off the Right's
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attempts	 to	 delete	 Clause	 Four	 from	 the Party
constitution, and the Right had established a defence
policy based upon the principles of multilateral
disarmament and membership of NATO.(96) Furthermore, the
Party's domestic policy, as outlined in Signposts for the 
Sixties (1962), was more critical of private enterprise
than previous policy documents of the 1950s. Finally,
after Gaitskell's death in 1963 his replacement, Harold
Wilson, was a man associated with the Left due to his
resignation with Bevan from the Government in 1951 and to
his challenge to Gaitskell's leadership of the Party in
1960. The Left welcomed his victory in 1963 as a defeat
for the revisionist Right and in the belief that the
Labour Party would now be led in a less determined right
wing factional manner than by the previous incumbent. Left
wing expectations had been raised: the undermining of
those expectations over the following years was to have a
considerable impact on the Labour Party. The re-emergence
of a distinct Labour Left in the 1970s, more extra-
parliamentary in its organisation and more critical of the
parliamentary Left than ever before, had its origins in
the disenchantment which arose in the years after 1963.
The Labour Left (1964-1970): ideas
Both the Labour Left and Right had united around
a Party programme Signposts for the Sixties (1962), in
which its ideological ambiguities had enabled both
factions to draw satisfactory conclusions concerning a
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future Labour government's programme. The Left noted that
the programme was more critical of the failures of post-
war private enterprise than any other policy document in
the 1950s and that it offered the possibilities of
substantial public ownership. However, the only specific
public ownership commitment was to the renationalisation
of steel.
The Labour Left lacked any coherent programme of
its own during this period. Its overriding priority was
that the Labour Government should manage the economy in a
more efficient manner than the Conservatives in order to
produce an economic surplus to improve the level of social
services and peoples' standard of living. It was therefore
placed in the position of reacting to the Wilson
Government's failure to renationalise steel in the 1964-
1966 Parliament, and then after 1966 its abandonment of
economic planning, its introduction of wages policy and
its attempt to reform the trade unions. In foreign affairs
it tacitly accepted the existence
	 of	 the	 nuclear
deterrent, although it was very critical of the
Government's failure to distance itself from American
policy in Vietnam.
The Labour Left (1964-1970): organisation, support and 
leadership 
	
During this period
	 organised	 Labour	 Left
activity centred around the PLP. After the 1964 General
Election, a group of 	 left	 wing	 backbenchers	 met
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unofficially on a weekly basis to discuss parliamentary
affairs and business. Liberalisation of PLP affairs in
1966, under the Crossman-Silkin regime,(97) led to the
formal establishment of the Tribune Group. We shall
discuss the operations of the group in a later chapter but
one important point needs to be made here concerning the
Tribune Group membership. In contrast to the parliamentary
left of the 1930s and 1950s many prominent members of the
Tribune Group were trade unionists with a manual worker
background.(98) These members were conspicuous in the
Labour Left fight against the Labour Government's wages
policy introduced in 1966 and then against the proposals
to reform industrial relations contained in the
Government's White Paper In Place of Strife (1969).
Previously the Labour Left had argued that a wages policy
was an essential part of a planned economy but now it had
shifted to opposing the idea because workers' standard of
living would be depreciated whilst non-manual wage earners
and other income earners would not be so affected. For the
first time ever the parliamentary left and the Trade Union
Group of MPs(99) were working in harmony against the Party
leadership. No longer was there the same social divorce
between the 'professionals' of the parliamentary left and
the 'manuals' of the parliamentary right. The
establishment of this new alliance between rank and file
unionists and the Tribune Group was of major importance in
intra-Party affairs.
These new roots for the parliamentary left
amongst manual worker trade unionists were nourished
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further by the election of a group of senior trade union
leaders in the late-1960s who, at the time, were directly
associated with the Labour Left. Elected in 1967 were Hugh
Scanlon, President of the Amalgamated Engineering Union
and Tom Jackson, General Secretary of the Union of Post
Office Workers; in 1968 Lawrence Daly, General Secretary
of the National Union of Mineworkers and Richard Seabrook,
President of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied
Workers; and in 1969 Jack Jones, General Secretary of the
Transport and General Workers Union.
Extra-parliamentary Labour Left activity re-
emerged in 1967. First, at the 1967 Party conference when
a 'teach-in' on the economy, workers' control, the welfare
state, Vietnam and the internal mechanism of the Party was
organised in order to rally the Left and "to begin to work
out and spell out an alternative socialist strategy for
the movement".(100) Second, in June 1968 when a group of
sixty six Labour MPs, trade unionists and academics
"deeply disappointed and disillusioned" by the Labour
Government, published an 8-point charter outlining Labour
Left opinion and inviting others to sign up as
supporters.(100) By 1969 this Socialist Charter had a
National Organising Committee and a National Convention
but the group had some major problems.
First, the extent of organisation was very
limited. A Registrar, Brenda Brett, provided a national
linkage and attempted to meet the needs of Party activists
for left wing speakers, but little more. In part this was
deliberate since a membership organisation acting in a
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corporate manner within the Party would be likely to face
proscription. Second, considerable tensions emerged
between the parliamentary left in the Tribune Group and
this group of non-parliamentarians. An example of the
tension occurred in 1970 when the National Organising
Committee of Socialist Charter nominated its Chairman,
Royden Harrison, as a candidate for election to the CLP
section of the NEC. This was not welcomed by many members
of the Tribune Group who were themselves candidates.
Whilst some, such as Stan Newens withdrew in order not to
divide the vote, others, including John Mendelson and Stan
Orme were most annoyed at this 'outside' intervention in
an election which many regarded as the preserve of the
parliamentary left.(102) Third, Socialist Charter
experienced similar Trotskyist attentions as VFS in 1961,
and by 1972 Socialist Charter was in the control of the
Trotskyists.
During the six years that Labour was in Office
the parliamentary Left was restrained and restricted in
its criticisms. Between 1964 and 1966 it was restrained by
Labour's small parliamentary majority of three and its
unwillingness to be seen to threaten Party unity in the
manner adopted by Woodrow Wyatt and Desmond Donnelly over
steel nationalisation.(103) Furthermore, in those first
two years the tenor of government remained wedded to the
Party's pre-1964 sentiments and commitments. Only after
the 1966 General Election as the serious economic problems
emerged did the Labour Left's dilemmas develop. The
restraint of the small parliamentary majority vanished
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after the 1966 General Election, but the personal loyalty
of many Left parliamentarians to Harold Wilson prevailed.
Wilson exploited this sentiment by encouraging private
discussions with leading backbench figures on the
parliamentary Left and by his Prime Ministerial patronage
powers. Potential critics had been silenced by Ministerial
office and immersion in the day-to-day pressures of
office,(104) whilst others outside the government were
constrained by Wilson's patronage. For example, his
dispatch of Harold Davies, an ex-Bevanite, on a peace
mission to North Vietnam in 1965 had more to do with
internal Party management than with international
diplomacy.(105) Wilson's obsession with right wing coups
by senior Cabinet Ministers communicated itself to some of
the Tribune Group who were therefore somewhat constrained
in their rebelliousness. Nevertheless, individual left
wing backbenchers kept up a constant criticism of the
Government.(106) However, the Labour Left, dominated by
parliamentarians, suffered from its close association with
the Wilson Governments.
Towards the end of the 1960's a radical left
rapidly emerged critical of the Labour Government, able to
exploit the disillusion of many over Labour's performance
in Office, and acting as a serious rival to the left
within the Labour Party. Part of this new left was made up
of socialist intellectuals, many of whom had been
optimistic of socialist change when Harold Wilson became
the Party Leader. As a result of meetings in the summer of
1966	 amongst a group of intellectuals the May Day 
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Manifesto was published in 1967 critical of the Labour
Government and the Labour Left and calling for the
creation of local, campaigning, socialist groups.(107)
Another part of this new left was made up of
emergent	 Trotskyist	 groupings,	 especially	 the
International Marxist Group and the International
Socialists, who by the mid-sixties had abandoned entryist
tactics and were now extremely critical of the Labour
Party .(108)
Finally, there was the emergent student movement
which was associated with particular student occupations,
such as that at the London School of Economics in 1966,
but which also developed such organisations as the
Revolutionary Socialist Students' Federation. This student
revolt provided a considerable boost to the membership of
both the International Marxist Group and the International
Socialists. The various parts of this new left came
together in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, formed in
1966, in which the Labour Left was not the leading force,
which arranged two major marches and demonstrations in
1968 against American involvement in Vietnam and against
the	 Labour
	 Government's	 complicity	 in	 hnerica's
policy. (109)
The Labour Left's impact within the Party and
its appeal beyond the Party was weak by 1970. The promise
of a Labour Government led by a member of the Labour Left
introducing radical change had been undermined by a
government which subordinated the interests of labour to
those	 of	 capital	 and	 revealed	 few	 signs	 of
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internationalism in foreign affairs. The Labour Left's use
of the Party's institutions and procedures in an attempt
to change the course of the government's policies had
failed to make any significant Impression whilst it
appeared as if many in the Party leadership now believed
socialism was outdated and the mass party a thing of the
past. A catastrophic decline in individual Party
membership occurred in the last years of the decade. At a
time when significant changes had occurred in the social
composition of the recruits to the parliamentary left and
when the election of some leading trade union officials
reflected the left's growing base within the trade union
movement, it appeared that left wing support amongst
individual Party members was declining. No analysis has
been conducted into this decline of individual Party
membership at the end of the 1960s, but it can be surmised
that dissatisfaction with Labour Government policies, and
with the Party Leadership's devaluation of the role of the
Party member and of the Party conference, as well as
alternative political attractions either amongst some of
the new 'good cause' pressure groups or the new left sects
played an important part in this collapse of the Party
membership at CLP level.(110)
The Labour Left (1964-1970): an assessment
During this period the Labour Left reached its
weakest point since 1918. When asked in 1968 to describe
the influence of the current Labour Left Michael Foot was
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able to claim just two instances of its impact: first,
Barbara Castle's attempts to co-ordinate inland transport
and, second, Dick Crossman's pressures to secure an
abandonment of the Government's East of Suez defence
policy.(111) At this time it lacked any clear ideological
commitment in either domestic or foreign affairs: it was
trapped by personal loyalties to the Party Leader who knew
how to exploit these sentiments; and new left groupings
had emerged which appeared more attractive, especially to
the new generation of political activists enjoying the
benefits of higher education.
Conclusions
This brief examination of the Labour Left over a
period of fifty two years reveals an almost continuous
existence, constantly reminding the Party leadership of
socialist commitments and arresting any move to abandon
them. On occasions the Party leadership appeared ready to
dismiss the Left and realign the Party in a rightward
direction (for example, first the disaffiliation and then
the threatened expulsion of the Socialist League in 1937,
the proposal to expel Bevan from the Party in 1955, and
the threats to Victory for Socialism to curb its organised
activities in 1958) but it drew back from such a complete
break in recognition of the significant support for the
Left amongst the Party's rank and file. Nevertheless the
Labour Left's position within the Party was weakened by
its programmatic deficiencies, its lack of support amongst
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trade union leaders, its increasing parliamentary
orientation, its close identification with one person, and
its restricted composition.
Programmatic deficiencies
In the 1920s the ILP made serious attempts in
Socialism In Our Time (1927) and in its 'Living Wage'
proposal to develop a coherent alternative to Labour
economic policy, but when Keynes produced a means by which
the worst feature of capitalism could be eradicated
without major structural change he undermined the Left's
demand for socialist structural transformation. Not until
the 1970s did the Labour Left present an explicit
socialist challenge to Keynes.
Two other features of post-war politics made the
Labour Left's task of presenting a credible socialist
programme more difficult. First, the post-war
reconstruction of Britain, involving a mixed economy and
universal social services, plus the country's relatively
successful economic performance provided no compelling
reason for structural alterations. Second, socialist
ideology was often identified with Soviet Communism and
this model had been undermined by its practice of internal
political repression, as for example revealed by Kruschev
in 1956, and by its external aggression as practised in
its East European satellites. As a consequence of the cold
war the Soviet Union was identified in many people's minds
as the enemy. This Soviet model, mistakenly identified as
-77-
socialism, was (and still is, to a certain extent) a
limiting factor in developing a credible socialist model
in the public mind.
The Labour Left had become trapped between the
successful performance of Western capitalism and the
practice of Soviet Communism and it was exceedingly
difficult to present any form of socialist alternative.
Lack of support amongst the trade union leadership
The Left faced an alliance in the Party between
leading trade unionists and leading Labour
parliamentarians which developed in the 1930s, reached its
pinnacle of accord in the 1ate-1940s and early-1950s, and
only began to crumble towards the end of the 1950s. Trade
union leaders were often willing to sustain the Party
leadership's right-wing orientation as a consequence of
the Party's deliverance of full employment, a rising
standard of living for their members, state provision of
social welfare, and free collective bargaining. The
distribution of power within the Party resulted in trade
union votes sustaining the Party leadership at annual
Party conferences and electing personnel to the NEC who
would be similarly supportive. Occasionally victories were
secured by the Labour Left but the balance of power was
overwhelmingly arranged in such a manner as to leave the
Labour Left in a permanent minority within the PLP, the
NEC and the annual conference.
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Increasing parliamentary orientation 
It was amongst the Party membership that the
Labour Left had most of its support but after the
disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932 and the disbandment of
the Socialist League in 1937, the focus for Labour Left
activities became the PLP. The result was that the Labour
Left became more caught up in the intricacies and
conventions of parliament and consequently lacked the
links with trade unions at their base and ignored,
underestimated, or disagreed with the need to shift the
balance of power from the parliamentarian to the Party
member.
Close identification with one man
During the 1930s and 1950s the Labour Left
became very closely linked to the fortunes of single,
dominant personalities. This was attractive because it was
attached to a 'political star' who commanded attention,
but it was decidedly
	 counter-productive
	 since
	 the
individuals concerned (Cripps and Bevan) were often
unpredictable, unaccountable, and personally ambitious and
the Labour Left's progress was therefore too closely
identified with the personal behaviour of the individuals
concerned.
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Restricted social composition 
Finally, the Labour Left failed to attract
manual worker/trades unionists to leading positions which
made it very vulnerable to attack by the Party leadership
as being unrepresentative of the Party mainstream and
socially exclusive.
Throughout this period then the Labour Left
acted as the socialist conscience, the 'gadfly',
constantly there to be knocked away, but unable to be
completely ignored. Two examples of its existence and
persistence determining the nature of the Party's
commitment were, first, the nationalisation of the steel
industry in 1949, and second the maintenance of Clause
Four as part of the Party's constitutional objects in
1959.
Ralph Miliband is one amongst many academic
critics of the Labour Left who dismisses its impact upon
the Labour Party. He argues.
...the whole history of the Labour Party has
been punctuated by verbal victories of the
Labour Left which, with some few exceptions,
have had little influence on the Labour Party's
conduct inside or outside the House of Commons,
but which have always been of great importance
in keeping up the hopes and the morale of the
activists.(112)
Numerous other authors have reaffirmed
Miliband's thesis that the Labour Left's influence is
marginal. Their argument has better basis during this
period than after 1 970 when the Labour Left began to
remedy the deficiencies noted above and since has become a
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powerful and, at times, dominant faction within Labour
politics.
By 1980 the Party's policies and structures
reflected	 many	 of the Labour Left's demands. This
political metamorphosis which occurred over ten years was
due to the collapse of revisionism, the organised
political initiatives of the Labour Left, and the re-
emergence of a left wing rank and file in both the CLPs
and the trade union branches. This is the subject of the
rest of this thesis, commencing in the next chapter by
describing the development of a new Labour Left programme
and its impact on the Labour Government elected in 1974.
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CHAPTER THREE
LABOUR LEFT RESURGENCE 
The emergence of an increasingly powerful Labour
Left had its origins, first, in the performance of Labour
governments between 1964 and 1970 and, second, in the
adoption of a more ideological version of Conservatism
between 1970 and 1972. Both undermined Labour's prevailing
right-wing ideology and stimulated a commitment to a more
traditional form of socialism.
Labour in Office 1964-70 
The Labour Governments of 1964 and 1966 were led
by a man associated with the Labour Left in the 1950s, and
some of his colleagues were also from the Labour Left(1)
but the senior Government Ministers - at the Treasury and
the Foreign Office - were people from the Party's Right
and, overall, revisionism dominated the Government. So
much of revisionism was based upon the idea of an
efficient and growing economy. Socialism was made possible
through the redistribution of the economic surplus in
which public expenditure would create equality of
opportunity. By discreet government intervention capital
would operate in a socially responsible manner, but with
the absence of sustained economic growth, with curbs in
public expenditure, and with a rise in unemployment the
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revisionist position was undermined.
From the moment of Labour's election in 1964 the
Government faced major economic problems highlighted by
Britain's balance of payments deficit. By 1966 economic
growth had been subordinated to the achievement of a
balance of payments surplus to be secured by orthodox
economic policies which involved the cutting of public
expenditure and the curbing of wage increases. The
revisionist claim that a socialist society could be
secured by the redistribution of abundant resources and
that the imbalance between 'private affluence and public
squalor' could be remedied by fiscal measures was
undermined by Britain's economic decline. By 1970 some
Labour supporters were claiming that the poor had become
poorer during the six year period of Labour government.(2)
Furthermore, Labour's pre-1964 claim that an
incomes policy was concerned to plan the growth of real
wages and secure social justice was subordinated in 1966
to deflationary necessities. First, a wages policy was
introduced which was admitted to have nothing to do with
fairness(3) and then, after the difficulties experienced
in maintaining wage controls, the Labour Government
attempted reform of the trade unions as a means of
securing long-term economic growth. Revisionists had shown
little sympathetic understanding of the trade union
movement, criticising its conservatism in the face of
socio-economic changes in the 1950s and arguing that
Party/union	 links	 should be broken because of the
electoral unpopularity of the trade unions.(4) Even though
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the Government's White Paper on reform of industrial
relations, In Place of Strife, proposed to strengthen
individual rights to trade union membership and bargaining
three proposals created considerable opposition - the
granting to the Secretary of State for Employment of the
right in an unofficial strike to order a return to work
for twenty eight days whilst arbitration took place if
he/she believed the effects of the strike would be
serious; the empowering of the Secretary of State where
he/she believed a strike would be a threat to the economy
or to the public interest to order a ballot of the union
membership; and, finally the introduction of financial
proposals concerning inter-union disputes. The reforms
proposed in the Government's White Paper prompted a rank
and file reaction within the trade union movement,
alienated some trade union leaders who previously had
supported the Party leadership, and helped forge an
alliance between the Parliamentary Left, the Trade Union
group of MPs, and some trade union leaders which had
considerable long-term implications for the future of the
Labour Party. Whereas it had been possible for some trade
union leaders to accuse the Left in the 1930s and 1950s of
being middle class intellectuals out of touch with trade
unionism, this was no longer possible since it was now the
Labour Left which was to the forefront in defending the
traditional bargaining rights of the union movement. The
division between the Party leadership and the trade unions
over In Place of Strife was a most significant factor in
contributing to the rise of the Left in the 1970s and the
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eventual split in the Labour Party in 1981.(5)
The election of a Conservative Government in
1970 seemingly intent on implementing an ideological
Conservatism which challenged essential features of the
post-war political settlement also undermined the Labour
Right's strategy which, based upon the 'end of ideology'
thesis, had adopted a pragmatic and classless political
appeal. Conservative abandonment of some forms of economic
planning,	 withdrawal of state aid to ailing firms,
establishment of a	 new	 legislative	 framework
	 for
industrial relations, revision of the funding process for
council housing, and implementation of
	 a	 budgetary
strategy giving tax benefits to the high income earner
initiated intense inter-party political debate.
Conservatism appeared to be attacking the working class
and this gave the Labour Left the opportunity to reassert
its belief that Labour's appeal should be based upon both
a more principled commitment to socialism than had been
the case in the 1960s and a defence of the working class.
Terms such as capitalism, crisis and class now appeared
more relevant in political debate and as such influenced
the direction of Labour's political appeal.
The leftward direction of political debate
within the Labour Party was given a further shift as a
consequence of the growth of industrial militancy from
1966 onwards. The number of stoppages of work and the
aggregate number of days lost due to stoppages increased
every year between 1966 and 1970.(6) The impact of this
industrial militancy was felt in the election of some new
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trade union leaders, many of whom were more closely
associated with the Labour Left. We have already referred
in the previous chapter to the fact that new trade union
officials were elected to four of the six largest
affiliated trade unions in the period from 1967 to 1969.
Perhaps the most significant of these elections was that
in which Hugh Scanlon replaced the 'loyalist' Lord Carron
as President of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers. The alliance of Scanlon with Jack Jones of the
Transport and General Workers' Union provided the core to
a powerful Left-wing trade union vote at the Party's
annual conference. By the time Labour lost Office in 1970
the Right-wing bloc vote was no longer dominant at the
Party conference. In its place was an emerging left-wing
bloc vote which provided the base for a powerful left-wing
thrust which developed in the constituency Labour Parties.
Although a steady stream of resolutions had been
submitted to the annual Party conference throughout the
1960's calling for extensions to public ownership the last
occasion on which it had debated the subject had been in
1962 .
 Sut the Party conference agendas for the Opposition
years, 1970, 1971 and 1972 contained an increasing number
of resolutions demanding commitment to public ownership,
either in general terms, often affirming a commitment to
Clause Four, or with regard to a specific industry.(7)
Such a high number, from both CLPs and trade unions, was
both a response to the Conservative Government's proposals
for denationalisation and a reaffirmation of traditional
socialism. Conference decisions from 1970 onwards included
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specific public ownership commitments as well as
	 a
declaration in favour of Clause Four of the Party
constitution - that clause which revisionists had first
tried to delete from the Party constitution and, then
having failed in that objective, tried to downgrade in
importance .(8)
This left wing thrust from the CLPs, dependent
upon a trade union base of support, was given direction by
the NEC. In 1970 a right wing majority still existed
amongst the twenty eight members. Only eleven were on the
Left: six of the seven CLP representatives (Allaun, Benn,
Castle, Driberg, Lestor and Mikardo); three of the five
Women's section representatives (Hart, Jeger, and Short);
and only two of the twelve Trade union section
representatives (Kitson and Forden), but by 1973 the
balance of power within the NEC had shifted towards the
Left following the election of one additional left winger
to both the Women and Trade union sections (Maynard and
Forrester), and also the creation of an additional place
on the NEC for a representative of the Young Socialists
(Doyle). The Left was now in the majority on occasions,
reflected in the fact that by October 1974 two of the
important NEC committees (Home Policy and International
Affairs) were both chaired by left wingers (Benn and
Mikardo) for the first time ever. By 1978 Eric Heffer had
also been elected to chair the important Party
Organisation committee giving the Left the chairmanships
of the three major NEC committees.
This growth of left influence on the NEC had an
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important impact upon the Party policy, electoral strategy
and internal power arrangements, but before considering
these we need to examine in more detail the nature of the
Left's programme as it emerged in the 1970s.
Labour Left Programme 
During the 1970s a more comprehensive Left
programme was drawn up than at any time since the 1930s.
For a great deal of the post-war period the Labour Left
had been more oppositional in manner, responding to the
latest proposals of the Party leadership the
consolidationist proposals of Herbert Morrison and the
reform proposals of Gaitskell and his fellow-revisionists
- by defending the Party's traditional commitments. The
Left might have possessed all the best slogans, such as
peace, equality and justice, but it lacked any detailed
programme for achieving these ends. During the 1970s,
however, the Labour Left was willing to think beyond
slogans and draw up a programme covering a wide range of
policies. For the first time in forty years the Labour
Left was no longer trapped in the defensive and reactive
mentality of much of the post-war period: it possessed a
credible alternative to the Party leadership.
The common ground on which the Labour Left
developed its ideas was economics and defence: first, in
producing an alternative economic programme and, second,
in its criticism of British defence policy.
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Economic programme 
The seminal influence on intra-party political
debate in the 1970s was The Socialist Challenge, written
by Stuart Holland. He attacked Tony Crosland's analysis of
the mixed economy and asserted that Keynesian techniques
of demand management no longer worked. The reason they no
longer worked was because the economy was dominated by
multinational firms whose power was so great as to
minimise the impact of government intervention. These
firms operated in the 'mesoeconomic' sector of the economy
and occupied the contemporary commanding heights of both
the national and international economy. Power resided with
a small number of top managers running monopolistic firms
and a divergence arose between the public interest as
pursued by governments and what was perceived to be that
interest by these economic controllers. Different
perceptions existed on such issues as the balance of
payments, regional development, industrial investment,
prices and productivity. Multinational companies could
undermine a government's monetary, exchange control,
fiscal and locational policies. Whereas Crosland had
argued in 1956 that there had been a transfer of economic
power to political authorities, Holland stated that the
power of multinational and monopoly capital in the
mesoeconomic sector was considerable. Holland therefore
argued that the trend towards national and multinational
monopoly "supports the traditional socialist argument that
without public ownership and control of the dominant means
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of production, distribution and exchange, the State will
never manage the strategic features of the economy in the
public interest".(9) He argued that modern capitalism was
irresponsible and inefficient and it perpetuated a class
structure in which the degree of inequality was
unacceptable. In a language far removed from that used by
Crosland in The Future of Socialism Holland stated that
It.. the private sector in Britain is failing the nation
on a massive scale, and represents a dead weight on the
backs of the working class people...".(10)
Here then was a contemporary justification for
public ownership and control drawn from analysis of
economic developments so lacking in Left arguments in the
1950s. Holland did not propose the destruction of private
sector capitalism but thought that the mix between private
and public ownership should be shifted towards more public
enterprise and ownership. Holland predicted that by the
mid-1980s 100 companies would control two thirds of net
manufacturing output and these key firms needed to be
controlled by a mixture of public ownership and socialist
planning. He argued for the public ownership of
approximately 20 to 25 of the top 100 companies in
manufacturing in order to control one third of total
turnover, two fifths of profits and one half of total
employment.
Holland made considerable use of European
experience, especially from Italy, to develop ideas for
more state planning by the creation of a state-holding
company to manage the affairs of a large sector of the
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economy and by the introduction of planning agreements.
The state-holding company would purchase equity shares in
firms in order to establish some degree of public
enterprise within particular sections of the economy as a
stimulus to growth and efficiency. Furthermore voluntary
planning	 agreements	 would be drawn up between the
government, trade unions and the largest companies
covering prices, wages, investment and labour policies.
Voluntary is perhaps something of a misnomer since it was
envisaged that where companies failed to negotiate
satisfactorily with government and the unions, then the
government would use its purchasing and contract powers to
force the company to adopt the required policies.
The importance of The Socialist Challenge to the
political debate within the Labour Party was recognised by
at least one member of Labour's Right who asserted that
the book:
is glib and cocksure in style and sloppy in
argument; if it could be considered solely on
its intellectual merits, no one would have to
take it seriously. But it cannot be considered
solely on its merits.
Politically, this is a work of the first
importance, which the social democratic wing of
the Labour Party, in particular, will have to
take very seriously indeed. For what Mr. Holland
has done is to pour new wine into old bottles of
Clause Four: to provide, for the first time for
twenty-five years, an at least faintly plausible
theoretical justification for the prejudices of
the Labour Left. He has done so, moreover, at a
time when the Labour Left.., is in desperate
need of plausible theories. In these
circumstances, it seems to me as certain as
anything in politics ever can be that his
arguments will be seized on with delight; and
for that reason, if for no other, his opponents
will be forced to pay a good deal more attention
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to them than they deserve.(11)
The Right took little notice of David Marquand's
advice. Leading revisionists were either silent or made
little attempt to present an argument which incorporated
the evidence of Britain's economic decline. For example,
Tony Crosland reasserted his revisionist position in the
1970s with no examination of the dilemmas or failings of
the 1964-1970 Labour governments.(12)
The tenor of Holland's criticisms of capitalism,
his attacks on Crosland and his reassertion of the need
for public ownership placed him very clearly on the Labour
Left, but his proposals for state planning were not so
obviously part of a Labour Left programme. Proposals in
the Labour Party's policy document Industry and Society,
published in 1958, to purchase equity shares in companies
had been attacked by many on the Left as being a
surreptitious	 attempt	 to	 undermine the traditional
commitment to outright public ownership, whereas now
Holland's proposed state agency to purchase shares was
welcomed by the Left. The difference however, was one of
tenor of language. In 1958 the Labour Party's proposal was
made assuming a framework of relatively efficient and
humane private capital which needed to be tempered by a
modicum of public involvement, whereas in the 1970s the
proposals to manage the economy at the micro level were
put forward as a means of tempering inefficient and
irresponsible capital. Nevertheless, although the tenor of
language was more hostile towards capitalism than had been
the case in 1958, the Labour Left envisaged an economy in
-99-
which private ownership of capital remained substantial.
In contrast to the 1930s when the Labour Left
envisaged public ownership of all major industry the
contemporary Labour Left was more concerned to shift the
mix of public and private ownership of capital in such a
way as to ensure that the economy was run on lines other
than solely profit. Few of the contemporary Labour Left
argued for the elimination of private ownership of
capital. Eric Heffer wrote that "...no one to my knowledge
in the Labour Party wishes publicly to own everything"(13)
and Tony Benn stated that
the Labour Party has never been for 100%
nationalisation of every sweetshop. What we have
talked about are 'the commanding heights', which
in terms of numbers of companies represents
about 20% and in terms of output represents
about 50%.(14)
It was only the Trotskyists within the Party demanding,
for example, the public ownership of the two hundred
leading monopolies who seemed intent on eliminating the
private sector of the economy. Holland specified that the
leading banks, financial institutions and building
societies, along with twenty to twenty five of the leading
companies in the manufacturing sector of the economy,
would be sufficient to determine the overall nature of the
economy. However, much of the time the Labour Left used
general statements along the lines of "a really
substantial extension of public ownership"(15) or "a
substantial and vital sector of the growth industries,
mainly in manufacturing".(16)
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The Socialist challenge was published in 1975
but, as we will see later in this chapter, the key ideas
of public ownership, a state planning agency and planning
agreements were filtered into Labour's policy documents by
the NEC Left before Holland's book was published. These
economic proposals were further extended as a consequence
of the problems facing the British economy from 1975
onwards. In three areas - public expenditure, imports and
the EEC - the Left developed specific and distinctive
proposals.
Revisionists had placed great stress upon public
expenditure because it fitted their belief that fiscal and
social welfare measures were a more appropriate means of
alleviating social inequalities than structural change to
property relationships. The Left did not disagree that
social welfare expenditure was important in alleviating
inequalities but it placed more emphasis on public
ownership. However, by the mid-1970s some on Labour's
Right were questioning whether any further commitment
could be made to expand public expenditure without posing
a threat to liberal democracy,(17) whilst the Labour Left
had become the explicit defenders of public expenditure as
part of its demand for the economy to be reflated and as
part of its opposition to Labour Government expenditure
cuts. The Left argued that increased public expenditure
would be a stimulus to employment, would relieve some of
the serious problems of social deprivation and inequality,
and would go some limited way towards modifying the
capitalist pricing mechanisms. For some on the Left it now
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appeared as if public expenditure had replaced public
ownership as the crucial feature of socialism! For
example, Stan Orme wrote in 1978: "I nail my colours to
the mast of public expenditure" and concluded that the
objective of high public expenditure was why he was in the
Labour Party.(18)
The Left's commitment to reflation raised the
issue of import penetration because it was argued that
stimulating demand would only increase the level of
imports. By the mid-1970s the serious problem of Britain's
deindustrialisation was apparent and it was in response to
the decline in the traditional manufacturing base that
some on the Labour Left began to develop the case for
import controls. This proposal has been associated in
particular with the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, one
of whose leading members has been Francis Cripps, a
sometime adviser to the Tribune Group in the 1970s and an
economic adviser to Tony Benn between 1974 and 1979.
Import controls have generated considerable disagreement
on the Left and they remain one area in the economic
programme where considerable differences of opinion have
prevailed. Some oppose the idea because import controls
have been historically associated with high food prices
and a reduction in people's living standards and others
believe that they undermine the socialist commitment to
internationalism. Sensitivity to such criticisms was
reflected in early proposals that controls should be
placed on finished goods rather than on goods from third
world countries and later stress that the present level of
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imports should be maintained without allowing a further
large increase in a period of reflation.(19) By making
such amendments import controls emerged as an Important
part of the Labour Left's programme but such controls
would be illegal under EEC rules and therefore they served
to reinforce the Labour Left's opposition to the EEC.
British membership of the EEC has been an issue
which at times has transcended the Left/Right divisions
within the Labour Party. For example, in the early years
of debate over whether Britain should join, Eric Heffer on
the Labour Left was in favour, whilst Douglas Jay on the
Labour Right was against entry, but increasingly the
Labour Left opposed entry on grounds of principle and of
practice. The Labour Left's principled opposition was
based on the view that the EEC was formed on purely
capitalist ideals, namely the free movement of capital,
goods and services and the restriction of government
powers to control or plan the economy. Additional
objections were that Britain would lose some degree of
sovereignty to an unelected and unaccountable set of
political institutions and that Britain would inexorably
become drawn into a European foreign and defence policy.
In the 1970s the Labour Left's practical objections were
related to the impact of membership upon the British
economy, in particular that membership contributed to
Britain's de-industrialisation by opening the British
market to import penetration, to the view that the Common
Agricultural Policy would be a considerable burden upon
the taxpayer and would raise the cost of living, and to
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the belief that the development of the European Monetary
System would further restrict Labour's freedom of action.
The Labour Left's greatest worry was that its freedom of
action to introduce a programme of public ownership, state
planning and import controls would be vetoed by the EEC.
For this reason the Labour Left campaigned in the 1975
referendum for the rejection of the negotiated terms of
entry and continued to demand that Britain withdraw from
the EEC until after the 1983 general election defeat when
a division of opinion emerged.
Public ownership, economic planning, public
expenditure, import controls and withdrawal from the EEC
had all become part of a programme which by 1976 had been
given the title of The Alternative Economic Strategy
(hereafter AES). This programme was more comprehensive
than any put forward by the Left in the past. It was a
programme of limited but achievable reforms rather than a
demand for instant socialism. It moved beyond the Labour
Left's usual ability to monopolise the good slogans but
ignore specific policies. It also encouraged the Left to
think more in terms of power rather than permanent
opposition. The AES was the beginnings of a programme for
government but the programme had its weaknesses.
First, the inclusion of the word strategy
implied some detailed planning on the implementation of
the policies, which was not the case. For example, on the
EEC there was no attempt to consider the process of
withdrawal or to develop a post-withdrawal strategy of
international trading. The absence of such a strategy was
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eventually to result in the Labour Party's commitment to
withdraw from the EEC becoming electorally counter-
productive in the 1983 General Election campaign.
Second, there was the question of whether the
programme of state ownership and intervention was any more
than a corporatist rationalisation of a declining
capitalist economy. Whilst some, such as the Labour Co-
ordinating Committee and the Conference of Socialist
Economists, envisaged it being the first stage towards the
socialist transformation of the economy, there were others
who viewed it in a more orthodox Keynesian framework as
being the means to secure the recovery of the British
economy. (20)
Third, the emphasis in the programme on central
planning suggested a corporate or state capitalist
economy. Stuart Holland was aware of this danger and
argued that this would be the case without also a
programme of workers' control(21). But the demand for
workers' control has been one area in which the Labour
Left remains at the level of slogan rather than considered
practical proposal. With the exception of the Institute
for Workers'Control little attempt has been made to
consider in detail any specific plans because this is an
issue on which the Left was, and remains, divided: there
are those who argue that workers' control is an essential
means of extending democracy but others argue that it
would only be a means of undermining trade union power in
a capitalist society.(22) Divisions have existed within
the	 trade	 union movement with conflicting evidence
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submitted to the Bullock Committee established in 1975 and
a divided response to the final report.(23) One reason why
the Labour Left, with the exception of the Institute for
Workers' Control, did not develop a more coherent set of
proposals was because of its wariness of alienating
sections of the trade union movement which, on other
issues, would support the Left. This also partly explains
the Labour Left's unwillingness to discuss the problem of
incomes in the AES.
Only the Labour Co-ordinating Committee and the
Conference of Socialist Economists discussed the issue and
admitted that implementation of the AES would put
considerable pressure on wages. They affirmed the need to
extend the bargaining strength of trade unions and
reaffirmed the importance of free collective bargaining,
but argued that in isolation it was ineffective. They
claimed that there might be an agreement on incomes
reached if the total share of wages in total income was
not reduced, that there were specific measures to control
prices and dividends, taxation measures to redistribute
incomes and that any restriction on wages would be matched
by an increase in trade union powers and control within
the firm.(24)
A fourth weakness of the AES was that it tended
to be discussed in technical and economic terms and yet
the political consequences of its implementation would be
very considerable. There was little discussion of the
capitalist reaction, it being assumed that government
powers to withhold contracts or to refuse price increases
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to	 recalcitrant	 firms	 would	 produce	 the desired
objectives. But no guarantee that government would secure
such collaboration was possible and there was little
attempt by the Labour Left to campaign and educate trade
unionists to act as the only possible mobilising force to
counteract capitalist hostility.
The final weakness of the programme was that the
frame of reference was the nation and it failed to
recognise	 the degree of interdependence of European
economies. It is somewhat surprising that with the
development of multinational capital so well documented by
Stuart Holland in The Socialist Challenge the Labour Left
should place so much reliance on a national strategy of
planning and control and should make no attempts to
develop any multinational discussions in the Labour
movement. This contrasts sharply with the Labour Left's
defence policy where there has been greater emphasis upon
a European movement against nuclear weapons and upon a
European nuclear-free zone. In defence matters the Labour
Left's emphasis shifted between the late-fifties and the
late-seventies from national to international strategies.
Defence and Foreign Affairs 
The Labour Left has concentrated in previous
periods more on foreign affairs than domestic issues. The
rise of fascism in Europe, the Spanish civil war, the
rearmament of Germany and the development of the cold war
have been some of the major international events which
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stimulated a specific Labour Left response. We have argued
in the previous chapter that in foreign affairs the Labour
Left both embraced various strands of opinion and shifted
the emphasis of its demands according to changing
international circumstances. However, the 'third force' of
neutralist ideas of earlier times remained significant in
the 1970s. On the one hand the Left remained critical of
American foreign policy especially its involvement in
South East Asia at the beginning of the decade and its
intervention in the domestic affairs of Chile in 1973. On
the other hand the Left's hostility towards the Soviet
Union was greater than in the 1950s. Whilst a very small
number on the Labour Left remained friends of the Soviet
Union, many more were critical of the treatment of
dissenters in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, the Left held
a view of the Soviet Union, distinct from the Right, which
influenced its view of defence policy requirements. The
Left invoked political reality, so often claimed to be the
sole property of the Right, to argue that the Soviet Union
was a status quo power concerned more with the
consolidation of territory than expansion, that military
expansion in NATO member countries would create internal
problems for the Soviet leadership and that ideological
confrontation, perpetuated by the Soviet leadership, was
more concerned with maintaining internal stability within
the Soviet bloc than with external aggression. The Left
therefore argued that Britain should take a lead in
reducing	 arms	 expenditure	 since this would reduce
international tensions and would not be exploited by
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Soviet aggression.
For much of the decade the Left's main concern
was with the overall level of Britain's defence
expenditure and with developing the argument that it was
too high, in contrast to other NATO countries, and should
be reduced. Defence expenditure was "a parasite on the
economy"(25), diverting valuable resources away from
investment, research and development and hindering the
export market. Britain should take unilateral action to
reduce the military budget and to restrict arms sales in
order to break the log-jam of disarmament negotiations.
Such	 action	 by	 Britain	 would provide a positive
contribution to the lessening of international tension.
In arguing this case, the Labour Left was in a
stronger position than in previous periods because a great
deal more planning and forethought had been given to the
question of defence policy. An NEC study group on Defence
Expenditure, the Arms Trade and Alternative Employment,
established in 1974, brought together left-wing defence
specialists to work out how policy commitments might be
implemented and the reports published by this study group
presented more detailed analysis on this subject than ever
before. (26)
The level of defence expenditure was an
overriding Labour Left concern throughout this period but
the issue of nuclear weapons re-emerged as the central
feature of its programme by the end of the decade. Nuclear
disarmament had racked the Labour Party in the late-1950s
but with the election of the Labour Government in 1964 the
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question became of less importance in political debate.
Individual members of the Labour Left had retained their
concern and commitment to Britain's unilateral abandonment
of nuclear weapons, and for some, a withdrawal from the
NATO alliance, but for the Labour Left in general, detente
and the seeming success of the nuclear deterrent in
preserving peace between the superpowers was instrumental
in little emphasis being placed on the issue over a period
of almost fifteen years between 1964 and the late 1970s.
Perhaps in hindsight nuclear disarmers would be justified
in concluding that the Labour Left had used the issue as a
means to attack Hugh Gaitskell in 1960 and indirectly to
secure Harold Wilson's election as Party Leader in 1963,
but had then subordinated principle to Party. Only in the
late-1970s did the issue of nuclear weapons re-emerge as
an important feature of Left/Right Party debate.
It re-emerged	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the
deterioration in Soviet-American relations, especially
after Russia'a invasion of Afghanistan, the election of a
new American President committed to arms expenditure in
order to bargain with the Russians from a position of
military strengh, the Labour Government's decision to
renew Britain's nuclear defence forces and then the
Conservative Government's decision to accept Cruise
missiles as part of NATO defence strategy.(27)
In this situation the old divisions of the late-
1950s between the unilateralists of the Left and the
multilateralists of the Right re-emerged with the Left
arguing that British possession of nuclear weapons and
-110-
dependence upon Americam missiles made this country more
vulnerable to nuclear attack. When this argument had
divided the Labour Party in the late-1950s the Labour Left
had placed great emphasis upon Britain's likely influence
in the world in making a unilateral gesture but less was
heard of this particular argument and greater emphasis was
placed on securing a European nuclear free zone
independent of, and removed from,the arms race of the two
superpowers. The demand for European nuclear disarmament
from Poland to Portugal has been the theme of much of the
contemporary Labour Left argument.
The Labour Left's unilateralist position on
nuclear weapons won support within the Party primarily
because of the attractiveness of its moral commitment
against such horrifying weapons of destruction but there
were weaknesses in its case which became apparent during
the 1983 General Election campaign. It was never made
clear how Britain would be safer from nuclear attack by
unilaterally abandoning nuclear weapons, neither was it
ever explained in a convincing manner how Britain would
continue to participate in NATO as a non-nuclear power.
Economic affairs and defence were two areas in
which the Left developed a distinctive position during the
1970s. It also enlarged its commitment into other areas
including two of particular interest; the first being its
attitude towards the liberal democratic state and the
second being its view on the position of women in society.
The State 
There has always been a part of the Labour Party
sceptical of either the neutrality or sensitivity of the
state's institutions, in particular Parliament and the
judiciary, towards the demands of the underprivileged. The
Labour Left has regarded direct action and disobedience of
the law as a necessary part of socialist strategy. From
Poplar Borough Council to Clay Cross Urban District
Council, from the unemployed in the North East of England.
to the women of Greenham Common, acts of resistance and
disobedience are regarded as sometimes essential.
This attitude needs distinguishing from the
revolutionary critique of Parliament as part of the
bourgeois state requiring overthrow. The Labour Left
argues that Parliament - both the institution and the
procedures - produces a conservative political hegemony.
Extra-parliamentary political
	 pressure	 is	 necessary
therefore	 in	 order	 to	 stimulate	 radical change.
Furthermore, regular political accountability of
	 the
parliamentarians to the Party membership is necessary in
order to ensure that they maintain their socialist
commitments. The Labour Left adopts a scepticism towards
and a scrutiny of this institution but does not argue for
its abolition and replacement by some form of workers'
assembly. The most explicit contemporary critique of
parliamentary procedures and values comes from Dennis
Skinner. No such critique emanates from the Labour Right
which,	 in contrast, places greater stress upon the
-112-
legitimacy of the state institutions, the necessity of
abiding by the parliamentary process and working for
change within the institutional framework. It is very
uncommon therefore to find the Right advocating or
participating in extra-parliamentary direct action and
disobedience of the law.
After the collapse of the 1929-1931 Labour
Government Laski, Cripps and Cole argued that the election
of a future Labour government would stimulate institutions
such as the Monarchy and the House of Lords to obstruct
its policies. The Socialist League entitled one of its
earlier publications 'Can Socialism Come by Constitutional
Means?', making clear its doubts concerning the neutrality
of the state. However, by the 1950s the topic attracted
little attention on the Labour Left for the obvious reason
that it appeared that the state machinery was amenable to
socialist initiatives. Only in the 1970s did the Left
return to the question in the light of what it regarded as
the partiality of judges, housing commissioners, district
auditors, civil servants and controllers of the media.
Two issues which focused the Left's attentions
on this subject were the Conservative Government's
industrial relations and housing legislation. It was
argued that in both cases the law was being used to
discriminate against the weak. Organised labour was being
restricted in its day-to-day business and the withdrawal
of housing subsidy was forcing council house tenants to
pay higher rents. In both cases the left argued that the
law was discriminating against the underprivileged and was
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being administered in a partial manner and therefore it
should be disobeyed rather than wait for the normal
electoral
	 and	 parliamentary	 procedures
	
to	 secure
amendment.
The Left's challenge to the 'rule of law' was
given considerable boost by the TUC's decision in 1972
that its affiliated members should not register with the
Registrar of Friendly Societies, thus making them liable
to legal action in industrial disputes, nor should they
recognise the decisions of the Industrial Relations Court.
This policy culminated in the TUC's threat to call a
general strike in July 1972 following the arrest of five
London dockworkers for contempt of court.
Greater collective solidarity existed amongst
trade unionists in the non-implementation of the
Conservatives' industrial relations policy than amongst
Labour Councillors over the Housing Finance Act.
Eventually only one local authority (Clay Cross) refused
to implement the Act, resulting in the surcharging and
disqualification of twenty one councillors.
The Labour Left's commitment to extra-
parliamentary direct action was part of its challenge to
the PLP's dominance of the Labour Party. We will examine
in Chapter five its specific challenge to Labour
parliamentarians' security of tenure but will note here
the Left's critique of a political strategy reliant solely
on parliamentary activity. The Left believed in the need
for extra-parliamentary agitation as a necessary auxiliary
to parliamentary activity in order to generate a radical
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popular consciousness and stimulate radical change. Direct
action was a necessary feature of socialist activity
because of its impact upon popular attitudes and the
political elite.
Apart from this general critique of the state
and the nature of the law the Labour Left developed more
specific criticisms of certain state institutions which
recruited from a very narrow social base and were
therefore felt to be out of touch and sympathy with a
radical point of view. It believed that the judiciary
displayed this bias in its treatment of organised labour.
Its experience of senior civil servants during Labour
governments of the 1960s and 1970s was that the mandarins
were willing to sabotage radical initiatives. One group of
Labour Left MPs commented that
senior civil servants.., wield a great deal of
power and exercise it to the full to prevent any
changes, which they do not want, from being
carried through. (28)
It regarded the controllers of the media as irresponsible,
unaccountable and antagonistic towards organised labour.
The Labour Left's proposals for dealing with
this bias were ill-thought-out however. It tended to argue
for more open recruitment to the judiciary and civil
service as the means to curb their anti-Labour sentiment
rather than examine the structures and roles of such
institutions. The group of Left Labour MPs referred to
above did suggest that civil service power should be
restricted by the creation of "a ministerial committee
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system" under which Labour backbench MPs would comprise a
departmental cabinet to ensure that Party policy was
adhered to. However, it was the local government left
which made an attempt to curb the power of conservative
institutions by creating new structures, new posts and
expecting senior personnel in these posts to adopt a new,
more radical, role. We will examine this development in
Chapter ten.
Finally, in considering the development of a
wide-ranging Labour Left programme, we should consider the
impact of feminism.
Socialist feminism 
The emergent women's movement took many forms in
the 1970s - radical, socialist and reformist - and led to
many types of political intervention; for example, the
establishment of battered women's refuges and women's aid
centres, and campaigns to defend existing abortion
legislation and to demand equal pay and equal rights. This
new feminism was not necessarily linked to socialism. For
example, divisions occurred amongst feminists arguing that
class relationships (gender-based as well as occupation-
based) were the major source of women's oppression and
those arguing the primacy of biological differences. Those
arguing the latter point of view rejected the linkage
between socialism and feminism. I do not intend to examine
this	 debate here but merely to note the important
contribution of socialist feminism
	
to	 Labour	 Left
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ideology. Socialist feminists added another dimension to
the Labour Left's demands for a fundamental reorganisation
of society; they argued that the transformation of social
and sexual relationships was only possible within a non-
capitalist environment. Sally Alexander, for example,
argues that "...our demands, even at their minimum, cannot
be achieved without a fundamental reorganisation of
society".(29) Here was a powerful, additional intellectual
thrust to the socialist case, but it needs to be noted
that the linkage has not been without tensions. On the one
hand those on the Labour Left adopting a traditional
'economism' have argued that female oppression is a
diversion from the 'real' class struggle which has its
roots in the ownership of the means of production. On the
other hand some socialist feminists believe that the
predominant maleness of the Labour Left ensures that women
remain subordinate even amongst those claiming a
commitment to radical transformation. Furthermore, apart
from such ideological tensions there have also been
disagreements on specific items of policy. For example,
women have argued that the AES was designed to restore
(male) jobs in the economy and ignore questions of female
employment(30) and the demand for a distinctive and
autonomous position for women within the Party has also
created argument which we will examine in a later chapter.
Le4C
The development of this/programme, encouraged by
the NEC and sustained by the surge in political support
within the constituency parties and the trade unions,
enabled the Labour Left to gain the political initiative
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within the Party. This was reflected in significant Party
developments between 1970 and 1974.
Economic policies 
The Labour Left's re-emergence as a powerful
political force within the Party is reflected in the
longest and most comprehensive policy document ever
produced by the Party - Labour's Programme 1973. It was
the product of a considerable exercise of policy
deliberation carried on in many NEC sub-committees and
study groups, many of which often became particular
strongholds of Left or Right opinions.(31) The policy
document contained a comprehensive cover of Party policy
on a wide range of topics including the EEC, housing,
transport,	 agriculture,	 pensions,	 education,	 civil
liberties, overseas aid, European security and foreign
policy with recommendations, most of which were acceptable
to Left and Right. Where the serious factional divisions
occurred	 and where the Left's renewed strength was
reflected concerned the analysis and recommendations
contained in the first forty pages covering the Party's
industrial strategy.
The tenor of the language and the specific
proposals angered the Right. The change in tenor from
previous years can be displayed by comparison of Signposts 
for the Sixties, Labour's Programme 1972, and then
Labour's Programme 1973. In 1962 the Party regarded the
mixed economy as inefficient but capable of reform:
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The danger that faces us, after a decade of
complacent Tory Government is not the sudden
catastrophe of slump and mass unemployment, but
piecemeal economic deterioration and gradual
political decline. These processes of decay
have, indeed, already begun. But there is still
time to halt them...(32)
In 1972 criticism of the economy remained relatively mild:
...the market economy has many defenders, some
advantages, and a great deal of defects.(33)
However, by 1973 the language had become uncompromisingly
critical:
The experience of Labour Governments has made it
increasingly evident that even the most
comprehensive measures of social and fiscal
reform can only succeed in masking the
unacceptable and unpleasant face of a capitalist
economy, and cannot achieve any fundamental
changes in the	 power	 relationships	 which
dominate our Society.(34)
Labour's Programme 1973 indicted capitalism as
inefficient, inhumane and irresponsible and asserted the
need for public control of the leading sectors of industry
either by means of outright public ownership or by
selective investment in, and control of, particular
sections of industry by a new state agency, the National
Enterprise Board.
What caused considerable argument within the NEC
was the specific proposal that the Party would take a
controlling interest in twenty-five of the largest
manufacturing firms.(35) Furthermore, it was proposed that
both public and private firms would be encouraged to draw
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up, in consultation with the trades unions, planning
agreements detailing key decisions concerning firms'
policies on matters such as pricing, investment, profits
and labour. It was made clear that the Party would expect
such agreements to be drawn up by the one hundred largest
manufacturing firms.
The programme contained many ambiguities and was
based upon as many revisionist as traditional socialist
assumptions. For example, the fact that it contained
proposals for the purchase of equity shares in firms as a
means of control, a proposal which many on the Left had
opposed in 1958 when contained in a Party policy document
Industry and Society, tended to be overlooked by the Left
since the general emphasis in the programme was on an
economic policy which stressed the need for physical
intervention by the state in place of the revisionist
emphasis in the 1960's on fiscal measures as a means of
economic inducement.
The NEC was responsible for Labour's Programme 
1973 but it was from another body, the Liaison Committee,
that a second important policy document, Economic Policy
and the Cost of Living, energed.(36) This contained a
commitment to abolish the legal framework of industrial
relations' legislation introduced by the Conservative
Government, to introduce economic, social and industrial
measures designed to redistribute income and opportunity
to working people including price controls and subsidies,
rent restraint, pension increases, abolition of
prescription charges, reform of the tax structure and
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schemes of industrial democracy, and finally to respect
the trade unions' concern for free collective bargaining.
This rejection of wages policy and legal intervention in
collective bargaining was a complete reversal of the
Labour Government's previous policies in this area.
Defence
The Left's demands on defence were incorporated
into resolutions carried by the 1972 and 1973 Party
conferences. In 1972 the conference approved a resolution
which
opposed... any British defence policy which is
based on the use or threatened use of nuclear
weapons either by this country or its allies and
demands the removal of all nuclear bases in this
country.(37)
The following year both these demands were again carried
with, in addition, two further points. First, that these
commitments be included in the General Election manifesto
and, second,
that Britain should cut its military expenditure
initially by at least £1,000 million per
year. (38)
The specificity of these demands resulted in the NEC
asking for the resolution to be remitted, and when this
failed asking for its defeat but the resolution secured a
majority of seven hundred thousand votes.(39)
Apart from a significant shift in Party policies
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on the economy and defence the renewed strength of the
Left was displayed in the Party's response to specific
Conservative Government policies.
Non-compliance with the law
The Left perceived the Government's industrial
relations and housing policies as direct attacks on
working people and demanded that the Party should support
non-compliance with the relevant laws. For example, a
resolution passed at the 1972 Party conference, against
the advice of the NEC, fully supported those "campaigning
for non-co-operation and non-implementation of the Housing
Finance Act", and called for retrospective relief for any
councillors who suffered financial penalties for their
action.(40) At the 1973 Party conference, by which time
collective resistance to the Housing Finance Act had
collapsed, both NEC support and conference approval was
given for a resolution promising retrospective removal of
all penalties, financial and otherwise, for the Clay Cross
councillors who had refused to implement the Housing
Finance Act.
The Labour Left's impact was felt during these
years in certain important areas of Party policy but there
were also other features of the Party's politics, in
particular its electoral strategy and its internal
distribution of power, in which the growth of the Labour
Left was beginning to have an impact.
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Electoral strategy 
Whereas the revisionists had used psephological
research to justify an electoral appeal devoid of
socialism or class commitments in order to attract a
'middle ground' in the electorate the Left's electoral
strategy was one with an explicit socialist and working
class commitment. It's view was that the Party had lost
the 1970 General Election because of working 	 class
defections	 and	 that	 this	 electoral base required
nourishing. This electoral strategy was fortified over the
next four years by the Conservative Government's economic,
industrial relations, housing and social welfare policies,
some of which appeared to discriminate along class lines.
An ideological Conservatism, apparently benefitting the
more affluent members of society, strengthened the Left's
demands for a more explicit affirmation of socialist
ideology and a commitment to defend the working class.
Thus Labour's election manifesto of February 1974 stated
that the Labour Party had "Socialist aims and... (was)
proud of the word".(41)
Internal distribution of power 
The Left's view of the distribution of power
within the Party also differed from that of the
revisionists. The Left retained a commitment to the Party
member	 as	 important	 policy-maker	 and	 political
communicator	 whereas	 the revisionists had tried to
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downgrade the role of the Party
	 member	 in	 both,
particularly since it believed that political
communication was best carried out through the media and
advertising. The Left believed that one of the reasons
Labour lost Office in 1970 was because the Party
leadership had ignored the views of the membership and had
thus devalued the relative importance of the extra-
parliamentary Party. The Left was now intent on ensuring
that the previous imbalance was rectified. First senior
Party officials were appointed whose terms of reference
made	 clear
	 their
	 prime	 obligation to the extra-
parliamentary Party.(42)
Second, parliamentarians could no longer expect
automatic support from the NEC in any disputes between
them and their constituency parties. Under previous right
wing control the NEC had supported the parliamentarian in
any local Party conflict, even to the point of threatening
to disband any CLP which appeared unwilling to readopt its
incumbent Labour MP.(43) In 1970 Party rules were changed,
making the task of 'deselecting' an MP slightly
easier,(44) and when Lincoln CLP abided by these new rules
in removing its MP, Dick Taverne, the NEC did not come to
his support. The Lincoln
	 Party's	 actions	 mark	 a
significant change in the Party's internal power
relationships. This 'deselection' and Taverne's exit from
the Labour Party establish important precedents for the
future of the Party. The immediate impact was within local
parties. Sheffield Brightside CLP followed
	 Lincoln's
example by dismissing its MP, Eddie Griffiths, in 19714 to
-124-
be followed by Newham North East CLP. The expulsion of Reg
Prentice from Newham became a 'cause celebre' within the
Party and stimulated grass roots Party support for a well-
organised campaign to make all Labour MPs regularly
accountable to their CLPs which will be discussed in
Chapter five. Between 1970 and 1979, when the rules
concerning reselection were again changed, eight CLPs
rejected their incumbent MP and the NEC endorsed the local
Party's decision in six of the cases.(45)
Finally, the NEC adopted a more tolerant
attitude towards organised factionalism within the Party.
It believed that the harassment of the Left in the 1930s
and 1950s should not be repeated. Organised activities
which previously had been curbed by the NEC under the 1946
constitutional amendment were now accepted, and the
Party's 'proscribed list' of organisations was abolished
in 1973.(46) It refused to act against the Militant Group
after the Party's National Agent had produced a report in
1975 suggesting that it was acting in an unconstitutional
manner(47) and in 1976 it appointed a Militant activist,
Andy Bevan, as the Party's Youth Officer.(48)
By 1974 the Left was optimistic. The Party had
rediscovered and reaffirmed its socialist and working
class links and the internal power relationships had
altered. This is reflected in the fact that the usual
history of organised factionalism within the Party had
been reversed. Until 1970 the Left had been forced to
organise almost continuously whereas the Right, apart from
the time of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism between
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1960 and 1963, had no need for such activities. However,
in the 1970s various organised bodies of the Right emerged
within the Party - the Social Democratic Alliance, the
Manifesto Group, and the Campaign for Labour Victory -
whereas the Left had no need to organise extensively since
the Labour Party had become the voice of the Left.
The Right appeared demoralised and disunited.
First, Dick Taverne criticised his former CDS colleagues
for their timidity in not fighting the Left's upsurge,
whilst they were privately critical of his judgement in
forcing an open conflict with the Left. Second, in July
1975 leaders of the SDA attacked such leading Right wing
figures as Roy Jenkins, and Tony Crosland for their
pusillanimity in dealing with the Left.
The Party fought and won the 1974 General
Election with manifestos more specific in their commitment
to public ownership than their counterpart ten years
earlier.(49) The fact that Labour was returned to Office
due to a decline in Conservative electoral support was
passed over.(50) Labour was now the governing Party with a
left wing programme. Even the new PLP reflected this
leftwards shift. A new intake of Labour MPs after the two
General Elections appeared to be closely associated with
the Left. The Tribune Group's membership rose to 90, its
largest ever figure, and it seemed as if the Left had
begun to reverse its traditional weakness amongst the
parliamentarians when Ian Mikardo, a senior figure of the
Labour Left, was elected Chairman of the PLP in 1974. But
from this apparent position of strength the fortunes of
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the Left declined over the next five years.
Labour Governments 1974-1979 
” ...we have now become the natural Party of
Government in this country." Harold Wilson(51)
"We were all conned." Ian Mikardo(52)
The Left position shifted from one of apparent
strength within the Party in 1974 to one of apparent
weakness by 1979 and as a consequence its mood changed
from one of confidence and optimism to one of dismay and
despair. The Labour Government abandoned many of the key
commitments made by the Party in Opposition, it drew up a
parliamentary pact with the Liberal Party without any
consultations within the Party, it suffered electoral
losses in seven Parliamentary by-elections including the
loss of such safe Labour seats as Ashfield, Birmingham
Stetchford and Workington, and it became involved in
confrontations with certain large trade unions over wages
policy in which some leading figures in the Labour
Government seemed to relish the opportunity to make verbal
attacks on trade unionists.(53) The culmination of this
saga was the production of an election manifesto in 1979
which ignored some of the main commitments which the Left
had secured in preceding years. These five years of Labour
Government could have led to the complete collapse of the
Left as it experienced similar setbacks to those in the
late 1960s. Remarkably, however, whilst tensions within
the Left resulted in a degree of fragmentation, the
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overall position of the Left, as it once again in 1979
prepared for a period with Labour in Opposition, was one
of increasing strength.
The watershed for the Left was the referendum on
the terms of entry into the EEC, held in June 1975. This
referendum was the result of a Left victory within the NEC
in 1973 committing the Party to the testing of public
opinion on this issue by the use of a procedure alien to
the political system. The opponents of the EEC regarded
this device as a means of checking the pro-Europeans
within the Party and at first the strategy appeared to be
successful. Majorities were opposed to entry on the terms
negotiated by the Labour Government within the NEC, at a
special Party conference, and even within the PLP; only
within the Cabinet did a majority support entry on the
negotiated terms. However, Harold Wilson was successful in
persuading the Party to allow all members the freedom to
campaign as they pleased thus avoiding an outright Party
split.
The campaign within the Labour movement against
entry into the EEC was spearheaded by members of the
Labour Left and the referendum result was interpreted by
many commentators as a defeat for the Left. Considering
the fact that the Labour Party was divided, with the Prime
Minister and his senior Cabinet colleagues supporting
entry, and the imbalance of campaign expenditure and media
coverage, the anti-EEC vote was remarkably high,(54) but
Harold Wilson's response to the referendum result was to
interpret it as a defeat for the Left and therefore as the
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opportunity to remove Tony Benn from the Department of
Industry.
Labour's Industrial Strategy
The twenty-one-member Cabinet formed in 1974
contained only four people whose past association had been
with the Labour Left - Michael Foot, Barbara Castle, John
Silkin and Tony Benn. As Secretary of State for Industry,
Tony Benn was in the key position to implement the Party's
industrial strategy which he had been prominent in working
out in Opposition. Benn introduced the Industry Bill,
which established the National Enterprise Board as the
instrument for promoting the re-organisation of industry,
for extending public ownership into the profitable areas
of manufacturing and for creating new industrial
enterprises, in February 1975. He also provided financial
support for workers' co-operatives at Meriden, the
Scottish Daily News and at Kirkby, but in pursuing these
policies he incurred the considerable hostility of the
Confederation of British Industry, sections of the media
and even parts of his own Ministry.(55) The aftermath of
the EEC referendum therefore provided a convenient moment
for the Prime Minister to shift Benn to a less politically
sensitive department and appoint a new Minister, Eric
Varley, who, while being an anti-European, had played a
limited role in the EEC referendum, had displayed little
commitment to the NEC's industrial strategy and owed his
initial political promotion to Harold Wilson.(56) Harold
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Wilson and Eric Varley were more likely to secure the
confidence of industrial and financial capital than Tony
Benn.
In the face of the sinking pound and a deficit
on the current account of the balance of payments the
Labour Government's clear objective became one of securing
the confidence of, first, national and then, second,
international capital. By the time the Party conference
met in October 1975 the NEC was beginning to express
doubts about the Labour Government's commitment to the
original industrial strategy. In a policy document Labour 
and Industry the NEC described the "appalling record of
failure by British industry" and argued that the economic
crisis made the need for Labour's industrial strategy even
greater. Whilst praising the Labour Government for its
achievements so far it added that the Government "must now
begin in earnest to involve itself in the kind of economic
and industrial planning originally envisaged in Labour's
Programme".(57) It argued that the Industry Bill now fell
"very considerably short of our original proposals" and
concluded that planning agreements needed to be introduced
in which the government held reserve powers, that the NEB
should receive El billion per annum for the next five
years, that public ownership of whole industries should be
introduced, that there was the need for a substantial
public sector in banking and, finally, there was the need
for selective import controls.(58) Both Judith Hart and
Tony Benn, the NEC speakers at the Party conference on
this policy document, demanded more commitment from the
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Government to this industrial strategy.(59)
By November 1975 the NEC's fears were confirmed
when the Government's industrial policy was outlined. In
papers presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
the new Secretary of State for Industry to an
industrialists' conference stress was put upon the need
for a profitable sector of the economy. No longer was the
tone of language one of condemnation of the
irresponsibility and inefficiency of capital, but rather
one of support stressing "...the importance of sustaining
a private sector of industry which is vigorous, alert,
responsible and profitable."(60) Such a perspective
required the co-operation and support of capital, in
particular of the peak organisation of industrial capital
- the Confederation of British Industry. The CBI was
totally opposed to the NEC's interventionist industrial
strategy
	 and	 campaigned
	 against it. It found the
Government aid to private firms acceptable but was opposed
to the idea that such aid should be used as a means of
securing structural change in the economy.
CBI opposition to an industrial policy designed
to secure structural change in the British economy was
successful in that the NEB operated in a manner entirely
different from that envisaged by the NEC and the planning
agreement procedures were still-born. In terms of both the
limited scope allowed to the NEB to invest in private
industry and its limited role in acting as a catalyst for
structural changes the NEB acted primarily as the State's
holding company for Government money invested in firms.
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Furthermore, only one planning agreement was introduced
during the lifetime of the Labour Government and this one
proved useless in alerting the labour force in the
Chrysler company to the firm's imminent sale to a foreign
company.(61)
Another important aspect of Labour's industrial
strategy was worker control in industry. Both Holland and
Benn had stressed its significance. For example, Holland
in The Socialist Challenge had distinguished state
capitalism from socialism by "the extent to which working
people can exercise control over the conditions and
results of their own activity" .(62) In 1975 the Labour
Government had appointed a Committee of Inquiry, chaired
by Sir Alan Bullock, to consider the best means to achieve
"a radical extension of industrial democracy".(63) The
majority of this Committee reported in 1977 in favour of
employees having a statutory right to be represented on
Company Boards by trade union worker directors, but
divisons amongst the Committee's membership, divisions
amongst trade unions on this subject, and outright and
sustained	 opposition by industrialists to industrial
democracy resulted in the Government proceeding no further
than general	 statements
	 of	 support	 for	 worker
participation	 in	 company decision-making during the
remaining years it was in Office.(64)
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The Social Contract 
The Government began its term of office by
introducing a range of industrial measures designed to
satisfy the wishes of the trade unions. The Conservative
Government's Industrial Relations Act was repealed as was
the legislative framework of its prices and incomes policy
and new Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts were
introduced in 1974 and 1975 which, among other things,
legalised the 'closed shop'. The Employment Protection Act
and the Industry Act were also introduced in 1975 both of
which included provisions which trade unions wanted and to
these can be added the creation of the Manpower Services
Commission, the Health and Safety Commission and the
Advisory, Arbitration and Conciliation Service, as well as
the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination legislation. In
specific areas of industrial policy this Labour Government
introduced more legislation designed to meet the wishes of
trade unions than any previous Labour Administration. This
receptivity of Labour Ministers to specific trade union
demands was of crucial importance in explaining why the
trade union movement softened its criticism of the Labour
Government for reneging on its commitments in other areas
of the social contract.
As a result of the rapid rise in the retail
prices index in the first half of 1975 the Government
abandoned its commitment to free collective bargaining and
introduced a policy of wage restraint, voluntary in name
but increasingly backed up by administrative measures
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which the government used against employers to force wage
increases to be kept to a norm. This policy received
initial TUC support in 1976 and again in 1977, but with a
commitment to a phased return to free collective
bargaining. Then in 1978 the TUC rejected a policy of a 5%
limit on wage increases. During the period between March
1975 and June 1977 real take home pay fell by 8%(65) and
the Government eventually confronted the seamen, firemen
and public service workers in industrial disputes during
which many Ministers displayed considerable hostility
towards the trade union movement.
This strategy of trying to stimulate economic
growth by building up capital's confidence and by curbing
labour's bargaining powers failed to alleviate Britain's
economic problems and furthermore it failed to secure the
equality to which the Party was committed. From the Budget
of April 1975 onwards the Government was intent on cutting
public expenditure and thus undermining a key area of the
social contract. In July 1976 public expenditure cuts of
£1,000 million were announced followed by a cut of £2,500
million in December 1976 prior to an application to the
International Monetary Fund for a loan of £2,300 million.
Not only did this lead to the abandonment of welfare
commitments(66) but it also generated additional
unemployment which hovered throughout 1977, 1978 and 1979
around the one and a half million mark.
A third area of policy in which the Labour
Government pursued policies markedly different from those
approved by the Party when in Opposition was over defence.
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Defence
In order to ensure that its commitment to cut
military expenditure by £1,000 millions per annum was
implemented the NEC established in 1975 the study group on
Defence Expenditure, the Arms Trade and Alternative
Employment "to assess how and with what consequences it
(i .e . party policy) might be implemented .. ." . (67 ) This
study group, whose membership included three Junior
Ministers - two from the Ministry of Defence and one from
the Foreign Of fice - received considerable documentary
evidence on how and where cuts in the military budget
might be made as well as examining alternative forms of
production which would safeguard jobs.
Two major points of difference existed between
the Government and the Left - on Soviet intentions and on
the impact of unilateral actions - and the Government' s
perceptions on both resulted in the Left' s demands being
rejected. The Government argued that the Left was
unrealistic with regard to Soviet foreign policy. Russia
remained a threat only curbed by mil itary preparedness :
any perceived weakness in Western defence would be
exploited by the Soviet Union. Therefore whilst the
Government' s long-run objective was disarmament and a run-
down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliance it was vital
that neither side weakens its defensive
arrangements to such an ex tent that the other
side is able to take advantage of this weakness
to force through agreements which, far from
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enhancing the stability of inter-state
relations, might actually harm them in the long
term. Thus, from the point of view both of the
Alliance's interest in the pursuit of detente
and of the maintenance of an effective deterrent
force, it is important that Alliance members do
not reduce their contributions and, where
possible, actually improve the effectiveness of
their forces so as to stem the widening gap
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.(68)
This statement, with its implicit commitment at the end to
an expansion of arms provision was a complete rejection of
Party policy. Further rejection was contained in the
Government's belief that the Warsaw Pact countries would
not follow any unilateral action by Britain and that such
action would act as a destabilising influence in
international relations. Thus the Government's attitude
was that on political, military and economic grounds there
was no case for substantial cuts in future defence
expenditure. Between 1974 and 1979 it increased defence
expenditure and it also decided to modernise Britain's
independent nuclear defence force.(69)
Conclusion
The period from 1970 to 1979 was one of shifting
balances in the factional struggle. Labour was in Office
for fifty months, but for thirty six months of this period
lacked an overall parliamentary majority, and in
Opposition for forty four months. These ebbs and flows in
electoral support and parliamentary majority were matched
by ebbs and flows in the relative strengths of Left and
Right. The Left increased its powers and influence in the
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years of Opposition but it was weak during Labour's period
in Office. The confidence and optimism of 1974 was
replaced by dismay and despair as the carefully prepared
policies devised in Opposition were abandoned.
Both the NEC and the Party conference expressed
opposition to the Labour Government's policies on
occasions. The NEC was often openly critical of the
Government, passing resolutions "deploring", or "deeply
regretting" some aspects of Government policy, openly
criticising the Government at Labour Party conferences,
and even supporting a public demonstration against the
Government's public expenditure cuts in November 1976(70).
But the NEC wavered in its condemnation at times and in
certain situations majorities could be found on the NEC
for supporting the Government. For example, at the 1978
Party conference the NEC recommended acceptance of a
resolution which "support(ed) the economic strategy of the
Labour Government..." and asked for remission of a
resolution critical of the five per cent wages policy. In
both cases the Party conference failed to heed the NEC's
advice: in fact the delegates to the Party conference
displayed an even more critical approach to the Government
by defeating the NEC on a total of twenty one separate
occasions at the four conferences when Labour was the
governing party between 1975 and 1978.(71)
We have already referred to the parliamentary
left's opposition to the Government's policies. Backbench
rebellions were led by members of the Tribune Group, but
they continued to sustain the Government on votes of
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confidence. Some of the anguish, frustration and
despondency of the parliamentary left can be gauged from
Ian Mikardo's speech during a 'confidence' debate in the
House of Commons in 1978
I voted with the Government last night with the
utmost reluctance and with deep unhappiness. I
voted for a policy in which I did not believe
and only because I did not wish to be a party to
an attack from the Opposition Benches which was
manifestly hypocritical. I supported the
Government with great unhappiness, but I must
tell my Right. Hon. and Hon. Friends that I
shall not do it again.(72)
Yet again the Labour Left had helped to sustain a Labour
government in Office with very limited socialist
ambitions.
How did the Government survive these attacks
from the NEC, the annual Party conference, and from some
members of the PLP? It was able to undermine this
opposition by developing consultative procedures with key
trade union leaders from which emerged a degree of
consensus. By introducing a considerable range of measures
in the area of Labour law the Government was able to
maintain the support of enough trade union leaders to
sustain sane degree of political authority within the
Labour movement. Government consultations with the trade
unions tended to	 be	 with	 the	 six	 trade	 union
representatives on the National Economic Development
Council (NEDC) and the trade union members of the Labour
Party/TUC Liaison Committee.(73) What occurred during this
period was a division between 'the Party of Government'
and 'the Labour Party' . Whilst the Labour Party channelled
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its discontent through the NEC and the annual conference,
the Government used the Liaison Committee to undermine the
influence of the extra-Parliamentary Party. The Liaison
Committee emerged as the key institution for 'the Party of
Government' whilst the NEC was demoted in political
importance. The Party's Research Secretary has described
how the NEC "was at a disadvantage compared to other major
interest groups, including the CBI, the City, the TUC and
others".(74) Senior trade union leaders were willing to
sustain the Labour Government in Office even when
differing with Ministers on policy matters because of the
serious threat facing the trade union movement if a
Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher was
elected to power. Whereas the Left had been very critical
of much of the trade union leadership in the nineteen
fifties for being unrepresentative of rank and file
opinion it was loathe to criticise in the nineteen
seventies. It did not wish to upset the base upon which
the Left's political majorities had been established.
Furthermore, some of the leading figures upon which this
alliance between the Left and the trade unions had been
created, notably Jack Jones and Michael Foot, were now the
architects and defenders of the alliance between
Government and trade unions. The latent tension which was
present between the Left and this trade union leadership
eventually exploded in a personal confrontation and public
argument at the Tribune rally held at the 1976 Party
conference when Jack Jones was so enraged by Ian Mikardo's
comments on the trade unions that he forced himself onto
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the platform demanding a right of reply.
If this explains how the Government managed to
survive the criticisms of the left-dominated Party it does
not explain why the Government abandoned some of the major
commitments made by this left-dominated Party. Three major
explanations can be advanced: first, the policies were
unrealistic; second, powerful institutional restraints
prevailed; and, third, the people in Office were of weak
calibre and commitment.
The argument that the policies were at fault is
based upon the view that economic crisis necessitates
orthodox economic policies. The AES, and in particular
increased public expenditure, was entirely inappropriate
at a time when the British economy was suffering from
rapid inflation and a weak pound. This point of view is
argued most ably by Martin Holmes in The Labour Government 
197)4-1979.
The	 interpretation	 which	 emphasises	 the
institutional restraints on the Government considers both
international and national factors at work. It is argued
that the sovereignty of any government is limited by
treaty	 obligations	 and in the case of the Labour
Government membership of NATO and the EEC made it
impossible to abandon nuclear commitments unilaterally or
to introduce import controls. Beyond treaty obligations
there is also the power of multinational capital anxious
to avoid any national restrictions placed upon its freedom
of action to maintain its transfer pricing arrangements,
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to shift investment capital and, as an ultimate measure,
to withdraw entirely from the economy. National capital
can also bring pressures to bear on governments by
withdrawal of confidence. The CBI threatened not to co-
operate with the Government if the proposals contained
within the Bullock Committee Report on worker control were
implemented, and talked of an investment strike against
Government economic policies.(75) By 1976 the weak economy
necessitated arranging a loan with the International
Monetary Fund and the price extracted from the Government
was the abandonment of its 'social contract' commitments.
Finally, the institutional pressures from the bureaucracy
on a radical government can be considerable. It has been
argued that the proposals contained in Labour's industrial
strategy were sabotaged by senior civil servants at the
Department of Trade and Industry.(76)
A third explanation for the Left's failure was
that the Government personnel were drawn from the Labour
Right and they had no intention of implementing the
Party's pre-1974 policy commitments. During the years in
Opposition the policies had shifted but not the personnel
who merely lay low waiting for times to change and for
their chance to return to Office.
It is impossible to make an authoritative
judgement on which of these three explanations is most
accurate, but what is important is to note that the Labour
Left regarded the third as being the most convincing,
along with part of the second which covers the civil
service. A right wing set of Ministers, with their
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conservative advisers, had sabotaged the Left and
therefore the main thrust of Labour Left activity after
1979 was to rid the Party of 'dishonest' politicians. By
establishing procedures to place regular pressures on
Labour MPs, by removing the PLP's sole right to elect the
Party leadership, and then by electing persons from the
Left to lead the Party 'sell outs' would no longer occur.
Party policy was satisfactory: it was Party structures and
personnel which required changing.
There is no doubt that one of Callaghan's last
acts as Prime Minister provided a considerable boost to
this left interpretation. The Party had agreed that the
general election manifesto should not be produced in a
hurried manner but instead a long-drawn-out and elaborate
process of consultation between Ministers and the NEC had
been instituted in order to arrive at a Party programme
which reflected Party policy but was also sensitive to the
problems of governing in the late-seventies. However, at
the very last minute this draft manifesto was replaced by
a document drawn up by the Prime Minister's office in
which were missing some of the key Party commitments made
during previous years by the Party conferences including
the abolition of the House of Lords.(77) The cavalier
manner in which Callaghan and his colleagues pushed to one
side the policies drawn up over the previous years
contributed directly to the structural reforms of the
Party in the 1980s.
The Labour Left had been thwarted between 1974
and 1979 but the consequence of this check was to
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stimulate an increase in Labour Left activity. Labour's
Right had been further undermined during this period,
first because the majority of the personnel in the Labour
Cabinets had been drawn from its ranks and, second, the
Left's programme had been replaced by emergency measures
identified with the Right. This close association and
identification of the Right with the Labour Government
weakened its position. On the other hand, the Left could
not be accused of bringing the Government down by open
rebellion: their loyalty was not in doubt.
The Labour Left was not faced, as in 1970, with
other competing left groups. The growth of the left wing
sects had subsided and the radical student movement had
dwindled. Individual membership of the Party, always
notoriously difficult to estimate accurately at this time,
appeared to be rising, albeit from a very low base(79) and
within the CLPs a large-scale grass roots rebellion was
under way due to the manner in which Party policy had been
ignored.
The rise of the Left was given an added boost by
the emergence of a senior Labour politician with Cabinet
experience as its figurehead, able to weld together all
the disparate elements into one single force by 1981. But
before considering the influence of Tony Benn we need to
examine the left wing grass roots rebellion.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RANK AND FILE
The re-emergence of the Labour Left has been
examined already in terms of the collapse of revisionist
ideas, the increasing wage militancy of trade unionists,
the breakdown of the alliance between certain trade union
leaders and the Party leadership, and the emergence of a
Left majority on the NEC. Another key element was the
support from the Party's 'rank and file', 'the
grassroots', or the 'poor bloody infantry' .(1) Who and
what does one have in mind When using such terms? In this
chapter I am concerned with the individual Party member,
in particular the active member participating in the
activities of the local branch and General Committee and
thus involved in the selection of parliamentary and local
council candidates, the debating of resolutions, and the
organisation of local electoral activities.
The assumption is usually made that activists
are on the Left of the Party,(2) an assumption often based
on the resolutions submitted by CLPs to the Party's annual
conference. Lewis Minkin concludes after a survey of such
resolutions	 between 1956 and 1970 that "on nuclear
disarmament,	 Socialism,	 Conference	 decisions,	 EEC,
Vietnam, prices and incomes legislation and Rhodesia, the
overwhelming volume of resolutions and amendments were
either critical of official Party policy or to its Left in
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sentiment and rhetoric".(3) Minkin also points out that
"(c)ontrary to common misconception, the
	 preliminary
agenda as a whole has never been dominated by Left-wing
resolutions".(4) Other observers have pointed out that
local Party members are just as divided in their political
opinions as other sections of the Party (for Example, the
trade union membership). Martin Harrison's study of the
Trade Unions and the Labour Party, published in 1960,
concluded that "local parties... (have never been).., as
fanatically
	 left-wing as popular legend decreed".(5)
Janosik concluded a study in 1962/3 of leading personnel
in thirty six CLPs by supporting those who argued that
"the politics of the constituency parties cover the
spectrum of Labour Party politics".(6) A study in the
early 1960s of Newcastle under Lyme - a constituency with
a left wing MP and a left wing political tradition - found
consistent left wing attitudes held by only 5% of the
membership. The Left's support
	 in	 this	 particular
constituency	 was won on an ad hoc basis with the
composition of that support changing from issue to
issue.(7) This also is the case at the Party's annual
conference where each policy issue dealt with has resulted
in a different balance of opinion amongst CLP delegates.
Minkin suggests that between 1956 and 1970 the Party
leadership won the support of the majority of CLP
delegates on its defence policy and its incomes policy
legislation but not on the issue of public ownership.(8)
Whether or not the common assumption about the
political nature of the Party activist can be sustained or
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disproved for the 1950s or 1960s, what is important to
note is the growth in support for the Labour left within
the CLPs in the 1970s.(9) There are various reasons which
can be advanced to explain this trend. First, it could be
that the Party membership was converted from Right to Left
opinions. Or, second, that Party members on the Right
became disillusioned and departed leaving the Party in the
hands of the Left.(10) Third, a differential recruitment
process could have been operative with the new members of
the Party more likely to be on the Left. Finally, it could
be that the entryist tactics of the Trotskyist
organisations succeeded in controlling many of the local
Labour Parties. It is impossible, short of a comprehensive
survey of Party membership over the past two decades, to
answer definitively which of these factors is most
significant but it is possible to suggest some answers on
the basis of an examination first of some of the findings
of recent surveys of Party membership conducted in
specific constituencies, second, of some of the instances
in which Party members have asserted their powers over
Labour MPs by operating deselection procedures and, third,
of some of the details of a survey of Sheffield Party
activists.
Before examining the Party membership in detail
it is as well to point out the attempts by Labour's Right
to devalue the political importance of the mass party, in
particular the political importance of the Party member as
a political communicator, in the 1960s.
At the time when revisionists were far more
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preoccupied with boosting the role of the Party Leader,
and tended to write off the role of the mass party as
obsolete, Tony Crosland wrote in an influential pamphlet:
...the elan of the rank and file is less and
less essential to the winning of elections. With
the growing penetration of the mass media,
political campaigning has become increasingly
centralised; and the traditional local
activities, the door to door canvassing and the
rest, are now largely a ritual.(11)
These views had impeccable academic support from
Robert McKenzie, author of the standard work on British
political parties and an opponent of Labour's intra-party
democracy.(12) He was not on his own. Leon Epstein, an
hnerican expert on political parties and British politics,
argued strongly that the development of new forms of
political information and communication - television,
advertising and sample surveys - enabled party leaders to
deal directly with the mass electorate and far more
efficiently and effectively
	 than	 through	 a	 party
membership.(13) The authoritative British 'Nuffield'
election studies indicated that local factors of candidate
and organisation were of only limited importance in
causing any deviation from what was then a relatively
uniform swing of electoral opinion.(14)
The attitude of Labour's leaders in the last two
decades fitted into this pattern of beliefs. After the
famous occasion in 1960 when Gaitskell, then the Party's
Leader, succeeded in defying a major Party Conference
decision it was widely held that the Party's activists
were an uninfluential element in 	 the	 Party	 power
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structure, and were irrelevant to its electoral appeal.
The Leader - his prestige, his image and his media appeal
-	 was	 given	 central	 prominence. Consequently the
Parliamentary leadership expressed little concern at the
health of the Party's grass roots. Most of them proved
unenthusiastic about the campaign, launched in 1966, to
secure a complete overhaul of Party organisation.(15) The
resulting 'Simpson' Commission of Enquiry aroused little
interest amongst Labour Ministers apart from Richard
Crossman. Indeed in the fifteen years from 1 960 to 1 975 it
is difficult to trace any major speech of the Party's
leadership where the condition of Labour's organisation
and membership was given prominent attention.
Individual Party membership: numbers and opinions 
It is not possible to provide accurate figures
for individual Party members until the 1980s. The figures
published by the Labour Party headquarters have been based
upon the affiliation fees paid by local parties to the
Party at national level. Because the Party has a fixed
minimum membership upon which CLPs can affiliate
nationally, and because this figure was high between 1957
and 1981, the published figures have been an inaccurate
overestimate of Party membership. The figures are of
limited value only: all they reveal until 1980 is the
general trends of individual Party membership.
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TOTAL INDIVIDUAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
1928
1929
214,970
227,897(min.aff:250)
1956
1957
845,129
912,987(min.aff:800)
1930 277,211 1958 888,955
1931 297,003 1959 847,526
1932 371,607 1960 790,192
1933 366,013 1961 750,565
1934 381,259 1962 767,459
1935 419,311 1963 830,346(m .a.:1,000)
1936 430,094 1964 830,116
1937 447,150 1965 816,765
1938 428,826 1966 775,693
1939 408,844 1967 733,932
1940 304,124 1968 700,856
1941 226,622 1969 680,656
1942 218,783 1970 690,191
1943 235,501 1971 699,522
1944 265,763 1972 703,030
1945 487,047 1973 665,379
1946 645,345 1974 691,889
1947 608,487 1975 674,905
1948 629,025 1976 659,058
1949 729,624 1977 659,737
1950 908,161 1978 675,946
1951 876,275 1979 666,091
1952 1,014,524 1980 348,156(min.aff:256)
1953 1,004,685 1981 276,692(min.aff:128)
1954 933,657 1982 273,803(min.aff:167)
1955 843,356 1983 295,344
(Source: NEC Report 1984, pp.103/4)
Attempts have been made to ascertain the true
membershi p of the Party. The Nuffield election study of
1970 estimated an individual membership between 310,000
and 385,000.(16) Pinto-Duschinsky believed the figure to
be "barely 300,000" in 1970.(17) The Report of the
Committee on Financial Aid to Political Parties (The
'Houghton'	 Committee) put the figure at 317,000 in
1976,(18) but Whiteley argues that this was an
overestimate and put the figure at 250,000 in 1978.(19) A
survey carried out by Martin Linton for Labour Weekly 
estimated the figure to be 284,000 in 1978(20) and a
similar survey by Harold Frayman put the figure at 300,250
Wgrt
AWNSla /101111
Alger
Arr.-
Title
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL LABOUR PARTY MEMBERSHIP (000'S)
0
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
YEAR
-7q
77 78
1000•
Egio
E 600
400
0
0
20a ftlAMR MTMEI& 7111111.
-156-
in 1981. (21 )
Whatever the exact figure of Party membership it
is the overall trends which are of importance in this
study. The trend is upwards reaching a peak in the 1950s,
but from then on it is downwards. During our period of
study the general trend is downwards. Between 1964 and
1979, during which time all CLPs affiliated on a minimum
membership of 1,000 members, the recorded drop in Party
membership was 164,025 (20%). The major share of this
decline occurred during the first five years of Labour
government (1964-1969) when a drop of almost 150,000 was
recorded.
Confirmation of this declining membership,
particularly amongst the largest parties, is detailed in
the annual reports of the NEC. In 1955 the NEC reported
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forty five CLPs with a membership of 3,000 or over, but by
1977 this number had dropped to six. A further
confirmation of the decline is best illustrated from the
formal membership figures of CLPs in urban areas which
have had no Labour Club to provide social facilities to
artificially boost the level of membership. Salford East,
for example, one of the Party's most active OLPs, sunk in
membership from a 1952 figure of 3,724 to a 1978 figure of
1,291 members. A decline in some of the London
constituency parties was very marked. Bermondsey had 4,689
members in 1952 but by 1978 it had less than one thousand.
Battersea South had 2,089 members in 1952 and it too had
sunk by 1978 to less than a thousand. The mighty party in
Lewisham South had 7,674 members, whilst Lewisham West had
4,336 and Lewisham North 4,309 in 1952; by 1978 the two
reorganised Lewisham parties had around 4,000 members
between them.(22)
Some	 local parties experienced a traumatic
decline during the 1964-1969 years. The NEC Reports reveal
that whereas sixty CLPs had affiliated in 1965 on a
membership of 2,000 or above this number had dropped to
twenty two by 1969. The process is graphically portrayed
in the annual reports of the Brixton Labour Party which in
1965 had 1,212 members and in 1970 had 292 members.(23)
Academic studies of individual CLPs confirm this
rapid decline in membership: the only difference of
opinion is over the date at which the decline commenced.
For example, Tom Forrester's survey of Brighton Kemptown
reveals that membership was halved between 1965 and
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1969.( 2 'l ) John Tidball's study of Barnsley states that
membership "plummetted" between 1965 and 1970. In fact the
1970 membership figures for this CLP was the lowest
recorded	 since	 1951	 when	 detailed figures became
available.(25) These studies confirm Lewis Minkin's
assertion that "active Constituency Party organisations
shrivelled to a skeleton during the period from 1966 to
1970".(26) A combination of social change, neglect and
political disillusionment almost destroyed the Labour
Party as a mass party. In terms of ward and committee
attendance, and electoral work, activity was the lowest in
living memory.
It would appear reasonable to assume that the
decline in Party membership between 1964 and 1969 was more
likely to involve a Left exodus of those disillusioned
with the Wilson Government's foreign policy, particularly
its support for American policy in Vietnam, and with its
economic and social policies, particularly its failure to
redistribute resources and so alleviate 'private affluence
and public squalor'. The formation and growth of
alternative left wing political organisations such as the
International Marxist Group (1965) and the International
Socialists (independent of the Labour Party from 1967) and
the emergence of 'good cause' pressure groups, such as The
Child Poverty Action Group (1965), The Disablement Income
Group (1965), Shelter (1966), and The National Union of
Claimants' Unions (1968), was in part a reflection of this
disillusion and defection on the Left. By 1970 the Right
might have gained, by default, more influence within local
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parties but Whiteley argues that a "substantial part"(27)
of the decline in Party membership was due to the decline
of working class involvement in the Labour Party. He
argues that a working class member is more instrumental in
joining the Party and the persistent policy failures of
Labour governments between 1966 and 1970 (and again
between 1976 and 1979) caused the manual worker to defect.
If the working class Party member is more instrumental and
less ideological than the middle class member, then the
Right may also have suffered from the defecting of
individual members in the late 1960s. So it is not clear
whether Left or Right benefitted from the defections from
the Labour Party in the late 1960s.
However, it does appear as if Party membership
began to increase slowly during the 1970s.(28) Forrester
notes a steady annual rise in Party membership in Brighton
Kemptown between 1970 and the end of his research project
in 1973, although it should be noted that the 1973
membership figure had not reached the level achieved in
1965.(29) Tidball shows a steady rise in the membership of
Barnsley CLP throughout the 1970s (with the one exception
of 1976 which might be due more to local administrative
matters) until in 1980 Party membership was four times the
1970 figure.(30) What is remarkable about Barnsley is that
one half of the membership had been recruited since 1974
and almost one quarter (23%) since 1979.(31) These figures
confirm the author's own experiences of a steady rise in
individual membership in the second half of the 1970s.
It appears that these new members were more
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likely to be young, to be employed in non-manual
occupations and to be more ideological in their political
commitments than previous members. Bochel and Denver's
survey between 1976 and 1979 of Party members attending
parliamentary selection contests in eighteen CLPs in the
North of England and Scotland reveal that left wing views
predominated in these local parties and it was the
younger, non-manual selectors who were more likely to be
concerned with prospective candidates' political opinions
since they were "more likely to take political composition
of the PLP into account and to do so in order to favour
the beft".(32) Whiteley argues that the Party activists in
the 1970s were more middle class and more ideological.(33)
Forrester finds that middle class members were
disproportionately more active at Party meetings.(34)
Tidball refers to the fluctuating social composition of
Party membership in Barnsley where middle class
recruitment rose from one-third of the membership (1945-
1951) to over one half (1956-1963), then fell back to one
third (1964-1970), before rising again to one half the
membership (1971-1978). Tidball refutes the suggestion
that in Barnsley the Labour Party "has received an influx
of highly educated, middle class activists (or non-
activists) in the past decade".(35) However, Tidball
perhaps does not place enough stress on the determined
attempts by the Yorkshire NUM from the middle 1970s
onwards to increase its influence in the local CLPs by
raising its local affiliations and by ensuring that local
miners	 attended	 meetings	 of the local parties as
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delegates. Inevitably this policy increased the number of
manual worker activists within the Barnsley CLP. In nearby
Sheffield Chandler, Morris and Barker argue that the
middle classes do predominate amongst the Party
members(36) but they argue that it is the public service
professionals in particular who join the local parties.
Just over one third (35%) of all Party members were
employed in the public services: this figure included
teachers and lecturers who made up one quarter of all the
membership.(37) The predominance of public service
occupations is even more noticeable at this time amongst
the Labour ward secretaries in Sheffield. Two-thirds
(66.7%) were in non-manual occupations and an overwhelming
85.7% of these non-manuals were employed by the local
authority.(38) In neighbouring Barnsley 50% of the Party
members classified as middle class were employed in the
local public sector (e .g. local government administration,
social work, and teaching) whilst only 9% worked for some
form of private enterprise.(39) One cautionary note in
Interpreting these local figures is that in areas such as
Barnsley and Sheffield which have found it very difficult
to attract new private enterprise to replace the older,
declining industries it is the public sector, often the
socialist local authorities themselves, which provides a
larger proportion of total employment in the local economy
than in cities of comparable size in either the Midlands
or the South of England. Nevertheless, Peter Jenkins jibes
about the "lumpen-polytechnic"( )40) and its	 influence
within the Labour Party cannot be ignored.
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Finally,
	 Whiteley	 argues that there is a
"significant relationship between ideology and age"(41)
with younger respondents more left wing than older
respondents. He suggests the reason for this is early
political experiences and contemporary political events,
in particular the failures of the Wilson Governments of
the 1960s and the 1968 student troubles. The late 1960s
was an era of lost opportunities and wasted hopes that
made its mark on present-day young Party activists.
What these studies suggest is that the
recruitment of new members in the 1970s was primarily
concentrated amongst young, educated, public servants. A
new radical generation, many from working class homes who
had benefitted from Labour's post-war educational reforms,
was being recruited to the Labour Party. These new members
provided the political base and impetus for the rise of
the Labour Left.
A good example of a local party in which some of
these changes were occurring, and the tensions which they
caused, is Bermondsey. Bermondsey was a working class
constituency, with a long tradition of Labour
representation in the House of Gammons and of Labour
control of the local authority, in which local Party
membership had declined and Party activity had diminished
to little more than the periodic mobilisation of voters to
elect Labour representatives to the 	 local	 council.
However, in the 1970s younger Party members were
recruited, critical of the Labour MP - Bob Mellish - and
of the senior Labour councillors on Southwark Borough
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Council and, in particular, of the Leader of the Council -
John O'Grady - and they succeeded in winning control of
the local Party in 1980. The new CLP Secretary was Peter
Tatchell who, when he joined the Labour Party in 1978 at
the age of twenty six was an ex-social science Polytechnic
graduate, employed by the local authority. When Bob
Mellish was appointed to the London Docklands Development
Corporation, and therefore obliged to stand down as an MP,
Peter Tatchell was selected by the local Party to be
Mellish's successor, but the intense dispute within the
Party over Tatchell's candidature, and the Labour Party's
subsequent loss of the parliamentary by-election in
February 1983 was a disastrous period in the Party's
history and was a presage of the general election defeat
which occurred later in the same year.(42)
So far in this chapter it has been suggested
that a differential recruitment process prevailed in the
1970s, namely that those joining the Party were more
likely to be on the Left. The explanation for this is
based upon generational, educational and occupational
factors - the recruitment of young people who benefitted
from the expansion of higher education from the mid-1960s
and who, then, proceeded into public sector employment.
But there is another factor which deserves special mention
- gender. In the 1970s a new generation of women joined
the Party.(43) Young females were a significant force in
the Party's rank and file.
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Female recruitment 
The recruitment of women was continuous
throughout the 1970s but it was particularly associated
with two phases. The first wave of recruitment occurred as
a consequence of the growth of female trade unionism and
the resultant concern of some unions with discrimination
against women at work, as revealed in their pay, status,
and social security provisions. The demand by women trade
unionists for equal rights was highlighted by an equal pay
strike at Ford's Dagenham factory in 1968 which led
Barbara Castle to initiate equal pay legislation before
the fall of the Labour Government in 1970. The Women's TUC
was developing as an Important forum on women's rights
which succeeded in prodding the TUC into producing a
Women's Charter in 1975. The influence of the new female
leaders of the National Council for Civil Liberties
(Patricia Hewitt, Anna Coote and Harriet Harman), who were
instrumental in developing the organisation's work in this
area of women's rights, was important in developing the
commitments of both the TUC and the Labour Party. In 1973
the Party conference first debated the issue of sexual
discrimination. Employment protection and sexual
discrimination legislation was introduced following the
election of a Labour government in 1974. Women trade
unionists concerned with specific women's rights were a
growing influence within the TUC and the Labour Party.
The second wave of recruitment occurred in the
late-1970s
	 and	 involved
	 women's	 liberationalists,
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radicalised by the women's movement during the late-1960s
and the 1970s who had often been working with the Vietnam
Solidarity Campaign, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
or new left groupings such as the International Marxist
Group, the International Socialists or Big Flame. In the
early part of the decade such women were most
unsympathetic towards the Labour Party, regarding it as a
non-radical, conventional, male-dominated organisation.
But by the
position
'vanguard'
groupings.
contained
end of the decade some were reconsidering this
and	 expressing	 disillusion	 with Leninist
politics of the various revolutionary socialist
Beyond the Fragments, published in 1979,(44)
a long essay by Sheila Rowbotham in which she
voiced this sentiment. The book had a considerable impact
and prompted a wide debate on the nature and strategy of
socialist feminism. A conference held in Leeds on August
30th 1980 to discuss the ideas contained in the book
attracted an audience of over one thousand. Whereas ten
years earlier such a gathering would have poured general
scorn on the Labour Party and spent little time discussing
it now the opening sentence of a discussion paper prepared
for the conference stated
It is evident that many Socialists who have been
active in the Fragments over the past ten years
have been considering joining the Labour Party
recently or at least forming local alliances
with Labour Party activists in the
constituencies.(45)
Many women had been attracted to the Party by
the growth of the Left during the 1970s and by the attempt
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of the Labour Left's leading figure at this time, Tony
Benn, to identify with and mobilise the support of radical
feminists.(46) One experienced feminist has commented that
"a whole new generation of women, politicised in the 1970s
by the women's movement... (were) now entering the Labour
Party" and in her opinion one "has only to look around the
local Party GC (General Management Committee) to see the
gap between the older women who remained loyal during the
Wilson/Callaghan years and the much younger ones who
wouldn't have joined the Labour Party until the Left move
in the late 1970s".(47)
Not all of the women recruited to, or active in,
the Party in the 1970s were on its Left. Discussion within
the Party concerning the need for a separate women's
section prompted considerable disagreements. Many of those
women recruited to advance women's	 rights	 regarded
separate	 sections	 with	 some
	 suspicion	 as
institutionalising the traditional role of women in
servicing the needs of the Party's men, but others who had
often participated in women's support and consciousness-
raising groups tended to agree with a separate structure.
Many long-standing women members who had succeeded in
rising to positions of Party Office were often
unsympathetic to these new recruits and their demands.(48)
Women were not a united group within the Party but
nevertheless an alliance on the Left between rank and file
men and women was forged in these years which contributed
a very great deal to the pressures within the Party for
greater democratisation. Only after 1981 did tensions
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develop within this alliance over the choice of persons on
the 'Left slate' for NEC elections, over the priority to
be given to the demands for a restructuring of the Women's
Organisation in the campaign to democratise the Party and,
finally, over the limited number of women being chosen as
parliamentary candidates. These tensions will be discussed
in a later chapter but by the mid-1980s some Labour women
were arguing that the Party remained a male Party and that
the shift to the Left had merely enabled Left men to
replace Right men.
The sacking of Labour MPs 
The second approach in considering the trends
amongst the Party's rank and file in the 1970s is to
examine some of the cases in which Labour MPs were
deselected by their constituency parties. In Chapter three
reference was made to the change of Party rules in 1970
thus making the CLP's task of deselection slightly easier.
Prior to 1970 a four stage procedure had been in operation
involving three GMC meetings, specifically called to
discuss the issue of deselection, a meeting of all locally
affiliated bodies at which GMC delegates would be
mandated, and then a final ratification or rejection of
the decision by the NEC. This procedure was replaced by
one necessitating two GMC meetings and a four week
interval between them in order that locally-affiliated
bodies could discuss the matter, followed by the right of
appeal by the deselected MP to the NEC. The deselection
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procedure still remained complex but under the new rules
there was a little less deliberation of the matter by the
GMC, the mandating of affiliated bodies' delegates was
abandoned, and the NEC now played a lesser role in the
proceedings. These new rules prevailed until 1980 when a
major change occurred, which is the subject of Chapter
five.
Under the rules which prevailed between 1970 and
1980 the following cases of dismissal, or attempted
dismissal, occurred:
MP
_
Constituency
Date of
NEC responseDismissal
Attempt
A.	 Irvine Liverpool	 Edge Hill 1971 MPs appeal	 upheld
D. Taverne Lincoln 1972 MPs appeal	 rejected
E.	 Griffiths Sheffield Brightside 1974 MPs appeal	 rejected
E.	 Milne Blyth 1974 MPs appeal	 rejected
R.	 Prentice Newham North East 1975 MPs appeal	 rejected
F. Tomney Hammersmith North 1976 MPs appeal	 rejected
A.	 Irvine Liverpool	 Edge Hill 1977 MPs appeal	 rejected
M.	 Colquhoun Northampton North 1977 MPs appeal
	 upheld
M.	 Colquhoun Northampton North 1979 MP endorsed by NEC
as parliamentary
candidate
N.	 Sandelson Hayes & Harlington 1979 MP endorsed by NEC
as parliamentary
candidate
In these ten instances the NEC ruled that in six the local
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Parties had operated within the rules laid down and
therefore there were no grounds for supporting the MPs. It
is not possible here to examine these cases in detail.
Some of the deselections were due to personal issues or to
personality clashes between the MP and the local Party
(Milne and Golquhoun) but others involved differences on a
wide range of policy matters, in which a right wing MP was
faced with a leftwards leaning CLP (Taverne, Griffiths,
Prentice, Tomney, Irvine and Sandelson). By examining some
of these cases we may shed light on the nature of the
leftwards shift within the local Parties.
Lincoln 1972 
Dick Taverne's deselection by Lincoln CLP in
1972 was a watershed in Party history. It marked a
significant break with the past and was a portent of the
future split in the Labour Party. It reflected Party
activist dissatisfaction with Labour Government policies
after 1966; it represented a challenge to those Oxbridge-
educated professionals who expected the passive,
deferential support of local Party activists; it signified
the activists' increasing concern that Party
representatives be accountable to decisions taken by the
extra-parliamentary Party; and it revealed that the NEC
was no longer willing to impose an MP on an unwilling CLP
and that, as a consequence of the shifting political
composition of the NEC, the National Agent and staff could
no longer be used for factional gain by the parliamentary
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Party leadership. In 1972 Taverne's fellow-members of the
Labour Right believed his response to his local Party's
action, namely an independent electoral challenge, was
incorrect because they felt it still remained possible to
regain control of the Party and therefore they were
unwilling to give him open support once he resigned as
Labour MP to fight a by-election. Only nine years later
did Taverne's Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS)
colleagues make this break from the Labour Party to form
the SDP.(49)
Lincoln CLP was one in which in the 1950s the
officers and the main activists were "mainly middle-aged
members committed to supporting their MP and the national
party leadership and to opposing the left-wing of the
party as represented by the Bevanites".(50) Their MP since
1950, Geoffrey de Freitas, had been on the Right of the
Party. He paid £50 per month into local Party funds and as
a consequence there was very little need for the local
party to recruit new members. Party activity was confined
to "an occasional social function and canvassing at
election times".(51) The local Party leaders "were content
to let their MP function virtually independently of his
local party, as de Freitas had done".(52)
When de Freitas resigned in 1961 to become High
Commissioner in Ghana he had recommended to local Party
officers, on the advice of Hugh Gaitskell, that his
successor should be Dick Taverne. De Freitas and Jim
Cattermole, the East Midlands Labour Party Regional
Organiser and an active CDS supporter, provided Taverne
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with the necessary local contacts to guarantee nomination.
Then the National Agent (Sara Barker) and Jim Cattermole
ensured that the short-list of 3 candidates included no
left-wing or unilateralist candidate.(53) Some discontent
at the manner of Taverne's selection was expressed by five
members of the GMC who walked out in protest, but Taverne
was selected by 23 votes to 16, won the subsequent by-
election in 1963, and then secured immediate promotion in
1964 to Ministerial office in Harold Wilson's first
government.
The tensions between Taverne and his local party
only developed after 1966 when Labour's policy of wage
restraint, its raising of prescription charges, and then
the proposal to restrain trade union powers angered the
trade union activists in Lincoln. Those tensions were
exacerbated over Taverne's commitment to the EEC and his
vote in favour of the principle of entry into Europe in
October 1971 in defiance of a Party three line whip and in
the knowledge that the local Party had called upon every
Labour MP to vote against entry.(54) Taverne's vote
appeared to be sustaining a Conservative Government in
Office which was attacking trade union rights, was raising
council house rents, and was providing tax benefits for
the wealthy. As a consequence Lincoln CLP in November 1971
approved a motion of 'no confidence' in its MP by 54 votes
to 50 with 5 absentions.
Four out of five local Party officers and the
local Party Agent voted in favour of the 'no confidence'
motion. The active membership of the GMC, namely those
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voting, had increased in numbers from 39 in 1962 to 109 in
1971. The active members in 1971 were almost equally
divided in their loyalties but between the November
meeting of the GMC and one in June 1972, at which a
resolution was passed by 75 votes to 50 requesting that
Taverne stand down, all local wards had elected new
delegates to the GMC. The Left organised to ensure that
its support was maximised in these ward elections. Dickson
comments
Taverne's opponents ran a concerted canvassing
campaign in the wards to ensure that anti-
Taverne delegates were elected... Wives of
members, children of members, all of whom had
never before taken an active role in the party,
now turned up at ward meetings to support anti-
Taverne candidates. Also, the Chairman and Agent
attended ward meetings, hoping to influence ward
members by their presence. The campaign appeared
in March to have been successful, when all the
major positions in the party went to anti-
Taverne members at the AGM.(55)
Finally the NEC confirmed that the Lincoln Party had
abided by the Party rules in making its decision and for
the first time in nine years a Labour MP had been sacked.
The reasons for Taverne's rejection were both
political and personal. His very close association with
the policies of the Wilson Governments between 1964 and
1970,	 his	 lack of sympathy for extra-parliamentary
pressure on the Conservative Government over its
industrial relations legislation, and his aloof personal
manner were contributory factors. Also the Lincoln Party
had grown in membership since Taverne had first been
selected. This was reflected in the size of the GMC in
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which there were thirty nine voting members when he was
first selected in 1962, one hundred and nine in 1971, and
one hundred and twenty five in 1972.(56) Many of the new
members were trades unionists actively opposed to Labour
and Conservative governments' attempts to restrict their
bargaining strength. Also Taverne's critics were now
willing to organise in a manner previously only seen in
Lincoln on the Right of the Party.
Lincoln was a case in which	 trade	 union
militancy was of major importance in this rank and file
challenge to parliamentary dominance of the Party.
Sheffield Brightside was a constituency that followed
Lincoln's example and was similar in that it was again the
emergence of Labour's traditional constituents - manual
worker, trade unionists - in rebellion against the anti-
trade union sentiment expressed by the Labour Government
and the impact of the Conservative Government's trade
union and housing rent policies upon working people.
Sheffield Brightside, 1974 
Sheffield Brightside was a traditional working
class constituency with a large Labour majority, a low
individual Party membership and little activity except at
election times. Between 1935 and 1968 it had been
represented by only two MPs. Eddie Griffiths had been
selected to fight the 1968 by-election, following the
death of the previous incumbent, from a short list of
five. His connection with this constituency was based upon
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his employment in the steel industry as an industrial
chemist, and his appointment as one of the worker
directors on the Board of the publicly-owned British Steel
Corporation.
There was none of the manipulation of the short
list or walk-out from the selection conference as had
occurred in Lincoln. Griffiths was an acceptable candidate
to the constituency Party at this time. But recruitment of
new members in the constituency between 1968 and 1974
resulted in the complete changeover of the GMC with an
entirely new political composition. A major factor in
prompting this new recruitment was the Labour-controlled
City Council's decision in 1967 to raise council house
rents. This generated considerable local political
activity, the formation of local tenants' associations,
and the recruitment to the Party in the late-
1960s/early-1970s of many who were active in this campaign
on behalf of council house tenants. This issue caused a
split in Sheffield between the ruling Labour Group on the
City Council and the Sheffield Labour Party (at this time
organised as the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council) and
was a major factor in the Labour Party losing control of
the City Council in 1968. (See Chapter ten)
	
Tensions between the MP and the GMC 	 were
increasing. The main areas of disagreement were as
follows. First, on the issue of the European Economic
Community, whilst Griffiths had not been one of the
'rebels' in 1981 alongside Taverne and his colleagues, he
was	 not	 antagonistic concerning British membership.
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Second, Griffiths was in favour of an incomes policy.
Third, he was unsympathetic towards extra-parliamentary
direct action against the Government's Industrial
Relations Act, against the British Steel Corporation's
proposed closure of the local River Don steelworks,
against the Government's Housing Finance Act (which the
nearby Clay Cross Urban District Council had resisted and
refused to implement) and he did not support the miners'
overtime ban put into operation in 1972. A local Party
leaflet issued in 1974 at the time of the dispute with
Eddie Griffiths to explain the CLP's position called for
an MP who would oppose the EEC and compulsory wages
policies, would be active in Parliament on such issues,
would co-operate with local trades unions and councillors
in their struggles, would hold regular public meetings
and, finally, would live in the constituency. The local
Party wanted an MP who would identify with issues which
were affecting working class people and would adopt a very
different style from that which had prevailed in the past.
He or she would have to be an active local campaigner,
working with the trade unions to defend workers' rights
rather than being the London MP rather distant and aloof
from the immediate political struggles. Some idea of the
change which was being demanded is apparent from a survey,
conducted in 1967, of the relationship between Sheffield
MPs and their local parties which concluded that
The demands made upon the Member of Parliament
by his constituency party in Sheffield are
slight, and unlikely to offend his conscience.
Loyalty is given to the man and there are very
-1 76-
few attempts to influence the policy he wil l
follow.(57)
It was reported in this survey that one local MP never
attended his local Party meetings, four attended
occasionally, and only one attended regularly.(58)
In a city with a large working class population
and strong trades unions the CLP wanted someone who would
understand and act in support of the people who were
facing increasing economic and social problems. Perhaps
something of the flavour of this clash of style is gleaned
from the MP's comment to the local Party's charge that he
had adopted a style of life unfitting for a Labour MP. He
replied that
The Brightside party's thinking seems to be that
unless you have a cloth cap, a muffler and a
boiler suit, you are not fit to be a Labour
MP. (59)
In July 1974 the GMC voted by 40 votes to 12 to
reject Griffiths, and this was reaffirmed in September by
40 votes to 10. In his place the GMC selected Joan
Maynard, a left winger who had been first elected to the
NEC in 1972.
The sacking of Eddie Griffiths attracted none of
the publicity given to the previous sacking in Lincoln.
Griffiths was not an attractive media personality as was
Taverne, neither had he been a Minister in the Labour
Government, but it was no less significant a case than in
Lincoln and in one sense it was more important. This was a
traditional working class constituency in which the Labour
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Right had been in control for generations; Party members
had displayed a deference to parliamentarians and were
little concerned with political activity outside of local
and	 national	 elections,	 but	 Labour's	 traditional
communities	 were	 changing; they were becoming less
deferential and demanding more action to defend their
living standards. An aggressive political and economic
militancy was beginning to make itself felt in such local
parties. In Brightside's case this led to the sacking of
its MP, the CLP playing a prominent and active role in the
national campaign to make the PLP more accountable to tbe
active Party membership, and the leading part in local
city politics. Brightside's influence on the emergence of
a new left in local city politics was considerable since
this local Party provided most of the leading personnel
within the ruling Labour Group by the end of the
1970s.(60) (Further discussion of the Sheffield local
government left arises in Chapter ten.)
Newham North East, 1975 
The deselections in Lincoln and Sheffield
Brightside were the result of the recruitment of new
members critical of recent Labour governments (1964-1970)
and many of whom as trade unionists and council house
tenants were experiencing the worst features of the
Conservative Government. Neither were cases which can be
explained	 in	 terms	 of	 'entryism'	 by	 groups of
revolutionary socialists, but in our third case, Newham
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North East, it has been claimed that , entryism' was the
major reason for sacking the incumbent Labour MP.
Paul McCormick has argued that "Newham North
East is the most famous example of a new trend in British
politics... Marxist takeovers of constituency Labour
Parties" .(61) He claims that Reg Prentice was deselected
as Labour MP for this constituency because the local
Labour Party was taken over between 1972 and 1 976 by
Marxist infiltrators. He states that in the early 1970s
the local party was "a shell dominated by elderly men and
women"(62) into which came an organised group of new,
young members - forty at a maximum - who selected the area
in which they were to live on the basis of "securing the
greatest impact in the local Labour party".(6 3) By July
1975 McCormick claims that this organised infiltration and
subsequent use of intimidation, cheating, provocation and
manipulation tactics(6 14) had succeeded when the GMC
decided to call on Prentice to resign by 29 votes to 19.
McCormick estimates that out of the 29 voting to dismiss
Prentice only 3 had been members of Newham North East CLP
prior to 1970, and only	 three	 were	 locally-based
people.(6 5) None of these figures is surprising.
There is no disagreement with McCormick that the
local Party was run-down and moribund. Partly this was
explained by the nature of the local community which was
declining in population. This decline is reflected in the
number of MPs for the area. The Boroughs of West Ham and
East Ham, which were incorporated into the new Borough of
Newham in the reorganisation of local government in the
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early 1970s, had been represented by six MPS between 1 91 8
and 19149, and by four between 1950 and 1970, but by 19714
the new Borough returned only three MPs. Parts of the
Borough had suffered from the decline of the docks. Trade
union affiliations in the constituency were virtually non-
existent and in some wards the local Labour Party did not
meet . (66)
This was a changing working class community in
which skilled manual workers with employment potential had
moved elsewhere, often to the suburbs and new towns
surrounding London, and the subsequent in-migration tended
to be Asians or a limited number of white non-manuals
attracted by cheap housing. The expansion of the local
North East London polytechnic was influential in
attracting non-manuals to the area.
It only needed a few of these new inhabitants to
become Party members for the impact to be feLt with& tte
local Party. Alan Haworth, Philip Bradbury and Anita
Pollock - all key personnel in the deselection issue -
were examples of this phenomenon. They all joined the
local Party in 1971 and 1972.(67) Alan Haworth had become
a GMC delegate by 1972, whilst Bradbury and Pollock were
immediately made Chairman and Secretary respectively of
their local ward (Manor Park). They took on	 these
responsible positions not because of' some organised
infiltration and manipulation but because older Party
members welcomed this infusion of younger blood and
encouraged them to become active as Party officers and
delegates. (68)
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Whereas in Lincoln and Sheffield Brightside the
new members were predominantly manual workers in
traditional trades unions in Newham there were more non-
manual workers in public sector employment. It was
certainly true that the new members often claimed to be
Marxists - some as a consequence of their academic
background and studies, others as a consequence of their
membership of bodies explicitly Marxist in their political
commitment (e.g. the Militant Group). There was a
revolutionary socialist involvement. In this case the
growth of the local left was an amalgamation of both
revolutionary and non-revolutionary socialists, but they
were not a homogeneous group in their political attitudes,
except in their criticisms of the Labour governments of
the 1960s, in their belief in the legitimacy of extra-
parliamentary direct action and in their annoyance at Reg
Prentice's arrogance in dealing with local Party members.
Only later were the differences between the two left
strands to emerge.
After the litigation between Julian Lewis and
Paul McCormick on one side and the officers of the Newham
North East CLP and the Labour Party at national level on
the other side had been completed the local Party selected
in July 1978 a former Chairman of the Tribune Group, James
Dickens, as its candidate by 37 votes to 20 for Nick
Bradley, a leading member of the Militant Group. Nine
months later Dickens resigned when fewer than half of the
GMC voted in support of his proposed Election Address. The
differences of opinion between him and a large section of
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the GMC were very considerable. He claimed that the
divisions within the local Party "were more profound than
any I had known in over thirty years' activity in the
Labour Party". He pointed out that these divisions were
not of the classical Left/Right nature but "were rather
the result of the entry into the Party of a number of
ultra-left groupings who were attracted by the Prentice
affair and had remained in the Newham North East Labour
Party subsequently".(69) Dickens argued that these Marxist
revolutionaries, making up almost half of the GMC, were
out of sympathy with "virtually all aspects of Labour
Party policy" and "some of them also opposed Parliamentary
Democracy". They "treated with contempt" the Labour
Government's policies, especially the Social Contract and
they were extremely critical of the Tribune Group for its
failure to impose more left wing policies on the
Government. They also believed that a Labour MP had no
grounds for political independence but was a delegate of
the Party's annual conference and the local party's
General Committee and finally, they expected him to
support every pay claim and every strike.
These three cases in which local Parties sacked
the incumbent Labour MP confirm the findings in the first
section of this chapter, namely that the Party was
attracting new, younger, radical members in the 1970s. It
is also the case that revolutionary socialist
intervention, either as Trotskyist 'entryists' or as
declared revolutionaries, which had been 	 made	 more
possible by the abolition of the 'proscribed list' in
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1973, was part of the process of change. Not until the
1980s did the difference between the "revolutionary
reformists"(70) and the revolutionaries become important
to Party political debate but it would be incorrect to
treat them both as part of a single left wing entity in
the 1970s.
This chapter has so far considered the changes
occurring within the rank and file by examining, first, a
wide range of studies of individual constituency parties
and, second, a selection of cases in which constituency
parties deselected a sitting Labour MP. This has enabled
some conclusions to be drawn about the shifting nature of
the Party membership. A third method of examining and
explaining the changes is by conducting a survey of Party
activists or members. A country-wide survey would require
extensive resources not available to the author. Instead a
limited survey of Party activists (defined as delegates to
the CLP General Committee) was carried out in two
contrasting Sheffield constituencies (Sheffield Hallam and
Sheffield Attercliffe). The survey was conducted in
January and February 1986. The limitations of such a
survey are recognised: first, it is based in a city which
has been a Labour stronghold since the mid-1920s and is
not therefore typical of Labour activists nationwide; and,
second, it is based upon present-day Party activists and
therefore does not measure changing attitudes over time.
Nevertheless the survey does allow certain conclusions to
be drawn concerning the extent and depth of left wing
attitudes amongst a group of Party activists whose social
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background varies quite considerably. (For details of the
survey see Appendix 3).
Hallam and Attercliffe are two very contrasting
constituencies. Hallam has returned a Conservative MP and
Attercliffe a Labour MP in all thirteen General Elections
since the end of the second World War. Boundary changes in
the periodic parliamentary redistribution of seats has not
disturbed the electoral safety of either consituency,(71)
which reflects the distinctive socio-economic composition
of both sets of voters.
The 1981 Census reveals the following class
composition:
Table 1 Social Class (Registrar General's classification)
Hallam Attercliffe
I (Professional) 13.6 2.6
II (Intermediate) 42.3 14.5
IIIN (Skilled Non-manual) 13.8 11.5
HIM (Skilled manual) 18.0 45.4
IV (Semi-skilled manual) 9.2 18.8
V (Unskilled manual) 1.8 5.8
Other 1.3 1.1
100	 100
The two constituencies are asymetrical in socio-economic
composition with seventy per cent of Hallam's population
classified as non-manuals and twenty nine per cent as
manuals and twenty nine per cent of Attercliffe's
population classified as non-manuals and seventy per cent
as manuals. Hallam has a higher proportion of 	 its
workforce
	
possessing	 degrees	 or	 professional
qualifications (34%) than any constituency in	 Great
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Britain; by contrast Attercliffe has one of the lowest
proportions (6%) and ranks 606 out of 633
	 British
constituencies. Nearly three-quarters of Hallam
householders are owner-occupiers (73%) whereas almost half
of Attercliffe householders (49%) are council tenants.
The two CLPs have quite distinct political
reputations. Hallam's left reputation has prevailed for
twenty years during which time the CLP nominated and
actively supported one of its members, Royden Harrison, as
a left-wing challenger to the political composition of the
NEC in 1970 and 1971 (for further details see Chapter
eight); consistently supported the Campaign for Labour
Party Democracy; cast its vote for Tony Benn in the 1981
Deputy Leadership election; and has voted consistently for
the 'left slate' in NEC elections.(72)
In contrast, Attercliffe has
	 a	 right-wing
reputation based in part upon the politics of the
incumbent MP, Pat Duffy, and upon its recent decision to
expel six of its members who were associated with the
Militant Group.(73) But this right-wing reputation is
slightly misleading as neither MP nor CLP have displayed
consistent support for right wing issues and personnel.
When Pat Duffy was selected to replace the retiring MP,
John Hynd, in 1970 he had emerged as the left candidate on
the short-list. In the 1981 deputy leadership election
Duffy cast his first vote for John Silkin and then
abstained on the second ballot. But in 1983 he did vote
for Roy Hattersley in the election to choose a new Party
Leader.(7 )4) Similarly the CLP has a somewhat mixed record
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of political identification in the 1980s. In 1980 it
passed a resolution supporting Michael Foot as Party
Leader; it voted in 1981 in favour of Tony Benn as the
Party's Deputy Leader in both ballots; and it voted for
Kinnock as Party Leader in 1983. Its vote in NEC elections
has tended to follow a left pattern although its support
for Gerald Kaufman and Jack Ashley in the CLP section, and
for Gwyneth Dunwoody and Betty Boothroyd in the Women's
section reveals some rightward tendencies.(75)
Finally the two constituencies differ in their
level of Party membership.
Table 2 Individual Party membership(76)
Hallam	 Attercliffe 
1982	 607	 230
1983	 624	 308
1984	 928	 384
Hallam CLP has the largest membership of all fifty one
local parties in Labour's Yorkshire region.
If we now turn to an examination of the two sets
of Party activists we find that amongst Hallam's there are
almost no affiliated trade union representatives whereas
amongst Attercliffe's there is an even division of trade
union and Party branch representatives.
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Table
	 3 Organisations represented by delegates to
the General Committee
Organisation Hallam Attercliffe
Nos Nos
Party branch/ward 90.5 (57) 49.4 (44)
Trade union 7.9 (	 5) 46.1 (41)
Young socialist 1.6 (	 1) 2.2 (	 2)
Co-operative party (	 -) 2.2 (	 2)
100	 (63)
	
100	 (89)
But amongst both sets of Party activists, even though
there are almost no affiliated trade union representatives
in one constituency, we find a similar recruitment
pattern. Over half of the activists have joined the Party
since 1975, with the greatest concentration between 1980
and 1984.
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Table 4 Year of joining the Labour Party 
Year of recruitment Hallam Attercliffe
% Nos % Nos
Pre-1964 19.0 (12) 16.9 (15)
1965-1969 - (	 -) 6.7 (	 6)
1970-1974 19.0 (12) 5.6 (	 5)
1975-1979 17.5 (11) 16.9 (15)
1980-1984 44.4 (28) 39.3 (35)
1985-
- (	 -) 6.7 (	 6)
Unknown/No response
- (	 -) 7.9 (	 7)
100	 (63)
	
100	 (89)
These recruits are completely new to Party
activism in the sense that they have not belonged to other
parties prior to joining the Labour Party (85.7% of Hallam
and 92.1% of Attercliffe activists are completely new to
any form of Party activity) and nor have their parents
been Labour Party members (over three quarters of their
parents in both Hallam and Attercliffe were not members).
Hallam activists are younger than their
Attercliffe counterparts (mean ages 41 and 52). Two thirds
of Hallam activists are between the ages of 31 and 50,
whereas one quarter of Attercliffe activists are aged 61
or over.
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Table 5 Age of Party members
Age Hallam Attercliffe
% Nos % Nos
20 & under 1.6 (	 1) 2.0 (	 2)
21-30 l4. 3 (
	 9) 10.8 (	 9)
31-40 28.6 (18) 20.4 (17)
41-50 38.1 (24) 19.2 (16)
51-60 15.9 (10) 18.0 (15)
61	 & over 1.6 (	 1) 27.7 (23)
Unknown/No response - (	 -) 1.0 (	 1)
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
Both sets of Party activists are predominantly
male.
Table 6 Gender of Party activists
Gender Hallam Attercliffe
Nos Nos
Male 63.5 (40) 71.9	 (64)
Female 36.5 (23) 27.0	 (24)
Unknown/No response (	 -) 1.1	 (	 1)
100 (63) 100	 (89)
It is no surprise, considering the socio-
economic structure of these two constituencies that the
two sets of Party activists differ in their educational
and occupational backgrounds. Hallam activists have had a
Grammar school education and have proceeded to University ;
in contrast Attercliffe activists went to Elementary or
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Secondary Modern schools with one-third leaving without
any formal educational qualifications.
Table 7 Type of schooling
School Hallam At tercliffe
%	 Nos %	 Nos
Elementary only 1.6	 (	 1) 33.7	 (30)
Secondary Modern 6.3	 (	 4) 32.6	 (29)
Comprehensive 15.9	 (10) 14.6	 (13)
Grammar school 60.3	 (38) 15.7	 (1)4)
Other ( eg private) 1)4.2	 (	 1) 3.4	 (	 3)
Unknown/no response 1. 6 	(	 1) -	 (	 -)
Table 8 Highest educational
100	 (63)
	
100	 (89)
qualification
Qualification Hallam At tercliffe
%	 Nos %	 Nos
School cert . 1.6	 (	 1) 12.4	 (11)
Higher school cert . -	 (	 -) 2.2	 (	 2)
CSE -	 (	 -) 1.1	 (	 1)
'0'	 levels 9.5	 (	 6) 13.5	 (12)
I A'	 levels 6.3	 (	 4) 5.6	 (	 5)
Technical 7.9	 (	 5) 12.4	 (11)
Degree 68.3	 (43) 12.4	 (11)
No qualification 3. 2 	(
	
2) 38.2	 (3)4)
Unknown/No response 3.2	 (
	
2) 2.2	 (	 2)
100	 (63) 100	 (89)
Two-thirds of Hallam activists are employed in
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full time jobs whereas one quarter	 of	 Attercliffe
activists are unemployed.
Table 9 Present employment position
Employment status Hallam At tercliffe
% Nos % Nos
Full time 68.3 (143) 38.2 (314)
Part time 11.1 (	 7) 13.5 (12)
Unemployed 6.3 (	 4) 25.8 (23)
Student/ retraining /4.8 (	 3) 4.5 (	 4)
Domestic homecare 6.3 (	 4) 2.2 (	 2)
Retired 3.2 (	 2) 13.5 (12)
Unknown/no response - (	 -) 2.2 (	 2)
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
An overwhelming number of those Hallam activists
in full-time employment work for a public body with half
being paid employees of a local authority ( predominantly
Sheffield City Council) . The main employer of At tercliffe
activists is the private firm, with another one-third
employed by the City Council.
Table	 10 Type of Employer
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Employer Hallam Attercliffe
% Nos % Nos
Private firm 11.6 (	 5) 32.4 (11)
State institution
(eg.	 civil service/
nat. industry) 7.0 (	 3) 5.9 (	 2)
Local council 55.8 (24) 29.4 (10)
Trade union 18.6 (	 8) 20.6 (	 7)
Self employed 7.0 (	 3) 2.9 (	 1)
Unknown/no response - (	 -) 8.7 (	 3)
100	 (4.3)	 100	 (34-)
A vivid contrast in the class composition of the
activists emerges from comparison of those in full-time
work (or having previously been employed full-time).
Almost ninety per cent of Hallam activists are non-manuals
where sixty per cent of Attercliffe activists are manuals.
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Table	 11 Social class of Party activists
At tercliffeSocial class Hallam
Nos
(14)I	 (Professional)
%
23.7
%
-
Nos
(	 -)
II	 (Intermediate) 52.5 (31) 25.7 (18)
IIIN	 (Skilled non-manual) 10.1 (	 6) 14.3 (10)
HIM (Skilled manual) 11.9 (	 7) 38.6 (27)
IV	 (Semi-skilled manual) 1.7 (	 1) 21.11 (15)
V (Unskilled manual) - (	 -) - (	 -)
Unknown/No response - (	 -) 2.2 (	 2)
100	 (59)	 100	 (72)
Finally, amongst both sets of Party activists
owner occupation is the most common form of housing
tenure, although one-third of Attercliffe activists rent
their home from the City Council.
Table 12 Type of housing 
Tenure	 Hallam	 At tercliffe 
%	 Nos	 %	 Nos
Owner occupation	 85.7	 (54)	 57.3	 (51)
Rented from council	 3. 2 	( 2)	 311.8	 (31)
Other ( eg . private rented;
living with parents, etc .)	 11.1	 ( 7)	 7.8	 ( 7)
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
An examination of the socio-economic
characteristics of these two sets of constituency Party
activists reveals features which are stereotypical of the
contemporary Labour Party. Hallam is made up of middle
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class, highly-qualified public sector professionals and
Attercliffe is composed of manual worker trade unionists.
Often the assumption is made by political commentators
that the political attitudes of these two types of Party
member differ, with the Hallam activist on the left and
the Attercliffe activist on the right. But the evidence of
this survey is that left-wing attitudes are firmly based
amongst both sets of activists.
A majority of activists are committed to the
economic objectives of public ownership and worker control
as outlined in Clause 4 of the Party constitution.
Attercliffe activists have a stronger attachment to Clause
4 than do Hallam activists, almost one-quarter of whom do
not see its implementation as a central concern of a
future Labour government.
Table 13 Attitudes towards Clause 4 
(Statement: "The central concern of the next Labour
Government should be to Implement Clause 14
of the Party Constitution")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
Nos
Agree* 55.6 (35) 68.5 (61)
Neither agree nor disagree 12.7 (	 8) 11.2 (10)
Disagree* 22.3 (14) 8.9 (	 8)
Don't know/no response 9.5 (	 6) 11.3 (10)
100 (63) 100 (89)
(*in all the following attitudinal
agree"/"agree" and "strongly
responses have been merged)
tables the "strongly
disagree"/"disagree"
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This could be interpreted as more a loyalty towards the
Party constitution per se than a commitment to public
ownership, but another question on nationalisation reveals
that almost one-half of the activists would wish to see a
Labour government take over the largest two hundred
companies in the economy.
Table 14 Attitudes towards nationalisation
(Statement: "The next labour Government should nationalise
the largest 200 British companies"(77))
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 42.9 (27) 48.3 (43)
Neither agree nor disagree 20.6 (13) 12.4 (11)
Disagree 28.6 (18) 34.9 (31)
Don't know/no response 7.9 (	 5) 4.5 (	 4)
100 (63) 100 (89)
Unilateral disarmament has the support of a
majority	 of Party activists in both constituencies.
Amongst Hallam activists there is overwhelming support,
with almost eight in ten (77.8%) expressing "strong"
support for this policy.
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Table 15 Attitudes towards unilateral nuclear disarmament 
(Statement : "The next Labour Government should not
unilaterally give up Britain' s nuclear
weapons" (78 ) )
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 14.8 (	 3) 31.5 (28)
Neither agree nor disagree 3.2 (
	
2) 7.9 (	 7)
Disagree 92. 1 (58) 56.2 (50)
Don' t know/no response - (	 -) 14.5 (	 4 )
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
But the Party activists do not agree in their
attitudes towards NATO. A majority of Hallam activists
believe that a Labour government should withdraw from the
organisation whereas opinion amongst the Attercliffe
activists is much more evenly divided,  with a slight
majority against such action.
Table 16 Attitudes towards NATO 
(Statement : "The next Labour Government should withdraw
from NATO")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 63.5 (40) 39.3 (35)
Neither agree nor disagree 6.3 (	 4) 13.5 (12)
Disagree 27.0 (17) 143.9 (39)
Don' t know/no response 3.2 (
	
2) 3.3 (	 3)
100 (63) 100 (89)
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Both	 sets of activists are convinced that
private schooling and	 private	 medicine	 should	 be
eliminated by a Labour government.
Table 17 Attitudes towards private schools
(Statement : "The next Labour Government should abolish
all private fee-paying schools")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 77.8 (49) 62.9 (56)
Neither agree nor disagree 11.1 (
	 7) 19.	 '1 (17)
Disagree 11.1 (	 7) 15.8 (114)
Don' t know/no response - (
	 -) 2.2 (	 2)
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
Table 18 Attitudes towards private health care 
(Statement : "The next Labour Government should not
completely abolish all aspects of private
sector health care")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 19.0 (12) 25.8 (23)
Neither agree nor disagree 6.3 (	 4) 10.1 (	 9)
Disagree 73.0 (46) 60.6 (54)
Don' t know/no response 1.6 (	 1) 3.4 (	 3)
100	 (63)	 100	 (89)
We have noted in Chapter three that the Labour
Left adopted the view that some of the laws passed in the
1970s and 1980s were discriminatory and should not be
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obeyed. But on this question the two sets of Party
activists were divided in their opinions. Those from the
working class constituency display a much greater respect
for the law than those from the middle class constituency.
Table 19 Attitudes on breaking the law 
(Statement: "The Labour Party should not support trade
unionists, councillors or anybody else
undertaking activities which break
civil or criminal law of the land")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 11.1 (	 7) 48.3 (43)
Neither agree nor disagree 17.5 (11) 7.9 (	 7)
Disagree 69.8 (44) 42.6 (38)
Don't know/no response 1. 6 (
	
1) 1.	 1 (
	
1)
100 (63) 100 (89)
One subject on which a majority of both sets of
activists do not share the Labour Left point of view is on
prices and incomes policy. The experience of such policies
after 1966 led the Labour Left to oppose any restraint on
trade unions' rights of free collective bargaining
symbolised by the phrase 'prices and incomes policy'. But
this phrase did not arouse such hostile emotions in our
survey and in the working class constituency of
Attercliffe two-thirds of the activists supported such a
policy.
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Table 20 Attitudes on voluntary prices and incomes policy
(Statement: "The next Labour Government should encourage
a voluntary prices and incomes policy in
order to control inflation")
Hallam
Nos
Attercliffe
% % Nos
Agree 54.0 (34) 66.3 (59)
Neither agree nor disagree 9.5 (	 6) 7.9 (	 7)
Disagree 31.7 (20) 20.2 (18)
Don't know/no response 4.8 (	 3) 5.6 (	 5)
100 (63) 100 (89)
Our conclusion from this limited survey is of a
growing body of Party activists, most recruited during the
past ten years, with a strong Labour Left commitment,
irrespective of social background, to the need for public
ownership in the economy and to Britain's unilateral
abandonment of its nuclear armaments. On two other issues,
however, on which part at least of the Labour Left have
campaigned, namely withdrawal from the NATO alliance and
civil disobedience of bad laws, working class activists do
not display the level of support that is forthcoming from
middle class activists. And on one issue, prices and
incomes policy, activists do not share the Labour Left's
hostility.
Without a comprehensive survey of individual
Party membership in the 1970s it is impossible to draw
conclusions whether the Labour Left's forward march in the
local	 Labour	 Parties was the consequence of Right
defections,	 infiltration	 of	 entryists,	 individual
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conversion from Right to Left opinions, or the recruitment
of new (Left) Party members. It is almost certain that
over Britain at large all of these factors played some
part in the leftwards shift. But from this survey of the
literature on Party membership, an examination of some
constituency Parties involved in deselecting their MP and
a particular study of two sets of Sheffield activists it
would appear that two forces were at work which played an
important part in the emergence of a more left wing rank
and file. First, the Party was attracting a new generation
of articulate and radical members often highly-educated
and professionally-qualified. Many had been first made
aware of Marxism in their intellectual studies but then
adopted the ideas as part of their political perspective.
Second, a new generation of manual worker trades
unionists, often living in council housing, had joined the
Party to defend their standards of living and were less
deferential than previous generations to their Party and
trade union leaders.
This emergent left rank and file channelled a
good deal of its activities into the issue of Party
democracy intent on ensuring that the parliamentarian was
made more accountable to the extra-parliamentary Party. It
is to this subject that we now turn and also to the
activity and influence of the Campaign for Labour Party
Democracy (hereafter CLPD).
-200-
FOOTNOTES
1. A phrase used by Ron Hayward, the Party's General
Secretary.
2. Perhaps the most renowned comment on Party activists
was Sidney Webb's, when he was reported as saying that
”...constituency parties were frequently unrepresentative
groups of nonentities dominated by fanatics, cranks and
extremists..." Quoted in R. McKenzie British Political 
Parties, p.505.
3. L. Minkin The Labour Party Conference, p.145.
14. loc.cit.
5. M. Harrison Trade Unions and the Labour Party, p.238.
6. E. Jasonik Constituency Labour Parties in Britain,
p.58.
7. F. Bealey, J. Blondel and W. Mc Cann Constituency
Politics: a study of Newcastle under Lyme, p.285.
8. L. Minkin op.cit., p.88.
9. Examination of the vote for the left candidates in the
CLP section of the NEC during the 1970s reveals a surge in
support between 197 14 and 1976 and then again in 1979.
Successful Left candidates' vote as a % of the total vote 
in the CLP section
1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979
55	 54	 53	 53	 58	 65	 67	 55	 58	 65
Source: NEC election results and CLPs voting strength in
Labour Party conference report, 1970-1979.
10. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky believes this to be the
explanation. He argues: "An important effect of declining
local Labour Party membership appears to have been that
moderates have departed and extremists have remained. The
fall in membership therefore has tended to be accompanied
by an increase in political militancy within constituency
Labour parties." British Political Finance, p.2914.
11. A. Crosland 'Radical Reform and the Left' Encounter,
1960 reprinted in The Conservative Enemy, p.130.
12. R. McKenzie British Political Parties and 'Power in
the Labour Party: the issue of intra-party Democracy' in
D. Kavanagh (ed) The Politics of the Labour Party, Ch.8.
13. L. Epstein Political Parties in Western Democracies.
-201-
1 14. D. Butler and R. Rose The British General Election of
1959, pp. 237-238.
15. Plan for an Efficient Party (PEP) was launched in 1966
in a manifesto sponsored by Richard Clements (on behalf of
Tribune), Rita Hinden (Socialist Commentary) , Paul Johnson
(I‘lelatesman), and Dick Leonard (Plebs). PEP's organiser
was Jim Northcott. PEP published regular newsletters in
1966 and 1967.
16. D. Butler and M. Pinto-Duschinsky The British General 
Election of 1970, p.265.
17. M. Pinto-Duschinsky British Political Finance, p.160.
18. Report of the Committee on Financial Aid to Political 
Parties, p.31.
19. P. Whiteley The Labour Party in Crisis, p.55.
20. M. Linton Labour Weekly, September 28, 1979
21. H. Frayman Labour Weekly, February 26, 1982.
22. The author' s research. See P. Seyd and L. Minkin 'The
Labour Party and its members' New Society, 149, September
20, 1979, pp.613-615.
23. loc.cit.
2 14.	 The membership dropped from 1,232 to 628. Tom
Forrester The Labour Party and the Working Class p.157.
25. The membership dropped from 33 14 in 1965 to 159 in
1970. J. Tidball A Study of Barnsley Constituency Labour 
Parby ( unpublished MA dissertation, University of
Sheffield, 1981), p.114.
26. L. Minkin op.cit., p.87.
27. P. Whiteley op.cit., p.61.
28. Pinto-Duschinsky	 suggests a static or slightly
declining membership. Pinto-Duschinsky op .cit., Figure 1,
p.158.
29. T. Forrester op.cit., p.157.
30. A rise from 159 in 1970 to 631. J. Tidball op.cit.,
p.114.
31. J. Tidball op.cit., p.58.
32. J. Bochel and D. Denver 'Candidate Selection in the
Labour Party: What the Selectors Seek' British Journal of 
Political Science, 13(1), 1983, p.62.
33. P. Whiteley op.cit., pp.614-69.
-202-
314. T. Forrester op.cit., pp. 118 - 119.
35. J. Tidball op.cit., p.62.
36. 62% of Party members are part of the Registrar
General's classes I to IIIn. J. Chandler, D. Morris and M.
Barker 'The Ascent of Middle Class Politics: the middle
class membership of the Labour Party' (paper presented to
the 1982 annual meeting of the Political Studies
Association), p. 3.
37. J. Chandler, et al op.cit., p.4.
38. M. Barker, J. Chandler and D. Morris The Labour Party
Ward Secretary: a socio-political profile (Sheffield City
Polytechnic occasional paper No. 7. , 1978), p.28.
39. J. Tidball op.cit., p.I47.
40. P. Jenkins The Guardian, October 14, 1980.
41. P. Whiteley op.cit., p.I40.
142. Peter Tatchell notes that in 1978 Bermondsey CLP
membership was below 1400 and that ward meetings were
poorly attended. P. Tatchell The Battle for Bermondsey,
especially Chs. 1 & 2.
43.	 This statement is based upon the author's own
experiences and general observations during the 1970s as a
Party branch secretary, General
	 Committee	 delegate,
District Labour Party delegate, and Party conference
delegate. Until 1970 the Labour Party distinguished
between males and females in its individual membership
figures but since then no national Party records are
available
	 which	 record the growth in female party
membership.
14 14. S. Rowbotham, L. Segal and H. Wainwright Beyond The
Fragments.
145. 'Notes for Discussion on the Labour Party' Beyond the
Fragments Conference, Leeds, August 30, 1980 in the
possession of the author).
146. See, for example, Tony Benn's interview in Spare Rib,
35, December 1980,  pp .30 -35. For all Benn's efforts to
take the feminist movement seriously the interview reveals
a good deal of tension between himself and the feminist
interviewer.
147.Jean McCrindle New Socialist, July/August 1983, p.3.
It should be pointed out that her letter to New Socialist
was prompted by an article by the author which had ignored
the significance of women in the forward march of the
Labour Left.
-203-
148. The tensions were apparent in Sheffield in the 1980s.
The traditional working class CLPs (Sheffield Attercliffe
& Brightside) possessed women' s organisatons but the
middle class CLP (Sheffield Hallam) had no such
organisation and by tradition refused to send delegates to
the Party' s national women' s conference believing such
structures to be unnecessary. But after an acrimonious
debate lasting over a period of three years Hallam CLP
created a separate women' s section in 1982 which adopted a
critical stance towards the more traditional role for
women in the Sheffield Labour Party. Hallam women faced
considerable opposition in their demands to change both
local Party attitudes and structures especially from the
small number of local women who had secured leading
positions within the Party and Labour-controlled Council.
149.The Campaign for Democratic Socialism had been founded
in 1959 by members of the Labour Right to campaign for a
revision in the Party' s objectives and to sustain Hugh
Gaitskell in his campaign against the unilateralists.
Tav erne was a senior figure in CDS as its Treasurer. For a
detailed examination of CDS see P. Seyd Factionalism in 
the Labour Party: a case study of CDS (unpublished M.Phil .
thesis, University of Southampton, 1968).
50. A. R. Dickson MPs' Readoption conflicts (Ph. D., Paisley
College of Technology, 1979) , p.2149.
51. loc .cit  .
52. ibid . , p.273.
53. On the advice of Sara Barker the GMC rejected by 23
votes to 16 a proposal that two additional names be added
to the list. ibid., pp.252-253.
5 14. ibid., p.257.
55. ibid., p.263.
56. Confirmation of this growth in local Party membership
has been provided by Leo Beckett, the Lincoln Party
Secretary at this time. Party membership when Geoffrey de
Freita was MP had been approximately two hundred but an
active recruitment campaign in the late-1960s, in which
University undergraduates were paid to canvass and recruit
members in their vacations, combined with a tote scheme
and a thriving Labour Club resulted in an individual
membership of approximately one thousand, seven hundred
and fifty. Interview with Leo Beckett, October 2, 1985.
57. W. Hampton Democracy and Community, p.86.
58. loc.cit.
59. Sheffield Morning Telegraph, September 19714.
-2014-
60. The City Council Leader from 1974 until 1980 was
George Wilson and his successor was David Blunkett. Both
were councillors for Wards in the Brightside constituency.
Other leading members of the Labour Group Executive who
were either members of the Brightside CLP or were
councillors in this constituency were Clive Betts, Peter
Price, Roger Barton and Bill Michie.
61. P. McCormick Enemies of Democracy,
62. ibid., p.143.
63. ibid., p.49.
64. ibid., pp . 176 - 199.
65. ibid., p.57.
p.200.
66. Interviews with Alan Haworth, Philip Bradbury and
Anita Pollock. I am grateful to Alan Haworth for his
detailed comments on this section.
67. Both Alan Haworth and Philip Bradbury were social
science students in their early twenties studying at this
time at the North East London Polytechnic.
68. Reg Prentice welcomed their membership and active
participation as a means of stimulating the local Party.
Interviews with Alan Haworth, Philip Bradbury and Anita
Pollock, May 1984.
69. This quotation and all others in the paragraph are
taken from 'My resignatin as Parliamentary Labour
Candidate for Newham North East: a Memorandum by James
Dickens', May 1979 (in the author's possession).
70. A term used by Eric Heffer. Speech by Eric Heffer to a
'Turning Left' conference, Cambridge, November 2, 1985.
Text kindly provided by Eric Heffer.
71. Labour's vote in Attercliffe has ranged from 77.3%
(1966) to 51.5% (1983). The Conservative vote in Hallam
has ranged from 70.8% (1951) to 148.9% (February 1974).
72. LPACR, 1981 Appendix 7; LPACR, 1983 Appendix 8; LPACR,
1984 Appendix 8.
73. The expulsions included a sitting Sheffield councillor
(Paul Green). The NEC confirmed this expulsion by 14 votes
to 13 in December 1985.
7 14. LPACR, 1981 Appendix 7; LPACR, 1983 Appendix 8.
75. LPACR, 1981 Appendix 7; LPACR 1983 Appendix 8; LPACR,
1984 Appendix 8.
76. Annual Reports of the Yorkshire Region Labour Party,
1982, 1983, 1984.
-205-
77. The figure of 200 companies was chosen because this is
a major campaign slogan of the Militant Group. Neither
Hallam nor Attercliffe CLPs have, or have had, more than a
few supporters of the Militant Group, yet it is clear that
activists do want to see a very considerable public
presence in the economy.
78. Some of the statements were phrased in a negative
manner in order to eliminate any bias that might have
arisen from respondents merely affirming every statement.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DEMOCRACY IN THE PARTY(1): The Campaign for Labour Party
Democracy and the reselection of Labour MPs 
The Labour Left's perspective has always been
wide-ranging, extending beyond specific policy items to
embrace views on the Party's internal distribution of
power. It has always believed that the individual Party
member and affiliated trade union member holds views more
akin to the Labour Left than Labour Right but that these
views are often modified, sometimes even misrepresented,
by a parliamentary and trade union leadership. For this
reason the Labour Left traditionally has stressed the
powers of the extra-parliamentary Party as the institution
in which the 'real' views of the individual Party member
are likely to be voiced. Labour Left experiences of the
Labour Government between 1966 and 1970, followed by
Harold Wilson's declaration of a personal veto over the
NEC proposal to include the nationalisation of twenty five
companies in the 1974 election manifesto, his ignoring of
Party opinion in 1975 concerning membership of the EEC,
and the performance of the Labour Government from 1976
onwards, fuelled their demands that the extra-
parliamentary Party should play a more positive role in
Party affairs and, in particular, that Labour MPs should
be made more accountable to the CLPs.
We have considered in the previous chapter the
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moves made by some CLPs to sack their MPs following a
slight easing of the Party rules in 1970. However, there
was a growing demand, kindled by the experiences of
Lincoln, Sheffield and Newham Party members, that the
rules should be changed to ensure a regular selection
procedure during the lifetime of every Parliament. It is
worth noting in passing that a leading figure in the
Labour Left in the 1950s, Dick Crossman, described a
similar proposal to make Labour MPs more accountable to
their CLPs as "impracticable" and "insanely dangerous".(1)
The fact that a successful campaign could be mounted in
the 1970s to secure the introduction of an automatic,
mandatory reselection procedure in all constituencies
represented by a Labour MP is perhaps a sign of the
changing nature of the Labour Left - namely, less
deferential to parliamentarians and less dominated by
parliamentarians.
The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy: origins and 
purpose
We believe that policy decisions reached by
Annual Conference should be binding on the
Parliamentary Labour Party and undertake to
secure the implementation of this principle.
(Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, Statement
of Aims)
The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy
(hereafter CLPD) was first mooted in 1972 by a small group
of people from the Socialist Charter group, who had become
dismayed by the internal disputes within the group which
were primarily the consequence of Trotskyist infiltration.
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It is worth emphasising the point	 that	 Trotskyist
infiltration of the Labour Left was the reason for CLPD's
formation because outside commentators considering the
advance of the Left in the 1970s have treated orthodox and
Trotskyite left as a single entity which was not the case.
CLPD held its first public meeting in 1973 at
the Labour Party conference and announced the support of
ten Labour MPs and sixty individual Party members. From
these small foundations the group grew in support and
influence to the point where six years later at the 1979
Party conference it finally secured what had become its
major objective - an amendment to the Party constitution
establishing automatic reselection procedures in all
constituencies with a Labour MP.
CLPD's object was to ensure that Labour
governments Implemented Party policies as decided by the
annual conference and the NEC, and its initial proposals
were ones intended to make the NEC more accountable to the
Party membership.(2) No mention was made in the original
statement of aims about candidate reselection but after
CLPD's first meeting at the 1973 Party conference it
announced,
In the light of the points raised at Blackpool
and the comments received from CLPs and others,
the sponsors of the Campaign feel that the
statement of aims should be reformulated to
include reference to specific procedures which
would ensure a closer link between Labour Party
members and their elected representatives. In
particular we feel that we must take account of
the strongly urged proposal for automatic re-
selection conferences in Labour-held
parliamentary seats....(3)
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As outlined in the previous chapter the Labour
Party conference had approved in 1970 an NEC
recommendation that the rules concerning dismissal of a
Labour MP by a constituency party be modified. It was
under these new rules that Party members in Lincoln,
Sheffield Brightside, Blyth, Newham North East,
Hammersmith North, and Liverpool Edge Hill had challenged
and rejected their Labour MP.
CLPD argued that these rules should be altered
on grounds of principle and practice. The principled
opposition to the existing procedure was that it protected
the parliamentarian to an undue degree from accountability
to the Party membership. The introduction of an automatic
reselection procedure would necessitate that the incumbent
MP would take seriously the opinion of the Party
membership as recorded within the CLP and at the Party
conference.
Accountability of MPs would... end the fruitless
confrontations between Annual Conference and
Parliamentary Labour Party. Under the present
arrangements there is no way the Conference can
effectively influence the Parliamentary Labour
Party. By its very nature Conference can, as a
rule, do no more than lay down the broad
outlines of policies. It has no machinery to
ensure that its policy of recommendations are
acted on. However, the individual accountability
of each MP to a regularly-held selection
conference, backed up by the possibility of
replacement, can bring about this fundamental
change which no Conference can accomplish.(4)
CLPD wanted to reduce Labour MPs' security of tenure
believing that insecurity would concentrate their mind on
the commitments made at Party conferences.
It is the relative independence of the
Parliamentary Labour Party, rooted in the almost
automatic readoption of Labour MFt, which makes
-210-
it easy for Labour governments to abandon Labour
Party policies. The only way to undermine this
independence and to make MPs more mindful of
party decisions is to reduce their security of
tenure. Mandatory reselection would achieve
this .(5)
What CLPD does not consider in these early
statements is the order of priorities in the event of a
difference of opinion between a CLP and the Party
conference. To whom then would the Labour MP owe his or
her loyalties? CLPD statements assume that the CLP and the
Party conference will be in accord. If this is the case
then should the MP obey conference decisions? It is
unclear whether CLPD allows any room for the Labour MP's
independent opinion. CLPD's statement of aims, quoted at
the beginning of this section, states	 that	 annual
conference decisions should be "binding on the
Parliamentary Labour Party" and the CLPD Newsletter,
quoted above, states the need to "ensure" that annual
conference recommendations "are acted upon", whereas the
second Newsletter quoted only stated the need to make MPs
"more mindful of party decisions".
By 1981 CLPD is clearer on this question. The
first CLPD Bulletin in 1981 discusses whether MPs have a
duty to exercise their own judgement even when this will
lead them to take a contrary view to the annual conference
and it concludes that
No one, in fact, denies them this right. All
that is expected of them is that they should be
able to justify their decisions to those who
selected them.(6)
Chris Mullins and Charlotte Atkins, 	 in	 a
pamphlet written for CLPD, adopt a similar position
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arguing that
The purpose of mandatory reselection is to
establish an open and honest relationship
between the MP and his or her constituency
party...(7)
In	 their view the MP must be given the time and
opportunity to discuss political issues with the CLP
membership and thus develop a close relationship. They
stress that the CLP needs to behave in as responsible a
manner as the MP and state
Accountability is a two-way process which
confers responsibility on the party as well as
the MP.(8)
Michael Meacher, a prominent campaigner for
reselection, has written
MPs are persons with privileged access to inside
information, personal knowledge of the leaders,
measured judgement of events built on long
experience, and (it is to be hoped) a degree of
competent leadership, and that these assets and
qualities should be permitted to be used to the
full, subject to regular contact and genuine
consultation with those whom they represent, and
subject above all in the end to being held to
account for the way that these special
privileges have been exercised.(9)
Others on the Left but not necessarily leading
members of CLPD regard the MP as no more than a delegate
of the CLP, the assumption being made that the CLP and the
annual conference would be of the same opinions.(10)
The ambivalence concerning the role of the MP
and the relationship between the annual conference and the
CLP caused some leading figures on the left of the Party
in the 1950s and 1960s, with a long tradition 	 of
parliamentary rebellion, to vigorously oppose CLPD.
Michael Foot was one who had been sustained in his
rebellions against the Party leadership by his local Party
-212-
- first, Devonport and, then, Ebbw Vale - and did not take
kindly to the notion that he should act as a delegate of
the Party conference.
The pragmatic argument used by CLPD against the
existing procedures for sacking an MP was that they were
cumbersome in the sense that the process took time during
which internal party conflict was exacerbated and the
media was provided with the opportunities for hostile
coverage of the constituency party activists. One person
actively involved in the reselection saga in Sheffield
Brightside commented:
...I can assure you it is an experience I would
not like to recommend to any of you here. It is
a very lengthy drawn-out procedure, one which
leaves the management committee to come under
extreme fire and stress from the press and the
people. Dirt is thrown around, people
	 are
accused, you cannot walk down the streets
without people accusing you of being Marxists,
International Socialists; everything is thrown
at you. It is a procedure that goes on far too
long, it is something that could happen to
anyone here. If you find yourself unsatisfied
with your local MP and you have the problem of
trying to replace him, believe me, the job is
monumental and the stress one puts on one's
officers is really too much.(11)
Yet the sitting MP in Sheffield Brightside, Eddie
Griffiths, had attracted less media attention and support
than that given to either Dick Taverne in Lincoln or Reg
Prentice in Newham North East! CLPD's argument was that by
establishing an automatic procedure a great deal of the
hostile media coverage would be dissolved because all
constituency	 parties	 with	 a	 Labour	 MP would be
reconsidering their representatives sometime in the life
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of each Parliament and the process would not immediately
appear as a direct vote of no-confidence in any one
person.
Before examining the main developments within
the Party over reselection it is necessary to
	 say
something	 about the nature of CLPD. What was this
organisation? And who were its leaders?
CLPD: organisation and leadership
We have already made reference to the origins of
CLPD as a group of people, small in number who, in
response to the Trotskyist takeover of Socialist Charter,
held a fringe meeting at the 1973 Party conference which
attracted the interest of sixty individual Party members,
three members of the NEC (Frank Allaun, Joan Lestor and
Joan Maynard) and a further eight Labour MPs (Norman
Atkinson, Lewis Carter Jones, Eric Heffer, Neil Kinnock,
Edward Milne, Stan Orme, Jim Sillars and Dennis
Skinner) .(12) Brenda Brett and Sid Hiett, as organiser and
secretary respectively, were the two who guided it through
its first months.
In 1974 the group adopted a	 more	 formal
structure with a defined membership, an elected executive
and an annual general meeting, a rather 	 surprising
development	 considering
	 the	 vulnerability	 of such
structures to organised infiltration and the recent
experience of the founders. Two forms of membership were
created, individual and affiliated, but in order not to
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transgress the Party constitutional rules restricting the
establishment of a branch- based membership organisation,
both categories were deemed to be supporters . (13 )
Membership figures rev eal a relatively small
number in the group until 1 978 after which it rose
considerably to a peak in 1982 since when it has declined,
although membership today is still larger than in the
early part of the 1970s.  
Table 1 
MEMBERSHIP OF CLPD:1974-1984(14) 
Individual
members
Indiyidual(f)
subscription
Affiliated members
CLPs branches
CLP Trade Union
branches
Trade Union
Other* Others2
1974 60 1.50	 4 1 0 0 1
1975 140 1.50	 21 5 1 0 5
1976 248 1.50	 47 18 8 12 9
1977 305 2.00/2.503	 74 32 25 14 28
1978 289 2.00/2.50	 75 34 47 30 28
1979 443 2.00/2.50	 77 37 85 49 46
1980 807 3.00/3.50
	
107 81 112 49 51
1981 1016 3.00/3.50	 118 88 113 68 51
1982 1203 4.00/4.50	 153 103 105 55 27
1983 1081 4.00/4.50	 97 88 91 59 19
1984 668 5.00/6.00	 101 60 77 50 10
* e.g. Shop Steward committee
2 includes Co-operative branches, young socialist branches and University/
Polytechnic Labour Clubs
' individuals/couples
A similar picture of the group' s activities and
support is rev ealed in its finances. A considerable
growth occurs until 1 982 by which date the group' s income
was over three and a half times, and the group' s
expenditure almost four times, the 1977 figure : but since
then a decline has set in.
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Table 2 
CLPD FINANCES (INCOME AND EXPENDITURE): 1977-1984 (15)
Income Expenditure Balance
1977-1978 3,968 14,179 -211
1978-1979 5,738 4,961 +777
1979-1980 10,539 10,075 +464
1980-1981 14,063 16,661 -2,598
1981-1982 14,578 13,841 +737
1982-1983 14,493 16,071 -1,578
1983-1984 11,656 11,000 +656
The bulk of CLPD's income has come from
individual subscriptions and donations from trade unions,
the London Co-operative retail society, the Claverton
Peace Trust, and individuals. By the end of 1984 CLPD had
accumulated a deficit of £2,300 owed to its bankers and to
its Secretary.
CLPD has never been an organisation of left
'super-stars', namely prominent left parliamentarians, nor
has it been an organisation whose main mode of operation
has been the well-publicised public meeting. Rather than
platform speakers with success measured in terms of column
inches or broadcast times, it has been activists working
the duplicator, distributing information and guidance to
other supporters around the country, with success measured
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in 'model' resolutions and amendments.
Some Labour MPs have taken titular roles as
President and Vice-President(16) but the work has been
done by the elected Executive. CLPD's Executive has grown
considerably during its lifetime until in the 1980s it
included over 20 specific posts(17), six without any
specific responsibilities, six co-opted members, and a
further number of regional representatives. It was a very
large body and in order that no one might be attracted
solely by any notion of prestige of office the CLPD
constitution stipulates that all executive members have to
undertake "at least three hours work a week on Campaign
work"(18), and the annual report of the executive details
the time individuals have spent at the group's
headquarters assisting in the work.(19) Monthly executive
meetings have been tightly structured (perhaps not
surprising considering the size) with the times stipulated
for discussion of topics which have included such regular
matters as the group's 'model' resolutions and amendments
for the Party's annual conferences and regional
conferences, the strategy for mobilising trade union
support, the group's financial affairs and publicity
matters.
Over an eleven year period the personnel
involved has fluctuated but certain people have been
prominent throughout its lifetime. Vladimir and Vera Derer
were founder members and it is from their house that the
group's activities have been directed. Vladimir Derer
replaced Sid Hiett as Secretary in 19714 and has held the
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post continuously since. Victor Schonfield has been the
group' s Treasurer since 1975 and has been one of the major
figures in developing friendly links with the trade
unions. Peter Willsman first joined CLPD in 1976, soon
became a 'key person' on the Executive and by the late-
19703 had become a leading figure. These four people have
worked closely together and have been prominent over a
longer period than anyone else. Francis Prideaux is
another who has had as long a commitment and involvement ;
for a time however in the early 1980s, when the group was
seriously divided along both political and personal lines,
he was one who differed from the Derer group. Other people
who have played a leading role at times have been Steve
Boding ton , Chris Mullins, Reg Race, Andy Harris, Jon
Lan sman , John B1 ox am , Walter Wolfgang, Heather Gaebler, ,
Mandy Moore, Frances Morrell and Anne Pettifor. . With the
exception of' Vladimir and Vera Derer, , Steve Boding ton and
Walter Wolfgang the CLPD leadership has been young with
most of' the people in their thirties at the time of the
group' s major impact. Furthermore they are overwhelmingly
products of higher education.
Until	 1 981 a considerable degree of unity
prevailed within the group as it fought the Party
leadership on the specific issue of automatic reselection
of MPs. Vladimir Derer has written that "until about 1981
CLPD was a broad alliance whose membership encompassed
almost the whole of the Labour Left spectrum and even
beyond" .( 2 0 ) However, after securing its prime objectives
of automatic reselection , the group suffered from serious
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divisions and organised factionalism became a prominent
feature of its own activities. We will return to these
divisions later but first we need to examine the main
developments on the question of the reselection of Labour
MPs since it is both a technical and a complex subject.
Debates and decisions on the reselection of Labour MPs 
The issue of the automatic reselection of Labour
MPs was first debated at the 1974 Party conference. Three
resolutions to the 1973 Conference calling for a change in
the rules had been remitted to and considered by the NEC
in its overall review of Party structure. It reported to
the 1974 conference that the constitutional provisions for
removal of a Labour MP were adequate and therefore
required no amendment.(21) Ken Coates moved what became
known as 'the Rushcliffe hnendment' requiring "that every
constituency party shall hold a selection conference once
at least in the lifetime of every Parliament."(22) Ian
Mikardo, on behalf of the NEC, recommended rejection of
the amendment arguing that whilst CLPs should have the
right to reject their MP such a procedure already existed
- as used by Lincoln and Sheffield Brightside - and the
procedure should be made no easier. He argued that
"divorce should never be easy, because divorce is a last
resort".(23) The Rushcliffe hmendment was lost by
3,260,000 to 2,044,000 votes.
In the following two years CLPD attempted to
reopen	 the	 issue. Twelve CLPs submitted conference
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resolutions on the subject in 1975 and forty in 1976 but
on both occasions the Conference Arrangements Committee
ruled them out of order under the 'three year rule' .(25)
Emergency	 resolutions	 at	 the 1975 and 1976 Party
conferences challenging these Conference Arrangements
Committee rulings were deemed out of order and at the 1976
conference a reference back of the Conference Arrangements
Committee report, a means of challenging this ruling, was
lost by 3,906,000 to 2,280,000 votes.(26)
At the 1977 Party conference the 'three year
rule' could no longer be invoked on this subject of
automatic reselection and sixty-seven CLPs submitted the
proposed CLPD constitutional amendment.(27) On this
occasion CLPD's desire to debate the topic was again
thwarted by the Party's procedural rules, although in this
case	 the rule was one approved by the 1968 Party
conference of which CLPD was clearly unaware. The '1968
rule' was that constitutional amendments should be
referred automatically to the NEC for consideration and
report back to the following Party conference for debate.
Clearly this ruling was disadvantageous to CLPD in that it
delayed the matter for a year: further, that on the basis
of previous NEC attitudes, the report back was likely to
be hostile to the proposed amendment; and finally that the
debate on this topic at the following year's Party
conference would be structured as part of the NEC Report
thereby giving the NEC some political initiative which
might make CLPD's task more difficult. For these reasons
the '1968 rule' was challenged by moving the reference
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back of the Conference Arrangements Committee Report but
this was lost by 5,154,000 to 1,217,000 votes.(28) Rather
than have a debate on a specific constitutional amendment
CLPD had to make do at the 1977 Party conference with a
debate on a general resolution calling on the NEC to amend
the Party's rules on reselection and to insert a new
clause in the Party Constitution establishing automatic
reselection. From CLPD's point of view what also made this
debate unsatisfactory was that this general resolution was
moved by Ray Apps from Brighton Kamptown, a supporter of
the Militant Group and the resolution's wording reflected
Militant's views. CLPD and the Militant Group both agreed
on the principle of reselection but were divided over the
strategy. Militant's position was that the Party's rules
should contain both the existing procedure for removal of
a Labour MP, as invoked in Lincoln and Sheffield
Brightside, and the proposed automatic procedure in order
that instant accountability of an MP could be maintained
by invoking the existing procedure at any time over any
issue if the CLP desired in addition to the automatic
procedures being invoked sometime in the life of every
parliament. The disagreement over tactics bedevilled the
campaign throughout this period and was used by CLPD's
opponents who placed great emphasis upon the Militant
position.
At the NEC meeting immediately prior to the 1977
Party conference, at which it determined its attitude
towards the resolutions on the final agenda, it voted by
15 to 13 votes to accept the principle of automatic
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reselection but to advise the conference to remit the
resolution. The opponents of the principle of automatic
reselection demanded a card vote in order to register
their opposition but remittance was carried by 4,858,000
to 1,560,000 votes.(29) In the course of his speech on
behalf of the NEC Ian Mikardo gave an undertaking that,
...We shall put down at next year's Annual
Conference	 all	 the	 amendments	 to	 the
constitution necessary to provide automatic
reselection in the way and in the sense that the
sponsors of those 60-odd resolutions want. I do
not think there is the least chance of the
Executive reneging on that undertaking.(30)
Such a clear commitment from Ian Mikardo
appeared to imply that CLPD's campaign on the particular
issue of automatic reselection had reached a successful
conclusion but at the NEC Organisation committee meeting
in December the Party's National Agent submitted a paper
asking for certain guidance in drafting rule amendments on
this issue. Some of the National Agent's questions were
concerned with technicalities such as whether reselection
should be carried out by the GMC or at a meeting of a
large number of individual Party members, what should
happen in the event of a snap general election, and should
both automatic and extraordinary reselection be included
in the rules. However, the National Agent's first question
to the committee revealed that Ian Mikardo's public
commitment was not being honoured and that there was
lingering opposition to automatic reselection procedures
because it asked:
(a) Should a Selection Conference be mandatory in
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all constituencies where there is a sitting
Member of Parliament (except where the Member
of Parliament has announced an intention to
retire), or
(b) Should the Constituency Labour Party have an
option either
(i) to reselect the Member of Parliament
without a Selection Conference with
other nominees, or
(ii) to hold a Selection Conference with
the full procedure, or
(iii) should each Constituency Labour Party
hold a special General Committee meeting
to first consider whether or not the
Member of Parliament be reselected and,
if not selected, the full procedure
be set in motion?(31)
As a consequence of these questions from the
National Agent the NEC established a Working Party in
January 1978
(a)	 To consider the questions set out in the paper
prepared by the National Agent and other
relevant questions
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(b)	 In accordance with the answers to these ques-
tions to consider what amendments to the Party
Constitution and Rules should be proposed.(32)
This working party contained thirteen members, including
four from the NEC Organisation Committee (Bryan Stanley,
John Cartwright, Eric Heffer, and Ian Mikardo), three from
the PLP (Sydney Irving, George Park and Jo Richardson),
two trade union representatives (Moss Evans and Terry
Duffy), one representative each from the Party Agents
( Bill Alston) , the Parliamentary candidates ( Bernard
Kissen) and the Co-operative Party (David Wise) and,
finally, Ray Apps representing the CLP which moved the
resolution. The Working Party was evenly divided between
Left and Right although the Right was likely to be in a
majority because of the disagreements on the Left over
strategy. The final report of the working party revealed
this division on the Left with three - Eric Heffer, Ian
Mikardo and Moss Evans - agreeing to a mandatory meeting
of the C LP to consider whether to invoke the full
reselection procedures or not which contradicted the
commitment made by Ian Mikardo at the	 1978	 Party
conference. These three aligned themselves with the
majority of the working party by rejecting the idea of
automatic reselection procedures in every constituency
with a Labour MP but offering CLPs the opportunity for
reselection if they desired. Three members of the working
party signed a minority	 report	 reaffirming	 their
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commitment to automatic reselection procedures together
with the retaining of	 the	 extraordinary
	 dismissal
procedures already provided in the Party's rules.(33)
CLPD's dilemma following circulation of the
Working Party report to all the Party's affiliated bodies
in May 1978 was whether to maintain its original demand,
as advocated in the sixty seven resolutions to the 1977
Party conference, for an automatic reselection procedure
to be invoked once in the lifetime of each Parliament,
whether	 to	 support	 the	 compromise proposal of a
reselection procedure where demanded by a CLP, or whether
to support the minority signatories of the report who
demanded both the automatic procedure once in the lifetime
of each Parliament but also the retention of the powers to
dismiss an MP at other times during the life of a
Parliament. CLPD's position was made more difficult by the
fact that the NEC Report to the 1978 Party conference did
not contain the amendment to the constitution proposed in
1977 by the sixty seven organisations which had been
automatically remitted to the NEC for report back the
following year and therefore no advance warning was given
to affiliated bodies that the debate at the conference
would also include this original option. At the time that
many affiliated bodies were determining their attitude on
this issue it appeared as if the choice was between the
majority and minority positions contained in the working
party report and it was very likely that the majority
position, containing as it did the support of both Right
and Left members of the working party and two leading
conference majority for this view and
possibility of automatic reselection.
considerable CLPD pressure on the
thus
This
NEC to advise the
ruling out the
necessitated
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trade union officials - Moss Evans and Terry Duffy - would
prevail. Later the NEC admitted a mistake in not including
the original constitutional amendment in its report to the
Party conference and a supplementary report was published
for conference delegates.
CLPD decided to stick by its original position
but then had to ensure that in the vote to be taken at the
1978 Party conference its original constitutional
amendment be taken before the NEC recommendation which
incorporated the majority view of the working party
because the TGWU and the AUEW, supporters of the principle
of automatic reselection, would vote for the compromise
proposal if that was taken first, thereby leading to a
Conference Arrangements Committee of the desired order of
business. This pressure succeeded in ensuring that one of
the CLPD-sponsored amendments was voted on first at the
end of the debate.
The debate itself was organised in a way that
enabled conference delegates to choose one of three
approaches on this subject, either the CLPD view of
automatic reselection, or the NEC view of a mandatory CLP
meeting to decide whether to proceed with the reselection
procedure, or the commitment to both automatic and
extraordinary reselection as reflected in the minority
position on the working party. The CLPD position was made
even more difficult by the fact that the NEC spokesman
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spoke twice, introducing the NEC proposals and summing up
the entire debate, that he suggested that the CLPD
position would discriminate against union-sponsored
candidates and that he claimed the NEC proposals to be
more democratic because they gave the CLPs the democratic
right	 to	 choose	 whether	 to reselect or not.(34)
Furthermore, whilst opposition from the ranks of the PLP
was	 not	 unexpected,	 two opposing contributions in
particular posed a serious challenge. First, Joe Ashton, a
member of the Tribune Group, appealed to trade unionists
by arguing that automatic reselection would eliminate the
rights of an MP to some form of job security, that it
would result in fewer manual workers in the PLP, and that
it would cause splits in approximately twenty five
constituencies. Second, the Chief Whip, speaking in the
debate very much as the PLP's shop steward stated:
I am very much concerned about the effect of
automatic reselection, and you must look at
this. Labour Members are subjected to far more
strain in their job than Tories. The average
Labour constituency is very much further away
from Westminster. There is a great deal of
travel. Most represent urban areas with very
great problems, so there is a great deal of
constituency work, both individual and in the
constituency, on the wide range of problems. The
uncertainty of an MP's life is made very much
worse if he does not know what his position is
going to be. What is going to happen when local
parties put pressure on a Member?(25)
Notwithstanding the procedural difficulties that
had confronted CLPD and the political opposition to its
proposal which had been voiced during the debate, pre-
debate tallies of trade union and CLP support appeared to
suggest the chance of victory but the votes cast by the
AUEW destroyed this possibility.
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The AUEW delegation had considered the issue at
its customary pre-Conference delegation meeting and had
decided by twenty-five votes to twenty-two to support the
CLPD position. Hugh Scanlon, known to be unsympathetic to
this position, recalled the delegation prior to the debate
but again it voted by twenty-five votes to nineteen in
favour of automatic reselection, but the AUEW vote was not
cast in favour of hmendment 1 (the CLPD position) and this
was defeated by 3,066,000 to 2,672,000 votes. Hugh Scanlon
immediately rose on a point of order and claimed that he
had not voted for this amendment because he believed that
another composite resolution was to be voted upon which
incorporated the CLPD position. Scanlon's confusion seems
difficult to accept when the Chairman of the Conference
had made quite clear on three occasions the procedure to
be adopted.(36) As a consequence of Scanlon's failure to
cast the AUEW vote in the manner decided by the
delegation, the vote was then taken on the NEC proposals
which were carried by 4,081,000 to 2,519,000 votes.(37)
It was after this setback that CLPD's commitment
and organisation was most impressive. An inevitable
feeling of dispirited resignation prevailed amongst many
of the supporters of this reform after the Party
Conference with them thinking that the compromise proposal
was at least some form of improvement and also that there
was little chance of overturning this new set of rules.
However, CLPD continued to mobilise active support for the
principle of automatic reselection during the next twelve
months.
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Its campaign was centred	 around	 reopening
discussion on the reselection issue at the 1979 Party
conference. To overcome the hurdle of the 'three year
rule' it had to persuade affiliated organisations to
submit a large number of resolutions to the NEC demanding
reconsideration of the subject, and then a similar large
number of resolutions for the Party conference. In this
campaign it set out to mobilise support within the CLPs
and trade unions, at the regional Party conferences, at
the national Women's conference, at the Go-operative Party
conference, and within the NEC itself.
Three weeks after the annual conference CLPD
sent out a letter to all its individual supporters
advising that they move 'model' resolutions to be sent to
the NEC and the regional conferences asking that the
reselection issue be debated at the 1979 Party conference.
By March 1979 CLPD's efforts had narrowly failed, when the
NEC defeated by eleven votes to ten a proposal from its
Organisation Committee that the 'three year rule , be
waived, but the NEC did add the rider that "if branches
and parties continued to show strong support for automatic
reselection, there was still time for it to approach the
Conference Arrangements Committee".(38) By May two
regional conferences - Greater London and the North East -
had passed the CLPD resolutions demanding that the subject
of automatic reselection be again debated at the next
Party conference. When in June the NEC Organisation
Committee again proposed that reselection be debated CLPD
sent out the following letter marked "very urgent" to all
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its individual supporters:
The full NEC will be considering this
recommendation in about two weeks' time and it
is crucial that maximum pressure is brought to
bear on the NEC now. The forces are very evenly
balanced and immediate action is needed... We
therefore ask you to raise that matter as an
emergency at your Trade Union Branch, Labour
Party Branch and/or CLP and urge them to write
immediately to the NEC along the following
lines:
"this Branch/CLP welcomes the recom-
mendation made by the Organisation Sub-
Committee of the NEC that the issues of
Reselection and method of election of Party
leader be placed on the Agenda of the 1979
Annual Conference, and urges the full NEC
to support this recommendation."
...In the past, individual letters to waverers
on the NEC have proved extremely effective. In
the present context this appears to include
Michael Foot, Judith Hart, Lena Jeger, Joan
Lestor and Renee Short. Your help now may make
all the difference.(39)
In July the NEC agreed that the issue should be
debated again at the Party conference although even then
this decision was not to CLPD's complete liking since the
NEC had agreed that the issue should be discussed and not
the constitutional amendments as contained in 'Amendment
Number 1' debated at the 1978 Party conference. Thus CLPD
was likely to be faced with the '1968 rule' on
constitutional change yet again. To meet this twenty-one
CLPs submitted a CLPD 'model' amendment demanding the
waiving of the '1968 rule' in order that the
constitutional change which was proposed in a CLPD 'model'
resolution submitted by twenty CLPs could be debated and,
if passed, implemented in 1979.
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Two composite resolutions were debated at the
Party conference. One, drafted by CLPD, first asked the
conference to waive the '1968 rule' and debate the
constitutional amendments submitted whilst the second
supported the principle of reselection and asked the NEC
to bring forward subsequent constitutional anendments.(40)
This second composite was moved by two members of the
Militant Group and CLPD was worried lest some trade union
leaders with mandates in favour of reselection would
support this composite rather than the first since this
would delay implementation for a further year and give
opponents the opportunity to marshall their forces for
another debate at the 1980 conference. CLPD pressure to
withdraw this composite failed, however, and further
antagonised the relationship between CLPD and Militant,
especially when Militant claimed the success for the
reselection decision after the conference.
Nevertheless even with this division over
tactics the CLPD-sponsored motion was passed by 4,008,000
to 3,039,000 votes(41) and the subsequent vote on the
constitutional amendment was passed by 4,521,000 to
2,356,000 votes.(42) The CLPD campaign on this specific
issue had eventually succeeded six years after the group's
formation and five years after the campaign had been
mounted in a systematic manner.
The adoption of this automatic reselection
procedure did not prove to be the immediate challenge to
incumbent MPs as some members of the PLP feared. Two
problems regarding the procedures to be adopted 	 in
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implementing	 the	 decision	 delayed and limited the
reselection process.
The first problem, a relatively minor technical
hitch, was the advice given to the NEC by its legal
advisers that the 1979 constitutional amendment was
unsatisfactory and required redrafting. Accordingly the
NEC presented a revised amendment before the 1980 Party
conference. This enabled the opponents of mandatory
reselection to debate the subject further in an attempt to
defeat the proposal. One trade union consistent in its
support for the Right - the Association of Professional,
Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) - had a
resolution on the agenda calling for the implementation of
the	 optional	 reselection	 procedure,	 the	 original
compromise proposal recommended by the majority of the
Working Party in 1979 and this was debated at the
conference but the NEC amendment was carried by, 3,798,000
to 3,341,000 votes.()43)
The second problem concerned the guidelines
issued by the Party's national Agent on the conduct of the
reselection procedure which threatened to undermine CLPD's
long and successful campaign. In December 1980 the NEC
Organisation Committee agreed that a short list of one
candidate was permissible, which might enable an incumbent
MP to avoid a contest with other candidates. Intensive
lobbying of the subsequent NEC meeting by CLPD Officers
persuaded a majority of its members that such a procedure
could undermine the element of choice, and thus the
principle of political accountability, which reselection
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offered. So the NEC returned the recommendation to the
Organisation Committee for reconsideration but this sub-
committee reaffirmed its view by six votes to five, with
its Chairman abstaining.(44) Again the NEC referred the
issue back to the Organisation Committee by fourteen votes
to thirteen.(45) After the Organisation Committee
reaffirmed its position for the third time the following
meeting of the NEC decided that "the reselection procedure
should follow the practice normally adopted for ordinary
selection conferences" (46), namely of more than one
person being put forward for consideration. However,
evidence in the following months of constituency Executive
Committees recommending shortlists of one, often under
pressure from the Party's regional organising staff,
prompted the NEC in May 1981 to agree by fifteen votes to
nine that local parties should be advised that it would
not be the normal practice to have a short list of one
when other names had been submitted.(47) CLPD believed
that	 "attempts	 to sabotage reselection through the
'manufacture' of short lists of one" were occurring and
therefore demanded that the NEC be instructed that
"shortlisting shall only be authorised where the number of
nominees makes it necessary."(48)
Eventually this matter was discussed at the 1982
Party conference, and a CLPD-sponsored resolution calling
for the NEC not to endorse candidates selected from
shortlists of one, except where one person alone was
nominated, was overwhelmingly defeated on the NEC's
recommendation.(49)
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CLPD was right to regard this shortlisting
procedure as a means of protecting some incumbent MPs from
a genuine reselection contest(50), nevertheless this was a
relatively minor procedural modification to the principle
of reselection and did nothing to undermine the shift in
power from parliamentarian to Party activist which had
occurred when reselection had been introduced.
Before considering the group's strategy	 in
achieving its success three points of general interest
affecting the Labour Left should be noted. First, the
issue of the mandatory reselection of Labour MPs high-
lighted divisions within the Labour Left which makes it
difficult to write of 'a party within the Party' as an
organised and united segment of opinion. Not all of those
persons normally associated with the Labour Left on
political issues supported the principle of mandatory
reselection.(51) Debates on the topic tended to reveal
these differences of opinion. Perhaps the most striking
example of the tensions that this issue caused within the
Left was on the occasion of the elections for the
constituency section of the NEC in 1978, when Lan Mikardo
a long-time and leading figure in the Labour Left was
replaced by Dennis Skinner. Mikardo had been involved in
attempts to find a compromise position on this issue
whilst Skinner had been a leading spokesman for mandatory
reselection.
Second, this issue revealed the tensions between
the Labour Left inside and outside Parliament. The
initiative on this issue was taken primarily by the extra-
-234-
parliamentary Left. At times this tension became public
as, for example, when the leading figure in the campaign,
Vladimir Derer stated that:
Tribune, like the majority of members of the
Parliamentary Tribune Group, has always been
deeply	 suspicious of the attempt by rank-
and-file Labour Party members to 	 use	 re-
selection	 as	 a	 means	 of	 democratic
accountability.(52)
Third, this issue caused argument within the
extra-parliamentary Left over the strategy to be adopted.
Bitter accusations regarding the tactics of the Militant
Group were made by the CLPD leadership at the Party
conference briefing meetings of 1978 and 1979.(53)
The group's strategy
"Constituency Labour Parties are the fuse and
the Trade Unions are the bomb"
(CLPD Officer in interview with the author)
CLPD strategy was to bring pressure on the Party
leadership by mobilising the dismay of many individual
Party members over the performance of Labour Governments,
by harnessing this dismay to the unease of many trade
unionists at the industrial policies adopted by the Labour
Government from 1976 onwards, and thereby to build up
majority support for its position at the Party conference.
For over six years the main focus of CLPD's campaign was
the annual Party conference. It concentrated upon building
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up commitment within the constituency and trade union
branches which would then be reflected in the debates and
votes at the Party conference. It also put pressure upon
the NEC both to support the principle of automatic
reselection and to determine the conference agendas in a
manner favourable to the group but in order to sustain the
issue and ensure that it was debated at the Party
conference it had to campaign at all levels and in all
segments of the Party.
Constituency Labour Parties
During	 the	 period	 1973 -79 the group was
strikingly successful in persuading a large number of CLPs
to adopt CLPD 'model' resolutions as their annual
submission for the Party conference. CLPD circulated these
'model' resolutions to its individual and affiliated
membership in May of each year leaving the individuals
then to argue the merits of the resolutions in their
respective branches and General Management Committees. A
total of one hundred and thirty one CLPs submitted one or
more CLPD-inspired resolutions sometime between 1975 and
1979 on the specific issue of candidate reselection. The
1977 conference agenda contained the CLPD model resolution
submitted identically by sixty-seven CLPs.
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Table 3 
CLPD-SPONSORED RESOLUTIONS TO LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE(54)
YEAR NUMBER
1975 12
1976 40
1977 67
1978 25
1979 50
CLPD's success in persuading CLPs to submit
these resolutions was remarkable when one considers the
technical nature of the 'model' resolutions which were
unlikely to inspire much emotion or socialist rhetoric
when being debated in competition with other resolutions
at meetings of GMCs called to decide upon their conference
resolution. Furthermore, the fact that the NEC was seen to
be putting forward a compromise in 1978 made the group's
task more difficult and then the fact that this compromise
was approved by the Party conference due to the miscasting
of a vital trade union vote might well have led CLPs to
abandon the issue in 1979. CLPD maintained its pressure
and for the 1979 Party conference twenty one CLPs
submitted the group's model constitutional amendment on
candidate reselection, whilst a further twenty nine CLPs
submitted a general resolution or amendment on the subject
in line with CLPD instructions. In 1979 CLPD's
organisation of motions was crucial because only the
demonstration of CLP's continuing concern with this issue
forced the NEC to reconsider its earlier decision not to
debate the issue again at the conference.
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Trade Unions 
CLPD consistently recognised the importance of
the trade unions in the Labour Party's internal power
structure. It recruited trade unionists as affiliated or
individual members of the group and it attempted to
organise trade union support by means of individual
informal contact with both leading trade union officers
and individual trade unionists as well as more formal
contact with those trade union branches likely to be
sympathetic, and by intensive lobbying at trade union
conferences through fringe meetings and leafletting. The
importance of the group's trade union work is reflected in
the fact that it established a trade union officer on its
Executive Committee and created a Trade Union sub-
committee specifically for the purpose of increasing trade
union contacts and support. This CLPD activity within the
trade union was concerned with winning the votes of the
trade union delegations at the Party conference. The fact
that key trade unions such as the Transport and General
Workers' Union, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers, the National Union of Public Employees and the
National Union of Mineworkers cast votes at the Labour
Party conferences in favour of the principle of automatic
reselection is testimony to the activities of CLPD since
many trade union leaders' initial response on this subject
was to regard it as an internal Party matter of limited
Importance. Other trade unions that cast votes in favour
of the CLPD position were the Association of Scientific,
and Allied Workers
Union (POEU).
Trade
(USDAW) and Office Engineering
union voting behaviour at Labour Party
the Post
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Technical and Managerial Staff (ASTMS), the Technical,
Administrative and Supervisory Section of the AUEW (TASS),
the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers
(NUAAW), the Firebrigades Union (FBU), and the Bakers
Union. Certain trade unions consistently opposed the
group's objectives including the General and Municipal
Workers Union (GMWU), the Electrical, Electronic,
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU), the National
Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the Union of Shop, Distributive
conference is dependent upon a set of influences ranging
from the decisions taken at each individual trade union
conference or in the executive committees down to the
deliberations of the trade union delegations themselves at
the Party conference. The problems faced by CLPD in its
campaign to win trade union support can be highlighted by
the example of the voting behaviour of the NUM delegation
to the 1979 Party conference which decided not to support
a	 procedural
	 motion	 calling
	
for	 a vote on the
constitutional amendments implementing automatic
reselection even though its own union conference had voted
in favour of the principle of reselection at its 1978 and
1979 conferences. Joe Gormley, the NUM President,
convinced the delegation that notwithstanding the union
commitment the procedural motion to by-pass the '1968
rule' should be opposed.
An important contributory factor in winning some
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trade unions' support for the principle of Party democracy
and for the specific proposal of the automatic reselection
of Labour MPs was that the issue of democracy and
accountability of leaders was of immediate relevance in
their own internal affairs. For example, NUPE was one of
the first trade unions to support CLPD and it was involved
in a major reorganisation in 1975 in an attempt to improve
its democratic structure. Democratic accountability of
Labour MPs fitted in well with the new-found enthusiasm
for democratic accountability within the union itself.
It was on the two largest affiliated trade
unions that CLPD concentrated its attention. By
establishing contact with the individual branches of the
TGWU and by the help of sympathisers within the union it
was possible to secure the support of two of the TGWU
regional committees in 1977. At the union's biennial
conference in 1977 six resolutions were submitted in
support of automatic reselection and CLPD sent a member to
lobby delegates throughout the week, but the issue was not
debated due, in part, to the opposition of the union's
General Secretary, Jack Jones. Therefore pressure had to
be put on the union's General Executive Council. CLPD was
in contact with senior officials within the union such as
Moss Evans and Alex Kitson and this strategy of winning
over the officials was assisted by the fact that one of
the CLPD's Vice-Presidents was Walter Greendale, a leading
lay-member of the TGWU. At the 1979 biennial conference
twenty one resolutions on reselection were on the agenda
and this time a debate resulted in the TGWU's commitment
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to support the demands for an automatic reselection
procedure.
CLPD's campaign within the AUEW was aided by the
existence of a well-organised Left faction which was
committed to the principle of greater accountability of
parliamentarians. The split between Left and Right on the
National Committee within this union was close but in 1978
and 1979 a small majority within the AUEW delegation to
the Labour Party conferences was in favour of automatic
reselection.
The annual Party conference 
The culmination of this continuous lobbying
process within all sectors of the extra-parliamentary
Party throughout the year was the 'compositing' advice
given to the organisations sponsoring CLPD 'model'
resolutions and amendments and the advice given to all
sympathetic
	 conference delegates. The first occurred
during September when the Final Agenda for the conference
had been published. From all the resolutions and
amendments CLPD Officers drew up 'model' composites, would
then discuss these in the weeks running up to the
conference with sympathetic organisations from amongst
those who had submitted resolutions or amendments, and
would then be on hand outside the hall in which the
compositing meetings were to take place to offer last-
minute advice.
The CLPD would hold a rally on the Sunday
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afternoon, after the composite resolutions had been agreed
and published, and before the start of conference
proceedings on the Sunday evening or Monday morning. This
rally was a working 'briefing' meeting rather than a star-
studded show, as for example has been the Tribune rally
later in the same week. The meetings have always begun
with one or two NEC representatives (usually Joan Maynard
and Dennis Skinner) giving details of the latest
happenings within the NEC before they departed to the
traditional Sunday afternoon meeting of the NEC. Then it
has been usual for a prominent trade unionist to speak in
order to dispel any feeling among trade union delegates
that Party democracy was purely a matter for the CLPs to
discuss.(55) These first prominent speakers would also
help to attract the large audience which was necessary for
fund-raising purposes. Then, however, it was down to the
real business of briefing delegates on the necessary
action to be taken in dealing with the Conference
Arrangements Committee report on the conference agenda, in
supporting composite resolutions (in particular not to be
trapped into supporting resolutions which might appear to
be supportive but which would undermine the campaign(56),
and in developing the arguments to be used by movers,
seconders and others in support of the resolutions. This
part of the meeting was in the hands of experienced
members of the group. It was well-conducted, specific in
detailed advice and of considerable value, especially to
the new delegates unaware of the pitfalls and dangers of
conference procedure.(57)
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Conclusions
CLPD's Immediate objective was
	 secured	 in
defiance of the Party leadership and the majority of the
Parliamentary Labour Party, in spite of the divisions
within the Labour Left over both the principle of
reselection and the strategy for its achievement, in spite
of the use of procedural devices at the annual Party
conferences by the group's opponents and the breaking of
mandates, intentionally or mistakenly, by certain trade
union leaders in the casting of votes at the annual Party
conferences. In the light of powerful and sustained
opposition the group's success was remarkable and shows
how a group with a specific objective, operating within
the Party at a time when 'greater democracy' drew
widespread support due to the performance of Labour in
Office, could use this prevailing political mood to
maximise its advantage and could succeed so long as it was
willing to organise its support. Vladimir Derer, the
group's secretary, has summed up the success in the
following manner:
...our experience in CLPD has shown that in the
context of the present party structure,
Important advances towards the achievement of
Labour's goals can be made. But an indispensable
condition for such an advance is a massive
pressure by the rank and file. Such pressure
rarely - if ever - emerges spontaneously. A
concerted effort by party activists must act as
a catalyst.(58)
CLPD acted as the catalyst in the move to redistribute
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power between the PLP and the constituency Labour Parties.
What made the success even more remarkable was
that the group managed to overcome the disappointment and
disillusion which occurred after the 1978 Party conference
when Hugh Scanlon miscast the AUEW vote in such a crucial
way as to defeat the proposal for automatic reselection at
the moment when it appeared that group success was likely.
Four reasons can be advanced for CLPD's success.
First, it capitalised on the disillusion widespread within
the Party based upon the belief that the Party leadership
would fail to implement the policies which had been drawn
up by the National Executive Committee and approved by the
Labour Party conferences. This had been the experience
between 1966 and 1970 when the Labour Government ignored
certain key Party conference decisions. This disillusion
was reinforced first by Harold Wilson's decision to
campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 1975 EEC referendum
notwithstanding NEC and Party conference opposition to the
terms of entry into the EEC, and second by decisions taken
from 1976 onwards by the Callaghan Administration,
especially in the fields of public expenditure, employment
and wages policies, which ignored NEC and Party conference
opinion. This disillusion was not confined to any
particular faction or to any particular section of the
Party: it extended beyond the Labour Left and it affected
the trade union movement as well as the constituency
parties.
A second reason for the CLPD success was the
manner in which it capitalised on this general disillusion
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amongst Party members. It used organisational skills in a
manner exceedingly rare amongst Labour factions. It should
be noted that CLPD depended upon the dedicated efforts of
a very few individuals with no professional, full-time
assistance. Whereas other groups on the Labour Left have
secured grants from the Rowntree Trust to pay for office
and secretarial services CLPD was turned down by this
charitable trust on three occasions - the reason given was
that the group was too successful! Even with limited
resources the group's output was very impressive and no
other group in the Party during this period organised in
as consistent a manner as CLPD. Only one other group, the
Campaign for Democratic Socialism, on the Labour Right,
compares in organisational ability in the history of
Labour factionalism and that group had the I
support of the Party leadership and the
Transport House.
A third factor in explaining CLPD's success was
the	 Northdevelopment of the dispute between the Newham
CLP and its Member of Parliament, Reg Prentice,East	 which
dragged on throughout 1975 and 1976 and which added force
to the group's arguments. The fact that there was
considerable media attention on the dispute, the great
bulk of it supportive of Prentice and critical of the
constituency Party officers, the fact that a small group
of people used the Law Courts in an attempt to defend
Prentice, the fact that the Party Leader along with one
hundred and eighty members of the PLP signed a letter in
defence of Prentice whilst Roy Jenkins and 	 Shirley
Party machine at
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Williams spoke at a public meeting in the constituency in
support of Prentice, highlighted the issue of reselection
and	 helped	 crystallise	 the arguments in a manner
favourable to the group since it appeared that a sizeable
segment of the PLP showed little regard for the views of
the Party membership but preferred to support an MP whose
opinions were hostile on certain issues to those being
expressed as Party	 opinion	 at	 the	 Labour	 Party
conferences. CLPD constantly suggested that the political
behaviour of members of the PLP should be	 closely
scrutinised and they should be regularly accountable to
Party activists for their behaviour. Clearly the
experience of the Prentice dismissal and his subsequent
declaration of support for the Conservative Party so soon
after being a Labour Minister had a considerable political
impact	 within	 the	 Labour	 Party upon which CLPD
capitalised.
A fourth factor contributing to CLPD's success
was the strategy of Labour's Right. Although CLPD officers
were associated with the Labour Left the campaign drew on
wider support. CLPD was assisted in drawing this support
by the behaviour of the Right in the PLP which appeared to
be	 arrogant	 and	 disdainful	 of constituency party
activists: this manner was exemplified in its most
explicit form by the behaviour of Reg Prentice. Others,
whilst not going so far as Prentice in refusing to meet
his constituency delegations and publicly disassociating
himself from his constituency party activists' opinions,
nevertheless made clear their belief that constituency
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party activists were unpresentative of political opinion
and should not be taken too seriously.
The Right also made a serious miscalculation in
opposing the demand for automatic reselection. For a long
time in this battle the Right opposed any alteration to
the procedures for reselection. For example, the Campaign
for Labour Victory argued that automatic reselection would
result in MPs becoming "the puppets of a few party
activists"(59) and Denis Healey suggested that they would
become "grovelling zombies... (subject) to the arbitrary
dictates of self-appointed caucuses	 which meet
	 in
secret".(60)	 The Right appeared to be limiting the
democratic rights of the individual Party member and it
only argued in favour of extending the numbers
participating in CLP selection/reselection conferences to
all individual Party members when it appeared that it was
losing the struggle. But the right could have afforded to
support the reform since party activists had in the past
displayed only a limited concern with the ideological
position of the contestants and rather more concern with
the contestants' political 	 experience	 and	 speaking
abilities.(61) More concern was being shown in the
nineteen seventies with contestants' political opinions
but it was possible for a conscientious and responsible MP
of either Right or Left, intent on maintaining good
relations with his/her constituency party activists, to
succeed at a reselection meeting.(62)
Victory was achieved because of a broad base of
Party support, Left organisational skills and right wing
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arrogance and ineptitude. This successful campaign had
taken six years but the momentum for further Party reform
was now considerable, fuelled by the Labour Government' s
policies, the tenor of Labour'ss election manifesto and its
election campaign, and Labour' s subsequent election
defeat. This momentum resulted in the creation of a
powerful Left alliance demanding further Party reforms and
a campaign to remove the Party Deputy Leader, Denis Healey
- a senior figure on the Party Right closely identified
with the Labour Government' s policies - and elect in his
place Tony Benn .
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